

## **Whistleblowing as a Catalyst for Diplomacy: The Cablegate Case and its Diplomatic Impact on USA-Pakistan Relations**

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*“Why am I going? Who Allows this Journey?” Divine Comedy (Canto II, 31) Dante Alighieri*

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## Resumo

O fenómeno do whistleblowing tornou-se impossível de ignorar ao longo dos últimos anos, nomeadamente pela comunidade internacional. Casos altamente mediáticos como o de Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning e Catherine Gun, trouxeram para a arena política internacional novos desafios que puseram em causa relacionamentos bilaterais e multilaterais, assim como a seriedade da política externa de vários atores. O conceito do whistleblowing adquire várias dimensões relativamente às suas consequências, podendo estas dar-se ao nível interno de um país como ao nível externo. O caso acima mencionado de Chelsea Manning, foi um dos casos de whistleblowing mais paradigmáticos e de enorme extensão de conteúdo. Dada a turbulência causada, pela disponibilização de material classificado, neste caso sobre as visões e orientações políticas dos EUA, não se poderia esperar algo diferente que não fosse o estrangulamento, mesmo que por pouco tempo, das relações externas entre os EUA e os países envolvidos. Um dos países em causa, foi o Paquistão. Apesar das extensas pesquisas sobre relações diplomáticas, poucos estudos foram elaborados sobre os impactos de eventos de whistleblowing nas relações bilaterais, sendo que as abordagens existentes envolvem, sobretudo, os media e a perceção do público face ao evento. Dada a ausência de investigação sobre outras perspetivas acerca do tema, este estudo aborda a questão: Como o evento de whistleblowing do Cablegate influenciou as relações diplomáticas entre os Estados Unidos e o Paquistão, aplicando o indicador diplomático do modelo DIME para avaliar o impacto nas dinâmicas diplomáticas.

**Palavras-chave:** Whistleblowing; Impacto Diplomático; EUA - Paquistão; Cooperação.





## **Abstract**

The phenomenon of whistleblowing has become increasingly difficult to ignore in recent years, particularly within the international community. Highly publicized cases, such as those of Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, and Catherine Gun, have introduced new challenges to the global political arena, questioning bilateral and multilateral relationships, as well as the seriousness of various actors' foreign policies. The concept of whistleblowing encompasses different dimensions regarding its consequences, which can be both internal and external to a country. The case of Chelsea Manning stands out as one of the most paradigmatic examples of whistleblowing, with a vast range of content. Given the turmoil caused by the release of classified material regarding U.S. political views and orientations, one could not expect anything other than a temporary strangulation of foreign relations between the U.S. and the involved countries. One of the concerned countries was Pakistan. Despite extensive research on diplomatic relations, few studies have investigated the impacts of whistleblowing events on bilateral relations, with existing approaches primarily focusing on media coverage and public perception of the events. Due to the lack of research into other perspectives on the topic, this study addresses the question: How has the Cablegate whistleblowing event influenced diplomatic relations between the United States and Pakistan, applying the diplomatic indicator of the DIME model to assess the impact on diplomatic dynamics.

**Keywords:** Whistleblowing; Diplomatic Impact; USA - Pakistan; Cooperation.



# Index

Acknowledgements .....	i
Resumo.....	iii
Abstract .....	v
Introduction .....	1
1.1. Research Justification .....	2
1.2. Methodology .....	3
1.3. Model Development.....	4
CHAPTER 1.....	7
Whistleblowing Contextualization - The Cablegate Case .....	7
CHAPTER 2.....	9
Revision of Literature - The Whistleblowing Theories and Concepts.....	9
2.1. External Whistleblowing.....	12
CHAPTER 3.....	15
Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and Whistleblowing .....	15
3.2. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy.....	19
CHAPTER 4.....	27
Threads of Trust: The Journey of USA and Pakistan's Diplomatic Ties .....	27
4.1. Historical Timeline.....	27
4.2. Cooperation: Protocols, Treaties, and Official State Visits from 2001 - 2010 .....	36
4.3. Cablegate Event: Bradley Manning .....	39
4.4. Cooperation: Protocols, Treaties, and Official State Visits from 2011 to 2020 ...	41
4.4. Data Collection Results: 2001-2020 .....	43
Conclusion.....	45
Sources .....	49
Bibliographic References .....	50

Attachments..... 56



## Introduction

As Aristotle said, the human being is a political animal, and it reveals the social and political organization as it needs to belong in a community. This communality, "a political community, he writes in the *Politics*, is a composite, comprised of a multitude of citizens (Caleb J. Basnett, 2016:7) and a multitude of relations between them. One community communicates with the other and engages in a bilateral or multilateral relation, promoting an external policy towards the outside of their frontiers of action, as established in <sup>1</sup>the Peace of Westphalia, which achieved the status of a founding moment of today's political system of sovereign states. That community needs transparent politics, much like ancient Greece, where political activities were conducted in an open and free environment, promoting participation, accountability, and transparency. The latter became a challenge when politics began to be carried out behind closed doors, leaving civil society unaware of the state's approach to national and external policy. This lack of transparency increased the gap between the state and society, allowing the circulation of information and speculation about the conduct of external policy.

Digital and technological evolution came to disturb the power of the state to conduct secret politics, and the actual conjuncture of diplomacy and relations, bilateral or multilateral, has several challenges. One of these challenges is the whistleblowing phenomenon, which allows the revelation of unknown documents about the conduct of politics and reveals it to society, mainly through media channels. The question emerges about what form of transparency is being fostered by the web. The lies "demonstrate how the long-running battle between governments to maintain confidentiality, and journalists to expose wrongdoing and scandal, continues behind the rhetoric of openness and accountability." (Garland, R., 2015: 1). This ongoing battle continues to pose challenges in today's interactions between three actors: state, media, and civil society.

This dissertation explores a specific instance in the ongoing conflict between the state and the media concerning transparency and accountability in government politics: the Cablegate

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<sup>1</sup> Almeida, J. M. The Peace of Westphalia, the history of the modern state system and the theory of international relations. *London School of Economics*. Retrieved from [https://www.ipris.org/files/18/C\\_18\\_A\\_paz\\_de\\_Westfa\\_lia\\_a\\_histo\\_ria\\_do\\_sistema\\_de\\_Estados\\_moderno.pdf](https://www.ipris.org/files/18/C_18_A_paz_de_Westfa_lia_a_histo_ria_do_sistema_de_Estados_moderno.pdf).

case. Orchestrated by Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks—a digital platform designed to challenge state secrecy—this case reveals and illustrates U.S. foreign policy toward various nations and organizations. One of the countries targeted was Pakistan. Although the classified content was not about military operations or extremely sensitive topics, as discussed further in this dissertation, it was classified, nonetheless. They were not meant to be of public awareness.

Furthermore, the Cablegate Case highlighted the dilemma between diplomacy, foreign policy, and secrecy. This complex triangle characterizes the complexity of conducting foreign policy and coping with secrecy and transparency simultaneously. The conduct of foreign policy differs depending on how we theorize it; in this case, realism and liberalism will be the glasses with which the diplomatic impact will be analyzed through the history of the bilateral relations between the two countries. Analyzing the impact of such events as the Cablegate is of high importance, bearing in mind that secrecy intrinsically exists in the conduct of foreign policy, and there is a need to differentiate what is necessary for foreign policy to be secret and what is only a way of camouflaging wrong behaviors within the state environment.

## **1.1. Research Justification**

The release of diplomatic cables in the WikiLeaks Cablegate scandal of 2010 had far-reaching consequences, particularly on U.S.-Pakistan relations. While significant research has focused on the public perception and media coverage of the event, there is a notable gap in the analysis of whistleblowing from a diplomatic and strategic standpoint. The current body of literature prioritizes public reactions and the ethical debates surrounding whistleblowing but fails to systematically assess the tangible diplomatic impact based on concrete events and shifts in policy (Thompson, 2011; Rogers & Poret, 2013).

This study aims to address the gap by assessing the diplomatic repercussions of Cablegate on U.S.-Pakistan relations through the diplomatic dimension of the DIME framework (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic). It explores how whistleblowing impacts diplomatic relations between these historically intricate nations, examining the crucial dynamics before, during, and after the leaks. The objective is to transcend public narratives and analyze empirical data related to diplomatic interactions. This analysis will enhance understanding of how the public disclosure of sensitive diplomatic information impacts international relations, moving beyond superficial headlines. The findings of this study are critical for shaping future diplomatic strategies and emphasizing the importance of transparency in governance practices associated with diplomacy.

## 1.2. Methodology

The appropriate methodology for examining the diplomatic influence of the Cablegate event on the bilateral relations between the USA and Pakistan is content analysis. This methodology aims to "say no to "transparency illusion" of social facts, refusing and pushing away the danger of spontaneous comprehension" (Bardin, L. 1977:28). Also, P. Henry and S. Moscovici<sup>2</sup> say that "anything said or written is susceptible of being submitted to a content analysis," however excluding what is not linguistical, like movies and figures. To establish the veracity of some information in a document, the more the same information is confirmed by different sources, especially if it's official sources, the greater the chance of that information being true, and the more reliable our research will be. Various indicators will be further examined and quantified using content analysis alongside the DIME framework to characterize the bilateral relations thoroughly. Ferreira (2023) noted that this approach was developed within the North American national security context to comprehensively consider external action instruments, encompassing diplomatic, informational, military, and economic aspects. This study will focus exclusively on the diplomatic dimension ('D') of the DIME framework. The analysis of its specific indicators will address the research question of whether the Cablegate event had a tangible diplomatic impact on U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan.

The diplomatic impact, *per se*<sup>3</sup>, will be analyzed by comparing the diplomatic relations as a tool of foreign policy between the two countries in two periods: the first from 2001 to 2010, where the period will be highlighted by close cooperation after the event of 9/11 that started the *GWOT*<sup>4</sup> policy of the U.S. towards the middle east with the cooperation of Pakistan. The second period analyzed spans from 2011 to 2020, following the Cablegate event in 2010, which creates a fair time split of ten years before the event and ten years after, allowing for comparison of the same time periods. Accordingly, to the American DIME approach (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic), the instruments of foreign policy, the diplomatic instrument will be analyzed by the following indicators: official state visits (only within the foreign affairs domain will be considered), the number of embassies in each country and if there was, or not, a period where there was no ambassador representing the state, agreements /treaties established. It is essential to mention that diplomacy is an instrument of national power, in this case, the diplomatic instrument that, according to Joint Publication 1 of the U.S. AF, defines as "the

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<sup>2</sup> P. Henry e S. Moscovici, Problems with content analysis, in Langage, September 1968, nº II

<sup>3</sup> By itself

<sup>4</sup> Global War on Terror, a policy developed by the US to combat terrorism after the event of 9/11



principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance US values, interests, and objectives, and to solicit foreign support for US military operations" (U.S. AF, 2017: 40) which will be the case in this dissertation. This Joint Doctrine states diplomacy is "a principal means of organizing coalitions and alliances, which may include states and non-state entities, as partners, allies, surrogates, and/or proxies" (U.S. AF, 2017: 40). This definition underscores the vital function of diplomacy as an instrument of national power, emphasizing its significance in the analysis of bilateral or multilateral relationships within the global system.

### **1.3. Model Development**

To create a parity system that ranks the importance of government visits between the U.S. and Pakistan, we developed a scoring scale to capture the hierarchy and influence of the officials involved. The model below evaluates the relative significance of each position, allowing us to measure the diplomatic value of each visit: U.S. President and Pakistani President = 1 point; U.S. Vice President and Pakistani Prime Minister = 2 points; U.S. Secretary of State and Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs = 3 points.

Following the scoring scale, a diplomatic importance scale is used to evaluate the significance of a visit and its corresponding diplomatic level. We can sum the scores of the positions involved. Using this framework, we can categorize diplomatic importance into the following ranges:

- High Diplomatic Importance (1-2 points): Presidential visits typically indicate significant diplomatic and strategic value, involving alliances, trade strategies, or defense pacts.

- Moderate Diplomatic Importance (3-4 points): Visits from figures such as the U.S. Vice President or the Pakistani Prime Minister involve meaningful discussions but lack the high stakes of a presidential visit. Topics may include foreign policy negotiations or business collaborations.

- Operational Diplomatic Importance (5-6 points): Meetings between the U.S. Secretary of State and Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs focus on implementing existing policies, providing logistical support, and negotiating technical cooperation.

To better understand, here is an example of a System Application: U.S. President and Pakistani President = 1 point (High Diplomatic Importance); U.S. Vice President and Pakistani

Prime Minister = 4 points (Moderate Diplomatic Importance), and U.S. Secretary of State and Pakistani Foreign Minister = 6 points (Operational Diplomatic).

This scoring system provides a clear metric to assess the importance of diplomatic visits between nations and helps evaluate potential impacts based on the rankings of the representatives involved. After quantifying these indicators during the two periods—before and after the Cablegate event—and determining if there was a diplomatic impact, it is essential to analyze U.S. foreign policy through the perspectives of two international relations theories: realism and liberalism.

The theoretical framework analysis of realism and liberalism, along with their conceptualization of diplomacy, offers a diverse and contrasting perspective on the diplomatic impact of the Cablegate event on U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan, highlighting their differences. Both theories are state-centered but differ in how foreign policy is conducted. Realism views states for what they are and do, while liberalism emphasizes what states could achieve and become.



## CHAPTER 1

### **Whistleblowing Contextualization - The Cablegate Case**

In an international system ruled by cultural diversity, the urge for diplomacy arises to pursue a favorable path among different ways of ruling. However, many challenges will come across countries' foreign policies, depending on their private interests at the time. An essential factor to consider in modern politics is the transparency that involves all policies and relations. Transparency is questioned when unwanted exposure regarding classified information occurs. It is not supposed to be known if it is classified, as it harms the parties involved. Since the globalization phenomenon and process, digital access to information has become a granted right to citizens. In this regard, politics became a constant in the daily life of civil society. That represents a danger as media like newspapers, news channels, and websites challenge the concept of secrecy within the political sphere. The distinction between what needs to be secreted to protect the state and what is being kept secret so there is no accountability is different and represents different purposes.

Whistleblowing, described as “the practice of publicizing wrongs that are harmful to, and therefore matters of, public interest” (Jubb, P. 1999:21), has become a more present phenomenon in modern society. Whistleblowers have also become more inclined to provide secret information to public disclosures and analyses. Among different whistleblowing cases, those concerning foreign policy and relations, like the Cablegate event that will be further explained and studied, represent a different level of importance and impact. Not only can it endanger the government's public recognition, but also externally, it can cause severe damage at a bilateral or multilateral level of action. The Cablegate event happened in 2010, when the website WikiLeaks, founded by Julian Assange in 2006, released thousands of U.S. cables from all its diplomatic network, like embassies, consulates, and more. Wikileaks, described by Assange in an interview with Der Spiegel, is a library “built from the courage and sweat of many and has had a five-year confrontation with a power without losing a single book. These books have educated many, and in some cases, in a literal sense, let the innocent go free” (Thompson, P. K., 2018), and they provide transparency and accountability in political dynamics and the importance of studying such concepts just as whistleblowing is increasing, due to the growing necessity of the public for information regarding what policies and how they are being conducted. Also, whistleblowing, primarily external whistleblowing, may significantly impact the relations between actors, mostly state actors, like in the Cablegate

event, and its effect must be studied to determine the seriousness of the act of blowing the whistle. Even though the Cablegate event was about the U.S. foreign relations with several countries, like Afghanistan, Iraq, and others, Pakistan was also involved. Situated in the central area of the Middle East, Pakistan represents an essential geopolitical actor in the relations between the East and West. The Arabian Sea bathes it and makes a frontier with Iran, Afghanistan, China, and India, an old rival after the end of British rule and the construction of the Muslim State of Pakistan; however, India has never been satisfied with the separation, and convergence over the Kashmir territory continues to intensify the bilateral relationship. On the other side, Afghanistan also represents tensions in the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. due to its involvement with terrorism and political instability.

This geopolitical context of Pakistan and the foreign policy of the U.S. towards the Middle East creates a necessary strong and well-constructed foreign policy approach for the U.S. when it comes to Pakistan. Therefore, the seriousness of blowing the whistle about subjects such as a country's foreign policy, considering a crucial geostrategic context that can or cannot advance the U.S. interests, is of critical analysis and careful opinion.

## CHAPTER 2

# Revision of Literature - The Whistleblowing Theories and Concepts

The description of whistleblowing is “the practice of publicizing wrongs that are harmful to, and therefore matters of public interest” (Jubb, P. 1999:21). To Miceli and Near (1984), whistleblowing is the act of organization members who disclose employers’ illegal (...) practices (...) to persons or organizations who may be able to affect action. Similarly, Farrell and Peterson (1982) say that <sup>5</sup>“whistleblowing is an illegitimate external action which may pose a very real risk.” The common characteristic is disclosing something outside the organization that can cause internal and external damage. That action comprises an illegal act done by an individual who does not possess legal protection. The current legal framework for whistleblowing protection does not facilitate the post-whistleblowing process. Lacking legal protection for those who commit whistleblowing and leak documents, blowing the whistle is not taken lightly, nor should it be.

To build the concept and action of whistleblowing in scientific terms, the reasons behind the action of blowing the whistle must be studied and framed in a normative way. Two normative views of whistleblowing are the extrema ratio view and the deontic view. According to Michele Bocchiola and Emanuela Ceva<sup>6</sup>, the ratio view frames the justification of whistleblowing as an individual act of dissent and indictment, like civil disobedience, and therefore, is seen by extrema ratio view supporters as always presumptively wrong (Boot, 2017; Davis, 1996). It focuses on preventing serious harm or avoiding complicity in organizational wrongdoing. This extrema ratio view justifies whistleblowing as an exceptional individual response to serious wrongdoing based on five key points: last resort, civil disobedience, presumptively wrong, threshold condition, and minimal costs. These justifications highlight the ethical considerations and conditions under which whistleblowing is morally permissible according to the extrema ratio view.

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<sup>5</sup> Keenan, J. P. & McLain, D. L. (1992) “Whistleblowing: a conceptualization and model”. *Academy of Management Proceedings*, 348-352.

<sup>6</sup> (2019). *Theories of Whistleblowing*. *Philosophy Compass*.

On the other hand, the deontic view considers the moral justification of whistleblowing, in more general terms, as an ordinary practice necessary for the self-correction of an organization in the face of wrongdoing that threatens its well-functioning. The justifications are the organizational duty, establishing reporting mechanisms, answerability, ordinary practice, and maximizing potential. These justifications highlight the managerial responsibilities and ethical considerations associated with whistleblowing. The two prominent families of normative theories of whistleblowing identified offer a “multifaceted outlook on whistleblowing within a broader ethics of office, which maximizes the potential of this practice while it minimizes the potential risks for the parties involved” (Ceva & Bocchiola, 2020).

Another study by Janet P. Near, Marcia Miceli, and Terry Dworkin<sup>7</sup> highlights two theories that also present justifications for whistleblowing: the power and justice theories. The power theory applied to whistleblowing focuses on the dynamics of influence and control within organizations, following a resource-dependence view (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the whistleblowing process, the theory suggests that whistleblowers attempt to withdraw power over the organization to address wrongdoing. The dominant coalition within the organization may either retaliate against the whistleblower to maintain or shift the power balance, or it may indeed address the wrongdoing. In a broader definition, power theory provides a framework for understanding how power dynamics work in whistleblowing situations and how they influence the behaviors of both actors involved: the whistleblowers and organizations.

On the other hand, the justice theory approaches Whistleblowing through the perceptions of fairness and equity in organizational processes and outcomes. It examines how individuals involved in whistleblowing situations evaluate the fairness of the actions taken by decision-makers and the organizations, and it suggests that individuals assess procedural justice (fairness in the decision-making process) and distributive justice (fairness in outcomes and resource allocation). It means that procedural justice involves how the whistleblowing process is handled, and distributive justice pertains to the perceived fairness of outcomes, so encouraging procedural justice for whistleblowers and distributive justice for all parties involved is predicted to promote whistleblowing.

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<sup>7</sup> (1993). Explaining the Whistle-Blowing Process: Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory. *Organization Science*, Vol. 4, No. 3.

Aside from the political and social behaviors or power processes involved, Ahmad et al. (2014) explains whistleblowing behavior by applying the Ethical Climates Theory. Developed by Victor and Cullen in 1988 and described by Cullen et al. (1993, p.103) as “the ethical dimensions of organization culture,” this theory suggests that the ethical climate within an organization, represented by dimensions such as egoism, benevolence, and principle, can influence employees’ decisions to engage in whistleblowing behavior. The theory focuses on two main dimensions: ethical approach and ethical referent. The first dimension “looks at the decision-making process” through egoism, benevolence, and principle, while individual, local, and cosmopolitan referents comprise the second dimension. The conclusion drawn from the ethical approach dimension is that internal auditors predominantly adhere to the principal climate over egoism and benevolence climates, suggesting that they prioritize personal morality, rules, and professional codes in their decision-making processes, indicating that they “internalized the value of principled reasoning” (Ahmad et al. 2014: 449) in their whistleblowing intentions. Conversely, the ethical referent dimension shows that internal auditors base their ethical decision-making on personal moral beliefs and professional codes of conduct rather than external factors, suggesting that individuals rely more on individual and local referents for ethical guidance. This emphasizes a strong internalization of ethical values and principles, highlighting the importance of internal standards and regulations in shaping whistleblowing intentions.

Bosupeng proposes a different approach and discusses whistleblowing in the context of various ethical theories, such as egoism and deontology, including the deontic view mentioned previously. However, he examines whistleblowing through another ethical lens: utilitarianism, articulated by the pioneer John Stuart Mill. From the utilitarian perspective, “the theme is to do an action which will benefit the greatest good for the most significant number of people (Duska et al., 2011). For Bosupeng, utilitarianism may support whistleblowing if it benefits many individuals, but adverse consequences must also be considered.

In conclusion, the first theory is based on the extreme ratio view, which is always morally incorrect, as whistleblowing can be seen as disobedience due to misguided motivations. Following this is the deontic view, which suggests that whistleblowing is ethically acceptable since it can rectify organizational wrongdoing. The power theory and justice theory: the first addresses how power dynamics influence the behaviors of both parties involved and, consequently, whistleblowing, while the second promotes the absence of justice within an organization as a motivation for whistleblowing. However, within the ethical framework, the



ethical climates theory focuses on two dimensions: ethical approach and ethical referent. The first considers the decision-making process, while the second considers individual and societal values when blowing the whistle. Finally, utilitarianism is drawn from philosophy and justifies whistleblowing if it benefits the most significant number of people; only then is it morally acceptable. All the theories above define whistleblowing, which comprises two primary motivations: individual/internal factors and external/group factors that influence the decision-making process of blowing the whistle.

## **2.1. External Whistleblowing**

“Mobility, viewed empirically as the movement of people, capital, technology, institutions, ideas, ideological systems, and knowledge, is the most visible face of globalization. Mobility is central to globalization, marking ageless continuity” (Khondker, 2023), and applies to information. With the evolution of technology, human beings have begun to have the possibility of seeing and sharing information, whether it is from our laptops or phones. All it takes is a click to access endless connections with available information about endless topics. However, it is easy to become overwhelmed with such a big network, and it is essential to know the veracity of the information circulating because “in a world full of irrelevant information, lucidity gives us power” (Harari, Yuval; 2018:13), crucial for our conclusions. It is essential to recognize that the effect of misinformation varies by subject, ranging from inconsequential and harmless to highly significant and potentially damaging. The dimension where that false information circulates also plays a vital role in the outcome; for example, a dispute caused by false information in a domestic dimension is entirely different if the same happens in an international context.

A significant change in the “information age includes connectivity, including social networks, virtual collaboration through networking, instant access to information and evidence, automatic searching, and the ease of generating information from many different sources” (Bosua, R et al., 2014: 253), making the process of gathering information much more straightforward and accessible. Digital information has become the primary source of information, and non-digital information can no longer be easily transformed into digital information, allowing it to navigate the internet and reach millions of people.

Considering the technological evolution mentioned above, there was a remarkable proportional direct growth of the number of whistleblowing cases, which took place in the last decades, regarding both past events and new ones of external whistleblowing. External

whistleblowing is “described as reporting wrongdoing to any party outside the organization who may be able to correct or stop the wrongdoing,” and “external whistleblowing, including that to the media, remains highly debated as it could not only expose wrongdoing but a failing organization” (Bosua, R et al. 2014: 250), also external disclosure is described as the only proper form of whistleblowing because internal whistleblowing is insufficient mainly to deal with wrongdoing. It cannot provide security and protection to the whistleblower once it is judged by internal law. That is different for external whistleblowing, in that in most cases, they appeal to international organizations to provide security through extradition to other countries and international courts, being judged through international law instead of national law. Those differences give more confidence to those who testify about wrongdoing and want to blow the whistle, as the list of external whistleblowing avenues is extensive: “government watchdog and investigation agencies, external anti-corruption hotlines, external counseling services, relevant trade unions, members of parliament and journalists” (Donkin et al., 2008)<sup>8</sup>.

The perfect symbiosis between whistleblowing and technological evolution, and extra help from globalization, allows whistleblowers to be independent, no longer needing a third party, by using new media organizations, for example, WikiLeaks, to reveal inside information in an easy, fast, and user-friendly way for those who will access it, meaning that the information age both lowers the constrictions in finding and transmitting information and creates better communication between journalists and whistleblowers. A significant turning point in the way whistleblowers share their information was the creation of a website, WikiLeaks, initiated in 2006 “that provides a unique approach for whistleblowers to provide documentary evidence of wrongdoing (...) providing newsworthy information to the public (...) publishing source material alongside stories as evidence of the truth associated with wrongdoing” (A. J. Brown et al. 2014: 254), shortening the time of reporting the wrongdoing and no longer need a story for journalists to publish alongside with the pieces of evidence. However, the public seems to prefer it when journalists investigate the veracity of the documents when they contact the whistleblower<sup>9</sup>, because the trust between ICT and the public is decreasing due to the fake news circulating all the time on digital platforms and websites. In addition, WikiLeaks provided two

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<sup>8</sup> A. J. Brown, David Lewis, Richard E. Moberly and Wilm Vandekerckhove. (2014). “International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research”.

<sup>9</sup> Result of an interview to interviewee 106 in a study performed by Rachelle Bosua, Simon Milton, Suelette Dreyfus and Reeva Lederman. International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research (2014: 286).

essential aspects to whistleblowers: first, anonymity, by ensuring that the computer used to transmit the information is difficult to follow and trace back to the source of the information; and second, security, by guiding whistleblowers through the process of encryption, allowing the files to be seen only by people who have a key generated during the encryption process. WikiLeaks became a world-famous platform for exposing wrongdoing because of those two factors, providing essential safeguards for whistleblowers to protect their identity.

The state's political life has long ceased to belong exclusively to the state itself. With the rise of the internet age, nearly nothing escapes the horizon of transparency; if something does, it is not for long “ (Lagasnerie, 2017). The emerging conflicts around mass surveillance, state secrecy, privacy, civil liberties, and rights present new and challenging issues. A new political subject arises, and the political landscape is thrown into crisis, as the consequences of such actions and resistance practices often lead to significant shifts in foreign politics. All the necessary factors came together at the right moments in history, leading to three different yet similar acts of resistance against the system carried out by Snowden, Assange, and Manning. Although other whistleblowers and hackers may be less well-known, they are equally important. For example, in 2007, Katherine Gun had whistleblowing cases that drew the world's attention to actions occurring far from the scrutiny of civil society.

The three whistleblowing cases have already been studied and analyzed by different authors with different approaches, like E. Boussios, in his book “Digital Policy, Regulation, and Governance” (2023), where he explores and theorizes on the motivations of a new league of whistleblowers, disrupting from the abusive cybersecurity practices of western governments, involving data collection from primary and secondary sources. This analysis has shown that a new league of power brokers with their ethos will be known by a new concept: New Knowledge Cyberclass (NKC), which first challenged Western governments and the political dynamics long rooted in covering malpractices. A different approach was given by Geoffroy De Lagasnerie, who presents a heroic and optimistic view on the acts of whistleblowing in his book “The Art of Revolt” (2017). Opinions and “elite views of this new form of ‘digital disclosure’” are mixed and sometimes ambivalent (Touchton et al., 2020), , and the views of Assange, Manning, and Snowden are subject to complex framing effects, such as the content of the whistleblowing, who is going to be hurt, and if it was ethically done.

## CHAPTER 3

### **Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, and Whistleblowing**

International Relations is a complex field that straightforward concepts or rigid guidelines cannot neatly define. It involves individuals with unique characteristics, personalities, and collective dynamics that can vary across different situations. This complexity extends beyond individual actors to include actions, which often operate under different structures than states and, therefore, require distinct theoretical frameworks. The study of International Relations initially centered around Realism but has evolved with shifts in the international system and world order, allowing for exploring other perspectives, such as Liberalism.

#### **3.1. "Harmonizing Ideals: The Role of Realism and Liberalism in Crafting Foreign Policy"**

It is important not to view theories of International Relations as competitors vying for a singular, universal understanding of world politics. Each theory is grounded in specific assumptions and epistemologies, operates within defined conditions, and pursues unique analytical objectives (Anne-Marie & Thomas, 2013). Together, these theories contribute to the broader establishment and enrichment of the social sciences field.

Realism, often considered the foundational theory for contemporary analysis of global power relations, is prominently featured in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece. Thucydides' work is celebrated as a seminal text on power politics. He identifies the "truest cause of the great war between Athens and Sparta" as "the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta" (Doyle, 2013). This observation underscores a central tenet of Realism: states invariably perceive each other as threats.

Thomas Hobbes, who traced the roots of Realism in his writings, portrayed international relations as a relentless pursuit of power. Niccolò Machiavelli was the "first critical theorist of European thought" (Cox, Robert, 1992: 168). Both, along with Thucydides, emphasized the constant risk of war and the fundamental role of power in statecraft (Armstrong, 2007). Thucydides' argument highlights how a state's excessive accumulation of power can generate insecurity among other states, intensifying power struggles and increasing the risk of conflict.

For realists such as Hans Morgenthau, who articulated his ideas in "Politics Among Nations," the international system is defined by anarchy—an absence of a central authority where states are "sovereign and thus autonomous of each other; no inherent structure or society can emerge or even exist to order relations between them" (Anne-Marie & Thomas, 2013). In such a system, state power is paramount, serving as the primary means through which states can defend themselves and ensure their survival. Realists understand power in various dimensions—economic, military, diplomatic—but the distribution of coercive material capacity remains the key determinant in international politics.

Despite the centrality of power in Realism, it is essential to note that "if a fluid balancing system placed enormous limits on national power, it never achieved perfection or prevented wars" (Graebner, N. 49). In realist theory, diplomacy might seem paradoxical given its state-centric focus. However, "in the realist perspective, there is room for a considerable proliferation of international institutions, but little room for any cumulative acquisition of authority by these institutions." From a realist standpoint, this implies that individuals, rather than institutions, primarily personify diplomacy. The core principles of realist diplomatic theory include a state-centric approach, balance of power, national interest, security and survival, pragmatism, and *realpolitik*. Realist diplomats engage in strategies of deterrence and coercion to advance their state's interests without relying on institutions to implement their foreign policy. These principles guide diplomats in navigating the complexities of international relations, where power dynamics, national interests, and security concerns are central to shaping diplomatic strategies in "an anarchical system of power distributed between self-interested, self-helping, power-maximizers" (Paul, S. 2009).

Classical Liberalism emerged as a strong critique of Realism, with its foundations laid by several influential thinkers such as Kant, John Stuart Mill, Schumpeter, and John Maynard Keynes. Its origins can be traced back to Athens and Rome, where the principles of free thought, republican self-government, and an independent civil society began to take shape (Siegel, C. 2011: 7). In the nineteenth century, classical Liberalism manifested in two distinct ways: one focused on economic issues, advocating *laissez-faire* principles, while the other addressed social concerns, emphasizing moral individualism and personal freedom.

The concept of freedom within classical Liberalism is complex and multifaceted. Classical liberals support positive freedom, which encompasses the ability to make significant decisions, such as managing one's business affairs. In contrast, modernist and *laissez-faire* liberals

advocate for negative freedom, defined as "the government does not interfere with your behavior" (Siegel, C.; 2011: 11). Classical Liberalism posits that a free nation must cultivate the character of its citizens, arguing that people must rise above self-interest to govern themselves effectively. In contrast, neoliberals contend that the government should "not promote any common idea of the good life but should simply enforce a set of fair rules that let individuals pursue their interests" (Siegel, C.; 2011: 12). According to Andrew Moravcsik, Liberalism can be understood as a social "scientific theory of IR that seeks to explain what states do, not what they should do" (1992: 2). Consequently, diplomacy from a liberal perspective emphasizes cooperation, negotiation, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts between states. This approach prioritizes dialogue, compromise, and promoting shared values and interests among nations. Thus, a liberal approach to diplomacy can significantly influence international relations by fostering peaceful interactions and contributing to a more stable and harmonious international system.

One of the critics presented of Realism, Alan James, believes that Realism fails to comprehend the nature in its full spectrum of both domestic and international politics, and "while war is certainly a prominent and important feature of international politics, it is mistaken to imply that it is an ever-present threat in all relationships" (Alan, J. 1989: 217). He even distinguishes between Realism with a small r and Realism with a big R, implying that Realism as a theory does not always imply its root concept of Realism. Also, Bell, accuses Realism of theorizing "not with the explanation of moral ideas (justice, freedom, rights, etc.), which are taken to settle the questions of value and principle in the political realm but in an (...) understanding of the practice of politics itself" (Bell, D. 2018: 6). Realism tends to overlook the evolving nature of state sovereignty and international governance, particularly in the context of globalization and the influence of institutions and norms. Authors collectively highlight Realism's tendency to oversimplify international politics by considering only state actors, conflict, and power politics, at the expense of realizing the growing role of non-state actors and the immense potential for international cooperation, safeguarded by international law.

On the other hand, Liberalism is traced back to Woodrow Wilson, when between 1945 and 1989 the U.S. established a liberal order, first in the U.S. and then with the end of the Cold War, throughout other continents. Moravcsik (1997: 514) argues that Liberalism, despite being the "core mainstream approach in International Relations, has simply never formulated a theory of IR" (Jahn, B. 2009: 409). Different theorists such as Hugo Grotius in "The Law of War and Peace" (1625), John Locke in "Two Treatises of Government" (1689), Jean-Jacques Rousseau

in "The Social Contract" (1762), Classical liberalism principles are harmony of interests (cooperation), well-being (subjective understanding), rationality (individual and collective capacity), individual rights (life, freedom, equality, property), regulation (law, state role, institutions) and competition (market economy). The Democratic Peace Theory, which emerged in the North American academic world in the 70's, is an approach that assumes that constitutionally liberal states do not wage war against each other, which would justify the absence of wars between liberal democracies. The Kantian peace emphasizes democracies and the notion that economic interdependency and international institutions promote peace.



**Figure 3.1**, Democratic Peace Theory (D, Seyle C, Wall K.) (Dimensions in Governance for Peace: How Inclusive, Participatory and Accountable Institutions Promote Peace and Prosperity)

This theory is based on three main points: 1) Historically, democracies have rarely, if ever, waged war against each other; 2) democracies are neither more nor less prone to war than non-democratic states; 3) while democracies do not engage in conflict with one another, they have participated in armed conflicts with non-democratic states. According to this democratic peace theory, democracies are less likely to become involved in conflicts or to seek out conflict.

Classical Liberalism, studied by Locke, Bentham, and Kant, relies on central assumptions such as a positive vision of human nature, cooperation in international relations, and belief in progress instead of the tragic vision of realists. Liberal theorists highlight different aspects of world politics in their conception of international cooperation.

What are the differences that liberal principles and institutions bring to the conduct of foreign policy in liberal states? For many, "international relations are governed by perceptions of national security and the balance of power; liberal principles and institutions, when they do

intrude, confuse and disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics" (Doyle, M. 2014: 205). This view on Liberalism is given by skeptical scholars and diplomats who conceive predominantly of a realist interpretation of international relations. However, Liberalism in international relations has brought institutions that have shaped the capacities for foreign relations and the "peaceful intent and restraint that liberalism does manifest in limited aspects of its foreign affairs announces the possibility of a world peace" (Doyle, M. 2014: 206). Even though Liberalism also considers the state as a significant factor in international politics, "for liberals, state purpose, not state power, is the most essential element of world politics" (Moravcsik, A.; 11), and so variation in the pre-planning process of strategy definition of the state, grounded in their volatile relationship to both domestic and international civil society, is the most fundamental determinant of shifts in foreign policy. In general, Liberalism is not a reductionist theory that does not consider the international context of state behavior. Instead, it is viewed as a systemic theory. It accounts for important historical changes in the international system and links domestic and international politics.

### **3.2. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy**

The challenges of the new millennium present us with a different set of issues compared to those faced in 1918 and 1945. With evolving paradigms, there are now "new expectations for action and new standards of conduct in national and international affairs" (Cooper, A. F., et al. 2013: 9), necessitating that diplomacy adapts to the changing landscape of foreign policy. Physical national borders are becoming increasingly irrelevant in controlling the flow of ideas, information, services, capital, goods, people, technology, and labor. The rapid pace of modern communications, particularly digital forms, allows information to move globally easily, making borders more permeable. This increased volume of cross-border flows challenges the capacity of states to manage and respond effectively. To address these complexities, states have expanded the scope and volume of their negotiations, especially within multilateral forums.

The growing number of actors in negotiations, the expanded array of issues on the international agenda, and the diversity of negotiation styles—stemming from vastly different cultures and levels of development—have made the negotiation process increasingly challenging (Cooper, A. F., et al. 2013: 10). The complexity of the 21st century is evident in issues like climate change, as seen in efforts to move beyond the Kyoto Protocol at major international conferences in Bali (2008), Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010), and Dubai (2011). These conferences set "legally binding emission targets for industrialized countries" and "established a broad international mechanism for expanding climate protection efforts"



(Böhringer, C. 2003: 1), among other initiatives that have presented significant challenges for diplomatic negotiations.

The term diplomacy originates from the ancient Greek word 'diploma,' meaning 'folded document,' which initially referred to a gold object and later to a document granting privileges from a sovereign. Over time, the term acquired multiple meanings, leading to the diverse definitions of diplomacy we see today. At its core, diplomacy is described as the "conduct of relationships, using peaceful means, by and among international actors, at least one of whom is usually governmental" (Cooper, A. F., et al. 2013: 2), or as the "management of relations between states and between states and other actors" (Barston, 2019). It primarily involves interactions between states, international organizations, or other international actors, and is often seen as an art form, particularly when viewed as negotiation or policymaking by the state (Burton).

Both Barston and Burton emphasize a state-centered approach to diplomacy, a perspective echoed by Roberts, who defines it as "the conduct of business between states through pacific means." Beyond state-centric views, Nicholson advocates for defining diplomacy as "the management of international relations through negotiation; the method through which relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or the diplomat's art," as per the Oxford English Dictionary. Recent definitions have expanded to include relations not just between states, but also among political entities, principals, and agents. Constantinou further broadens the concept by suggesting that diplomacy occurs whenever someone asserts the role of representing or negotiating on behalf of a territory, group, or cause, or claims to mediate between parties in such negotiations. In summary, "diplomacy means different things to different people in different moments and can be treated in different ways" (Verbeke, J., 2023: 1), reflecting its evolving nature and the varied contexts in which it operates.

When effectively practiced, diplomacy "is essentially political activity and, well-endowed with resources and ability, a key ingredient of power" (Berridge, G. R.; 2002: 1). This implies that a country's capacity for negotiation is a form of soft power—the power of attraction rather than coercion. Diplomacy aims to enhance national power by promoting the appeal of a nation's culture, political values, and foreign policy. Diplomatic capital relies on tradition, credibility, coherence, predictability, and negotiation skills, particularly through the training and expertise of its diplomats.

However, recent scholars like Spence, Masser, and Yorke have challenged these traditional characteristics of diplomacy. They argue that diplomacy is no longer confined to foreign ministries but has expanded across various governmental bodies. This broader scope reflects the integration of international relations into commercial policy, development, economic strategy, and national security. Consequently, the role of diplomacy now extends beyond its classic tasks to encompass dialogue, communication, conferences, intelligence gathering, and relationship-building.

Traditionally, the primary purpose of diplomacy is to advance the interests of the state it represents, based on established political directives. Under specific instructions, diplomats aim to influence foreign governments' and their populations' decisions and behaviors through dialogue, negotiation, and other peaceful measures, excluding war or violence. According to Holeindre (2012), "two figures structure interstate relations: the diplomat, who represents the state in times of peace, and the soldier, who bears the flag in times of war," highlighting that "the end of wars, with virtually no exception, involves a significant element of diplomatic negotiation" (Melissen, J. 2016).

The distinction between theory and practice in diplomacy is their focus: practice involves experience and habits from international affairs and negotiations, while theory explores the principles and methods observed in these practices. Constantinou, Sharp, and Kerr offer a broader view of diplomatic theory, describing it as "a systematization of thinking, an extensive elaboration of ideas and principles governing or seeking to explain a particular phenomenon" (Constantinou, C. 2016: 13). According to Nicolson, a classic difference between diplomatic theory and practice arises when policies must yield to the realities of specific circumstances during negotiations. For instance, while open or transparent diplomacy is ideal, it can complicate achieving successful negotiation outcomes. In such cases, a diplomat may advocate for transparency while recognizing that public exposure can diminish the effectiveness of negotiations. As Verbeke (2023: 422) puts it, "Idealism dominates diplomatic rhetoric, but practice is guided by realism."

Diplomacy studies should be conceptual and historical, encompassing a global perspective on subjects and processes. Thorough examination of these aspects is essential to differentiate between "old" and "new" diplomacy and understand when each approach is appropriate, as foreign policy is not a rigid concept nor guided by a single, straightforward path.

The challenges faced by the world in 1918 and 1945 differ significantly from those of the new millennium, which introduced its own set of issues and concerns. With these new realities come new expectations for the conduct of national and international affairs. In the Middle Ages, diplomacy was often conducted directly by kings and princes of neighboring states at the summit level. However, this practice fell out of favor due to the inherent risks to the personal safety of royals and the limited success of such meetings (Cooper, A. F., et al. 2013: 2). Today, however, the rapid pace of international travel and the expanding scope of diplomatic issues have led to an increase in diplomatic meetings and summits. This has created a convergence between diplomacy and foreign policymaking, making the two concepts increasingly intertwined. The international calendar for summit meetings has become increasingly congested, with leaders balancing busy schedules that include regular commitments to forums such as the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations like ASEAN, the European Council, NATO, and others.

In addition to these regular multilateral meetings, there are irregular, ad hoc summits where international actors meet face-to-face to engage in dialogue and diplomacy. These summits often symbolize diplomatic engagement, offering photo opportunities rather than substantial outcomes. Diplomacy has undergone a significant transformation in response to emerging concepts and the evolving landscape of international relations. New modes, types, and diplomacy techniques have been developed to address the needs of various international actors across health, economic, political, social, and military domains.


Other scholars, such as Barston (2019), highlight further evolution in diplomacy, citing new terms like 'oil diplomacy,' 'resource diplomacy,' 'logistics diplomacy,' 'global governance,' and 'humanitarian diplomacy.' These terms reflect a broader scope of diplomatic activity, moving beyond the traditional politico-strategic framework. Regardless of the specific form, diplomacy generally encompasses several core tasks: ceremonial functions, management, information and communication, international negotiation, protection duties, and contributions to the international order, making “public diplomacy essential, particularly in its digital dimension” (Portal Diplomático, 2025). These tasks highlight the evolution of diplomacy, underscoring that the discussion is not just about 'old' versus 'new' diplomacy, but about a continuous transformation from past methods and approaches to diplomacy. In the past, the conduct of foreign affairs was managed mainly by a small international elite, whereas today, the public is expected to engage with foreign affairs, stay informed about current issues, form

their own opinions, and express these views through media and parliamentary systems (Nicolson, 1961).

### 3.3. Diplomacy and whistleblowing

As stated in another section, for Cooper, diplomacy is described as the "conduct of relationships, using peaceful means, by and among international actors, at least one of whom is usually governmental". Those relationships often happen without the public knowledge and "in the anarchic international space, secrecy is a competitive, entrenched aspect of the dialogue between states" (Bjola, C., 2016).

For Carnegie, states use secrecy when their domestic publics disagree with their actions, and identifies interesting conditions like enacting unpopular policies, preventing escalations, reaching bargains, sending signals, and avoiding destabilization, under which states opt for secrecy. For Bjola (2016), the typology of secret diplomacy, or secret diplomatic activities, is calculated by two axes: the first being defined by the extent to which society is aware of the trip, and the second axis is determined by how much the government itself is aware of the diplomatic activities. With that, he created a secret diplomacy figure that characterizes the different types of secret diplomacy, and consequently, the various levels of secrecy within each one, what they are targeting, and the damage they can cause.



**Figure 3.2,** Types of diplomatic interactions (Secret Diplomacy Typology, Bjola, C.) (2016: 53).

As shown in the figure, secrecy diplomacy is placed slightly above clandestine diplomacy, meaning neither the government nor the public was aware of diplomatic activities. This categorization of diplomacy enables society to understand what can be expected and should not be considered, or what is moral or immoral regarding diplomatic activities. It might seem quite simple when we hear the word diplomacy and instantly make a connection between secrecy, peace, and morally correct activities. Hence, it is a state domain. If this were the case, diplomatic activities would not be concerning once their final goal is peace. However, it has not always been like this. Sometimes, and as mentioned above, diplomatic dynamics happen outside the "description" of what is expected when conducting diplomacy and originate suspicious behaviors that translate into the loss of trust by citizens in diplomats and, consequently, the government itself. In that sense, "transparency in politics is desirable (...) it can remedy corruption and favoritism, promote a rule-based order, advance policies that are in the public interest, demonstrate resolve, avoid costly conflict, and increase the legitimacy of domestic and international bodies" (Carnegie, 2021, p. 214). In that sense, there is "a distinction between what is characterized as secret negotiations, and attempts to conduct a secret foreign policy, but the latter is an undemocratic use of secrecy" (Nicolson, H. 1963).

With the increase of massive information circulation through online websites, one of the various challenges that diplomatic secrecy faces nowadays is the publication of such activities to the public and uncovering those activities to public scrutiny. So, how does whistleblowing balance the need for transparency with the operational demands of diplomatic secrecy? Or how is whistleblowing disrupting diplomatic secrecy rules and consequently undermining diplomatic relations? As discussed previously, whistleblowing allows public opinion to hold organizations or individuals accountable for their actions that may or may not be disruptive regarding their effects and how it was conducted.

To answer the first question, no absolute answer establishes what is tolerable to be released; however, when information is attributed with a classification level, each level has an established definition regarding the possible impact if disclosed to the public. In the case of the United States, hence the diplomatic cables in study are a part of the U.S. foreign policy, according to the National Security Agency Classification Guide, information is classified at one of three levels based on the degree of damage to national security that reasonably could be expected if the information were disclosed without authorization. The level of classification "CONFIDENTIAL" is expected to cause damage to national security; the level of classification

"SECRET" is expected to cause serious damage to national security, and the level of classification "TOP SECRET" is expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. Considering the possible damages from each level, the impact of information released to the public differs. So, when disclosing information, whistleblowers are aware of what damage can be expected considering the content and classification level, and a balance can be reached if the disclosure is done carefully. Only levels that minimize damage, but then full accountability ceases to exist, if whistleblowers consider all these aspects when blowing the whistle.

To answer the second question, there is a need to understand the ambiguity of whistleblowing. It disrupts secrecy diplomacy by promoting transparency and accountability regarding diplomatic activities that are not of public knowledge or the government's awareness. However, it can also occur that the government indeed knows that those activities occurred, but not the public. That is where whistleblowing has the most impact, obligating the government and politicians to account and assume responsibility for those hidden activities. In that sense, whistleblowing disrupts diplomatic secrecy and consequently undermines diplomatic efforts to establish negotiations and relations between parties. The definition exploited by Candice Delmas of "government whistleblowing", is described as "the unauthorized acquisition (typically through mishandling or theft of protected documents) and disclosure (typically through leaks to a news outlet) of classified information about the state or government" (2015: 78), refers to protected documents, that are not meant for the public knowledge since it might undermine diplomatic negotiations and its goals.

The preferable symbiosis of diplomacy and whistleblowing comes when the second exposes inappropriate negotiations and diplomatic interactions that enter the secrecy or clandestine diplomacy, as stated above in the picture, but without compromising national interests and security.



## CHAPTER 4

# Threads of Trust: The Journey of USA and Pakistan's Diplomatic Ties

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan before 2000 was intricate and significantly influenced by Cold War dynamics and regional power structures. Following Pakistan's independence in 1947, the U.S. regarded it as a strategic ally in South Asia. Also, "The United States of America established relations with Pakistan to contain Russian expansion in the region," (Muhammad, Khudija, & Muneeba, 2022) countering Soviet influence. This partnership was solidified when Pakistan joined U.S.-backed alliances like SEATO and CENTO in the 1950s. However, this relationship became tense over Pakistan's focus on India as its main adversary, which conflicted with U.S. interests that prioritized wider Cold War apprehensions over regional conflicts. During the 1960s, U.S.-Pakistan relations cooled, especially after the <sup>10</sup>U.S. suspension of military assistance during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war generated a widespread sentiment in Pakistan that the United States was not a dependable ally. This perception pushed Pakistan to strengthen its ties with China, complicating its alliance with the U.S. Relations improved again during the 1980s due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where Pakistan played a vital role in supporting U.S.-backed Afghan resistance. However, this cooperation began to decline, leading to increased tensions by the late 1990s, due to U.S. concerns that grew over Pakistan's nuclear program, leading to increased tensions by the late 1990s.

### 4.1. Historical Timeline

At the turn of the 21st century, following the end of the Cold War, which was marked by a power struggle between the US and Russia, a new era began to challenge the established norms of the international system. This period, characterized by debates over the unipolarity of the global order and the American superpower's tendencies towards isolationism and unilateralism (Viana, V. 2011: 25), led to the gradual decline of bipolarity. As a result, a new international

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of State. (2000). Background Notes: Pakistan. Bureau of South Asian Affairs Archive. Retrieved from [https://1997-2001.state.gov/background\\_notes/pakistan\\_0300\\_bgn.html#foreign](https://1997-2001.state.gov/background_notes/pakistan_0300_bgn.html#foreign)



landscape characterized by increased geopolitical fragmentation emerged (Ribeiro, F. 2004: 93), opening the door for diverse dynamics involving multiple actors.

Bilateral relations between the United States and Pakistan were established in 1947, when President Harry Truman recognized Pakistan as an independent state and congratulated Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, on the country's emergence as a member of the international community. Initially, relations between the two countries were informal and largely insignificant, as Pakistan's foreign policy was focused on Asia. At the same time, the U.S. had no concrete or defined objectives in the region. It was not particularly concerned with maintaining its image as a defender of international law and multilateral organizations (Rodrigues, R. A., 2004: 6).

Until the early 21st century, the dynamics of global politics shifted dramatically with September 11, 2001, attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in the United States, orchestrated by terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda, pushing the U.S. to "encourage the development of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan that actively combats religious militancy" (Kronstadt, K. 2023:1). These events "revealed the vulnerability of the biggest world power - the USA" (Ribeiro, F. 2004: 95) and prompted a strong response that led to the U.S. launching its Global War on Terror, which made "U.S. strategy toward Pakistan (...) dominated by the struggle against terrorism" (Markey, D.S. 2014: vii). This policy was fueled by the identification of the attackers as a radical political movement and non-state geopolitical actor, but utilizing Islamic fundamentalism as a catalyst for action to be taken in Middle Eastern territory. So, "the events of 11 September accelerated a profound change in US strategy for dealing with non-allied nuclear powers and states threatening to become nuclear powers" (Ribeiro, J. 2004:97), like Pakistan.

Pakistan's role in Asia is one of importance, even if indirectly, regarding U.S. interests in Pakistan's security, prosperity and regional role since it "has the potential to affect the region's economic growth, diplomacy between Washington and Beijing, and prospects for U.S.-India partnership" (Markey, D. 2014: 8). A violent or unstable Pakistan would compromise the U.S. agenda in Asia, while a stable and cooperative one would develop it, specifically regarding its relationship to China and India and nuclear arsenal, that does not respect the limitations set on the Non-Proliferation treaty, designed specially to control and mitigate growing nuclear powers. Even though the future of Pakistan is constrained by "the current combination of massive population growth, abysmal education, and the gradual weakening of traditional institutions

(both state and non-state) makes it easier to imagine that Pakistan will be a net exporter of violence to its region rather than a net contributor to security” (Markey, D. 2014: 8), there is the possibility for leadership and governance improvements that ultimately would enable it to play a more active and constructive role over time in the region’s political dynamics.

At the turn of the millennium, U.S.-Pakistan relations were in a precarious state. The United States had disengaged mainly from Pakistan following the end of the Cold War and the Soviet-Afghan War. During the 1990s, sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under the <sup>11</sup>Pressler Amendment, invoked by the U.S. Congress in 1985, due to concerns over its nuclear weapons program. This Amendment “caused great concern for Pakistan’s security and has been one of the central issues in the normalization of its relations with the United States” (Mahmood, T. 1994: 97). By 2000, Pakistan was internationally increasingly isolated, economically weak, and internally divided. However, the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States radically transformed the relationship. With the U.S. preparing for military operations in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistan, under the leadership of President Pervez Musharraf, became a vital ally. Pakistan’s geographical contiguity to Afghanistan made it indispensable for U.S. military logistics, intelligence gathering, and counterterrorism operations.

The cooperation between the United States and Pakistan from 2000 to 2010 is marked by a complex blend of mutual interests, strategic necessity, and growing distrust, especially in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In this decade, “The war on terrorism may have provided the rationale for the current U.S. reengagement with Pakistan, but this war neither limits the relationship’s scope nor exhausts the challenges it faces” (Hussain, T. 2005) meaning, the relationship was also strained by mutual suspicion, incongruities over counterterrorism strategy, and concerns about Pakistan’s internal politics and connections to extremist groups. Mainly because “on the one hand, the US wanted to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure of the Al-Qaeda, allegedly involved in the 9/11 carnage, by toppling up the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan, on the other hand, did not want to lose the support of

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<sup>11</sup>The goal defined in this amendment, regarding Pakistan, was that the President could suspend aid of any kind, specifically military and monetary, if certain conditions were not being granted by the receiver, in this case, Pakistan. Retrieved from <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf>

a friendly government in Afghanistan.” (Ahmed, Naeem. Nd: 211), making it a tumultuous relationship.

Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan found itself at a crossroads, were “General Musharraf initially cast his lot with the United States mainly as a result of deep fears about what U.S. enmity might imply for Pakistan’s long- standing rivalry with India, its efforts at economic revival, its nuclear weapons program, and its equities in the conflict over Kashmir” (Tellis, A.; 2008), and so he chose to align with the U.S. against the Taliban. Pakistan provided crucial access to air bases, logistical support, and intelligence, even stated by National Public Radio, “there was a very good relationship that actually worked very well between the two intelligence agencies” (Hadid, D.; & Sattar, A. 2023), that facilitated the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. The decision was not without internal challenges, as it led to domestic unrest and protests from Islamic groups within Pakistan that “are acting against their government's pledge (...) to support American military strikes against neighboring Afghanistan.” (The Guardian, 2001). The U.S., in return, lifted economic and military sanctions and provided financial aid to Pakistan. According to academic studies and U.S. Congress Reports, between 2002 and 2010, Pakistan received over \$20 billion in aid, with a significant portion directed towards bolstering its military capabilities, more specifically, by the end of the fiscal year of 2009, it obtained “about 7.2 \$ billion in military reimbursements for its support of counterterrorism efforts” (Kronstadt, K. 2009). This aid was seen as essential for maintaining stability in the region and supporting Pakistan’s efforts to counteract extremist elements within its borders. However, there was a growing concern in Washington about how effectively Pakistan was using these funds.

Despite the initial cooperation, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was marked by growing tensions throughout the decade. The U.S. “had expected Pakistan to lend more support to its efforts to defeat the Taliban, and Pakistan felt underappreciated despite economic and human costs it incurred for becoming a major non-NATO ally in the fight against terror” (Ali, S. Mohammad. 2023: 7). A key issue was the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which was accused of maintaining covert ties with the Taliban and the <sup>12</sup>Haqqani network, both

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<sup>12</sup>The Haqqani network is one of Afghanistan’s most experienced and sophisticated insurgent organizations. The Haqqani network has been at war for much of the last thirty years. Although the network wages its insurgency in Afghanistan, it is operationally and strategically headquartered in

of which were seen as essential to Pakistan's strategic interests in Afghanistan. According to reports from U.S. diplomats, there was significant mistrust regarding Pakistan's dual role as both an ally in the War on Terror and a supporter of groups that actively destabilized Afghanistan. This suspicion reached its peak in 2009 when the U.S. began conducting drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal regions, ending up "killing the Chief of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud" and "Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, a founding member of al Qaeda" (Bergen, P. & Tiedemann, K. 2018: 12), considering those drone strikes as successful in the GWOT. While the strikes successfully killed key Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, they also led to civilian casualties, sparking widespread anti-American sentiment within Pakistan, since "the majority of those killed in such strikes are not important insurgent commanders but rather low-level fighters, together with a small number of civilians" (Bergen, P. & Tiedemann, K. 2018: 12). The escalation of the drone campaign led to public protests in Pakistan and strained the government's ability to balance its alliance with the U.S. against the growing domestic discontent. The strikes also highlighted the U.S.'s frustrations with Pakistan's inability or unwillingness to eliminate safe havens for militants along the Afghan-Pakistani border. By the end of the decade, U.S. policymakers were increasingly critical of Pakistan's efforts, or lack thereof, in curbing terrorist activities on its soil.

Another critical aspect of U.S.-Pakistan relations during this period was the ongoing concern regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, "U.S. policymakers (...) also realize the danger of neglecting a nuclear-armed and populous Muslim-majority state that has become increasingly beholden to China and remains locked in a protracted and dangerous rivalry with neighboring India" (Ali, S. Mohammad. 2023: 7), and the U.S. was apprehensive that instability in Pakistan, along with the presence of extremist groups, could result in nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. Diplomatic cables, later revealed through WikiLeaks, showed that U.S. officials had privately expressed concerns about Pakistan's nuclear security for years, even while publicly stating confidence in the country's ability to safeguard its arsenal. This issue was further complicated by the rise of insurgent attacks within Pakistan itself.

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North Waziristan, Pakistan. It enjoys the support and protection of elements of the Pakistani intelligence establishment. Retrieved from [https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani\\_Network\\_0.pdf](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_Network_0.pdf).

Between 2007 and 2010, Pakistan saw a significant increase in terrorist activity, much of which was directed at the Pakistani state. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), formed in 2007, launched numerous attacks against civilian and military targets, further destabilizing the country, such as “In May 2011, TTP operatives stormed the Mehran naval base in Karachi and killed at least 10 Pakistani security officers” and “TTP also claimed responsibility for an attempted bombing in Times Square, New York, USA, on 1 May 2010” (United Nations).

The U.S. supported Pakistan’s military efforts to combat these insurgents by providing military aid and intelligence support. The end of the decade saw significant diplomatic challenges between the two countries. In 2007, President Musharraf faced domestic political pressure and was compelled to step down as army chief, eventually resigning from the presidency in 2008. His departure marked a shift in U.S. relations with Pakistan, as Washington sought to strengthen ties with the new civilian government led by President Asif Ali Zardari, considered “perfectly suited to being a total creature of Washington” (The Guardian). However, the civilian government encountered significant challenges, including a struggling economy, rampant corruption, and an escalating insurgency; hence, “he is deeply unpopular because of public perceptions that he is being too compliant with the US” (Tran, M. 2009) and “because the people of Pakistan mostly disliked the Pakistan’s support to USA and evaluation of people’s commits that Pakistan must review her foreign policy towards USA” (Ul Haq, M. 2023). The U.S. continued to provide financial and military support, but there was an increasing recognition that Pakistan’s internal political dynamics made it a less reliable partner. According to scholars, the U.S. needed to balance its reliance on Pakistan’s cooperation in Afghanistan with acknowledging that Islamabad’s strategic interests often diverged from Washington’s.

From 2001 to 2010, U.S.-Pakistan relations were defined by cooperation driven by necessity, particularly in the context of the War on Terror. While the two nations worked together on counterterrorism and military operations in Afghanistan, their relationship was also marked by deepening mistrust and frustration. U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s support for militant groups, nuclear security, and internal instability created significant diplomatic challenges. Despite these tensions, the decade rendered the indispensable nature of the U.S.-Pakistan partnership, as both countries navigated the complexities of their divergent interests.

Throughout the 2010s, the bilateral cooperation between China and Pakistan has <sup>13</sup>reached a new high with the incorporation of additional dimensions of collaboration across various sectors within the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key strategic element of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As Pakistan's economic dependence on China grew, including a "boost in April 2015 during Chinese President Xi Jinping's Pakistan visit, where he announced the allocation of US 46 billion dollars for its completion (...) the largest investment China has committed to another country, and the largest Pakistan has ever received" (Ali, G. 2016), its relationship with the U.S. shifted. While the U.S. continued to provide aid, Pakistan increasingly looked to China for investment, infrastructure development, and military support, and "China supplies Pakistan with nuclear technology and assistance, including what many experts suspect was the blueprint for Pakistan's nuclear bomb" (Afridi, J. & Bajoria, J. 2010). China's involvement in Pakistan's economy and military was seen as a counterbalance to U.S. influence, further complicating the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. This growing Sino-Pakistani cooperation posed a challenge for U.S. foreign policy, as it intersected with broader U.S.-China competition in the region and because "Pakistan considers China a more reliable ally than the United States, citing years of diplomatic manipulation and neglect on the part of Washington" (Afridi, J. & Bajoria, J. 2010). For the U.S., China's rising influence in Pakistan and across South Asia represented a potential threat to its strategic interests, especially regarding India, with whom the U.S. sought to deepen ties as part of its broader Indo-Pacific strategy.

While this increasing closeness to China, in August 2010, "U.S. intelligence agencies developed information that Osama bin Laden was likely living in a compound in northern Pakistan. On May 2, 2011, under orders from President Obama, a special operations unit raided the compound and killed bin Laden," (Federal Bureau of Investigation), who had been evading capture in Pakistan for several years, marking a significant turning point in U.S.-Pakistan relations. The fact that bin Laden resided near a Pakistani military academy led to intense scrutiny of Pakistan's role in harboring terrorists, even if unintentionally. The bin Laden raid severely strained relations, prompting the U.S. public and lawmakers to question the billions of dollars in aid provided to Pakistan. In Washington, some argued that Pakistan had either been incompetent or complicit in allowing bin Laden to remain concealed within its borders, hence

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<sup>13</sup> Official Message of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Ministry of Planning, Development, and Special Initiatives. Retrieved from <https://cpec.gov.pk/messages/12>.

“it was implausible that every high-ranking Pakistani military or intelligence officer was unaware that Bin Laden had been hiding (...) north of Islamabad” (Stevenson, J. 2011) and In Pakistan, the raid sparked outrage, as it was viewed as a violation of the country’s sovereignty, because it was done in secret without the consent or previous knowledge of Pakistan.

Despite the bin Laden incident, the United States continued to view Pakistan as a critical partner in the region, particularly in terms of counterterrorism and the war in Afghanistan, leading to a period of recalibration. The U.S. sustained military aid to Pakistan, although some voices in Congress advocated for reductions due to concerns about Pakistan’s reliability as an ally. Between 2001 and 2010, according to Foreign Assistance USAID, U.S. <sup>14</sup>assistance to Pakistan amounted to USD 5,080.63 million over the first ten years, with the highest amounts allocated in FY 2002 and FY 2010. From 2011 to 2020, the total aid was USD 5664 million, with the most significant quantities disbursed in FY 2011 and FY 2010.

Economic cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan remained significant throughout the decade. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) continued to support projects to improve Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy sector, which had been severely affected by years of political instability and corruption, “influencing Pakistan’s economic landscape, revealing both opportunities and vulnerabilities tied to its dependence on the United States” (Irfan, M. & Riaz, A. 2025). On its part, Pakistan was heavily reliant on this assistance to maintain economic stability, especially as its economy faced pressures from rising inflation, a growing trade deficit, and political instability. Although the economic relationship did not receive the same level of attention as the military alliance, it remained a critical aspect of U.S.-Pakistan cooperation.

Also, while there was significant cooperation in targeting terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the U.S. remained frustrated by Pakistan's ongoing ties with groups like the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network. These militant organizations operated in Afghanistan but were seen as strategic assets by Pakistan’s military establishment, which viewed them as a counterbalance to Indian influence in Afghanistan. This dual policy,

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<sup>14</sup>US Aid to Pakistan (2001-2020): Public Diplomacy Failures at the Behest of Strategic Gains. Centre For Strategic and Contemporary Research. Retrieved from [https://cscr.pk/pdf/perspectives/US-AID-TO-PAKISTAN-\(2001-2020\)-PUBLIC-DIPLOMACY-FAILURES%20AT-THE-BEHVEST-OF%20STRATEGIC-GAINS.pdf](https://cscr.pk/pdf/perspectives/US-AID-TO-PAKISTAN-(2001-2020)-PUBLIC-DIPLOMACY-FAILURES%20AT-THE-BEHVEST-OF%20STRATEGIC-GAINS.pdf)

where Pakistan would simultaneously fight some terrorists while allegedly supporting others, became a persistent point of contention between Islamabad and Washington.

According to BBC (2018), President Donald Trump “has previously accused Pakistan of deceiving the US while receiving billions of dollars” and “The US state department has criticized Pakistan, a key ally, for failing to deal with terrorist networks operating on its soil, including the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban.”

Regarding the tumultuous history of the relationship between the US and Pakistan, the most critical juncture in U.S.-Pakistan relations toward the end of the decade was the U.S.-led effort to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan, “due to a change in the U.S.’s geopolitical strategy, which began to focus on Asia” (Masta, A. Y. 2022) and because financially and militarily the US was facing losses and constraints. Pakistan played a pivotal role in facilitating talks between the U.S. and the Taliban, leveraging its historical ties with the group to bring them to the negotiating table. Pakistan's role was crucial in securing the 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, which was later<sup>4</sup> denominated as the “Doha Deal”, “provides for withdrawal of all American and allied troops from Afghanistan in 14 months, assurance from Taliban to prevent any group or individual, including Al- Qaeda, from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies” (Abraham, J. C. 2020) and other requests.

The U.S. remained concerned that Pakistan’s military establishment continued to view the Taliban as a strategic asset, and there were fears that once U.S. forces withdrew, Pakistan might exert influence over a Taliban-dominated Afghan government in ways that could undermine regional stability, mainly against India. Both cooperation and contention shaped the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from 2010 to 2020. While Pakistan remained a key ally in counterterrorism efforts, particularly in Afghanistan, persistent issues regarding its ties to militant groups and its nuclear program strained the alliance; hence, a “potential Pakistan-India nuclear arms race has been the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia” (Kronstadt, K. A. 2005).

The bin Laden raid and U.S. drone strikes exacerbated tensions, having and even created suspicious thoughts such as “that the ISI had connived with the September 11 attackers” (Ungerer, C. et al. 2011), even as the two countries continued to cooperate on military and economic fronts, but due to mistrust in the Intelligence Service of Pakistan for knowing the



location of Bin Laden, the service became more and more questionable to the U.S. The rise of China as a dominant partner for Pakistan, due to “long historical relations of Pakistan and China when the whole world was experiencing the curse of Cold War” (Yaseen, Z. et al. 2017) and with the establishment of economic partnerships and the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), further complicated the U.S.-Pakistan dynamic, leading to new geopolitical challenges for both countries as they navigated a rapidly changing global landscape. Although the U.S. and Pakistan remained strategically linked throughout the decades, the relationship increasingly reflected a transactional nature rather than one based on mutual trust or shared values.

## **4.2. Cooperation: Protocols, Treaties, and Official State Visits from 2001 - 2010**

Between 2001 and 2010, the U.S. and Pakistan established several key agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in response to regional security and economic challenges. These agreements reflect a complex relationship shaped by shared interests in combating terrorism and promoting economic development. In the tables below, data was collected about the visits made by U.S. Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Secretaries of State to Pakistan from 2001 to 2010 (Table 1) and the visits of Pakistani Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Foreign Ministers to the U.S.

**Table 4.1,** Official Visits by US Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Secretaries of State to Pakistan, 2001-2010

DATE	OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE	COUNTERPART	SCORE
2001	Secretary of State Colin Powell	President Pervez Musharraf	4
January 2002	Secretary of State Colin Powell	President Pervez Musharraf	4
July 2002	Secretary of State Colin Powell	President Pervez Musharraf	4
March 2004	Secretary of State Colin Powell	President Pervez Musharraf	4
March 2005	Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice	President Pervez Musharraf	4

October 2005	Secretary of State Condolezza Rice	President Pervez Musharraf	4
March 2006	President George W. Bush	President Pervez Musharraf	2
June 2006	Secretary of State Condolezza Rice	President Pervez Musharraf	4
December 2008	Secretary of State Condolezza Rice	President Asif Ali Zardari	4
October 2009	Secretary of State Hillary Clinton	Foreign Minister Qureshir	6

**Table 4.2,** Official Visits by Pakistan Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers to the US, 2001-2010

DATE	OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE	COUNTERPART	SCORE
November 2001	President Musharraf	President George W. Bush	2
February 2002	President Musharraf	President George W. Bush	2
September 2002	President Musharraf	President George W. Bush	2
June 2003	President Musharraf	President George W. Bush	2
September 2003	President Musharraf	President George W. Bush	2
October 2003	Prime Minister Khan Jamali	President George W. Bush	3
September 2004	President Musharraf	President George W. Bush	2
December 2004	President Musharraf	President George W. Bush	2
January 2006	Prime Minister Shaukaut Aziz	President George W. Bush	3

September 2006	President Musharraf	President George W. Bush	2
July 2008	Prime Minister Yousaf Gillani	President George W. Bush	3
September 2008	President Zardari	President George W. Bush	2
May 2009	President Zardari	President Barack Obama	2
September 2009	President Zardari	President Barack Obama	2
April 2010	Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani	President Barack Obama	3

**Table 4.3,** Agreements between the US and Pakistan from 2001 to 2010

DATE	TREATIES/AGREEMENTS/ PROTOCOLS	DESCRIPTION
2001	Strategic Alliance for Combating Terrorism	After the 11 September attacks, the US and Pakistan forged an alliance to fight terrorism, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal regions.
2003	The Economic Assistance Agreement	An agreement in which the US pledged to provide financial assistance to Pakistan, mainly through funds for economic development and anti-poverty program.
2003	Scientific and Technical Cooperation	-
2003	Agreement	Regarding the surrender of persons to international tribunals
2006	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)	The TIFA (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement) was signed to promote trade and investment between the two countries.

2007	Agreement	Mutual assistance between their customs administration.
2009	USA - Pakistan Strategic Partnership Agreement	Formalization of cooperation in various areas: security, energy, education, economic development.
2010	Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act (Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act)	This agreement extended financial assistance to Pakistan to 1.5 billion dollars a year for economic development.

### 4.3. Cablegate Event: Bradley Manning

The Cablegate leaks, which occurred in 2010, represent one of the most significant events in modern whistleblowing, with profound implications for international diplomacy. WikiLeaks published around 250,000 confidential diplomatic cables, primarily to the embarrassment of the U.S. government. But how does an event of such magnitude happen? To begin with, WikiLeaks, according to Britannica, is a media organization and website that serves as a clearinghouse for classified or otherwise privileged information. It was founded in 2006 by an Australian activist and computer programmer, Julian Assange. Many say that Assange was inspired by former whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers<sup>15</sup>, and created a digital platform available to anyone to expose wrongdoing within governmental organizations, hence the state.

The traditional relationship between the government and society has completely shifted at the turn of the century. An important determinant of this shift was the invention of the Internet, a form of communication that has established a global network, creating a unique channel for the sharing of information. The development of the Internet and "globalization revealed itself as a mechanism for renewing the social bond, which will be characterized by a new relationship with knowledge promoted by the synergy of skills, imagination, and collective intelligence" (Silva, L. nd: 3). That collective intelligence gave space for exchanging information in real-

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<sup>15</sup> The Pentagon Papers, are parts of the report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force, commissioned by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. Then in 1971, those parts of the report were leaked to the press and widely shared by a military analyst, Daniel Ellsberg, believed the Vietnam war was not ethical correct and the study conducted, and report developed should be available to the American public.

time and by people directly involved, precisely from the source of the information to the public in general.

The Cablegate event was orchestrated by a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst, Chelsea Manning, who provided WikiLeaks with over 250,000 classified U.S. diplomatic cables. These revelations highlighted the United States' behind-the-scenes activities and frank assessments of global allies and adversaries. Among the countries implicated in these leaks was Pakistan, a pivotal partner in America's post-9/11 foreign policy, particularly concerning counterterrorism efforts in South Asia.

The cables related to Pakistan, listed in attachments A to G, revealed several sensitive topics, from concerns over Pakistan's nuclear security, according to attachment 3, to its complex relationship with militant groups and the U.S.'s war in Afghanistan. One of the more concerning revelations was the U.S. government's deep distrust regarding Pakistan's control over its nuclear arsenal. Cable sent from Islamabad Embassy to the Secretary of State in Washington DC, classified as SECRET, revealed that U.S. officials feared the potential for nuclear material to fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue actors within Pakistan, *"there is simply no question of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands"* and this fear had long underpinned U.S. policy towards the region, but its open disclosure strained bilateral relations, as it publicly questioned Pakistan's sovereignty and ability to safeguard one of its most valued assets. Hence, Pakistan, according to the cable, was afraid that *"If the local media got word of the fuel removal, they certainly would portray it as the United States taking Pakistan's nuclear weapons."*

Further tensions were fueled by revelations concerning Pakistan's ties to militant groups, according to attachment 5, from the Islamabad Embassy to the Secretary of State in Washington and classified as SECRET. The cable suggested that certain elements within Pakistan's intelligence services, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), maintained covert relationships with extremist organizations such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, as stated in the message *"In response to queries posed by the National Security Council, Embassy Islamabad believes that it is not/not possible to counter al-Qaeda in Pakistan absent a comprehensive strategy that 1) addresses the interlinked Taliban threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan"*. The U.S. had long suspected this dual game, wherein Pakistan would outwardly cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism operations but simultaneously protect groups it viewed as essential for maintaining strategic influence in Afghanistan. These suspicions, though not new,

were laid bare in the leaks, exacerbating already fraught trust issues between Washington and Islamabad.

In addition, the cables highlighted the internal political instability in Pakistan and its leadership's complicated balancing act between aligning with U.S. policies and managing domestic anti-American sentiment. At the time, President Asif Ali Zardari was portrayed as a vulnerable leader, heavily dependent on U.S. support but fearful of public backlash for his perceived closeness to the United States. The leaks further underscored how U.S. diplomats had a nuanced understanding of these domestic pressures and actively sought ways to mitigate any potential fallout from the partnership with such an unpopular leader. The revelations also impacted U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, where Pakistan played a crucial logistical role. The U.S. relied on Pakistan for supply routes to NATO forces, making the relationship indispensable despite the significant mistrust. Considering the leaks, Pakistan faced increased scrutiny from both its citizens and neighboring countries, further straining its cooperation with the U.S. Despite these challenges, both countries recognized the necessity of continuing their partnership. However, it became evident that the relationship was more transactional than strategic.

Overall, the Cablegate leaks regarding Pakistan highlighted the deep complexities in U.S. foreign policy toward a country seen as both a partner and a challenge. It revealed the delicate balancing act required to maintain diplomatic relations in a region fraught with nuclear concerns, extremist threats, and political instability, all of which were exacerbated by the public exposure of U.S. diplomatic communications. These revelations from Cablegate exposed the deep undercurrents of mistrust that would continue to shape their interactions in the years to come.

#### **4.4. Cooperation: Protocols, Treaties, and Official State Visits from 2011 to 2020**

Between 2011 and 2020, the U.S. and Pakistan established several key agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in response to regional security and economic challenges. These agreements reflect a complex relationship shaped by shared interests in combating terrorism and promoting economic development. The tables below collect data about the visits made by U.S. Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Secretaries of State to Pakistan from 2011 to

2020 (Table 3) and the visits of Pakistani Presidents, Prime Ministers, and foreign ministers to the U.S. (Table 4).

**Table 4.4,** Official Visits by U.S. Presidents, Vice Presidents, and secretaries of State to Pakistan, 2011-2020

DATE	OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE	COUNTERPART	SCORE
May 2011	Secretary of State Hillary Clinton	President Asif Ali Zardari	4
October 2011	Secretary of State Hillary Clinton	President Asif Ali Zardari	4
July 2013	Secretary of State Forbes Kerry	President Asif Ali Zardari	4
January 2015	Secretary of State Forbes Kerry	Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif	5
October 2017	Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson	Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Ab-basi	5
September 2018	Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo	Prime Minister Imra Khan	5

**Table 4.5,** Official visits by Pakistani Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Foreign Minister to the USA, 2011-2020


DATE	OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE	COUNTERPART	SCORE
January 2011	President Asif Ali Zardari	President Barack Obama	2
May 2012	President Asif Ali Zardari	President Barack Obama	2
October 2013	Prime Minister Mohammed Sharif	President Barack Obama	3
October 2015	Prime Minister Mohammed Sharif	President Barack Obama	3
July 2019	Prime Minister Imran Khan	President Donald Trump	3

**Table 4.6,** Agreements between the US and Pakistan from 2011 to 2020

DATE	TREATIES/AGREEMENTS/ PROTOCOLS	DESCRIPTION
2012	Peshawar-Torkham Road Agreement	Improve the conditions of the section of National Highway N5, that served as a NATO supply route and providing the Pakistani military with access to key areas in the FATA and KP.

#### 4.4. DATA Collection Results: 2001-2020

The official state visits made by representatives of both countries from 2001 to 2020 reflect the diplomatic commitment and the highlights and setbacks of U.S. foreign policy.



**Figure 4.1,** Timeline of Official State Visits - Temporal Proximity of Events (2001-2020)

It is noted that the event marked by a red line refers to the Cablegate incident, which highlights a tumultuous period in the bilateral relations between the two nations. Analyzing all the visits, one can conclude that between 2001 and 2010, there was a consistency in diplomatic ties, particularly in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2009. After that point, visits became occasional and of lower levels, as previously mentioned. Additionally, regarding the establishment of protocols, treaties, and agreements, several agreements were made in various areas from 2001 to 2010, reinforcing cooperation at different levels. Following the Cablegate event, such celebrations became infrequent, with only one agreement and one protocol, indicating a decline in cooperation between the two states.





## CHAPTER 5

### Conclusion

The central question of the dissertation was whether whistleblowing acts as a catalyst for diplomacy. It specifically examined how the Cablegate case influenced bilateral relations between the US and Pakistan and impacted their foreign policy toward each other.

The Cablegate case highlights the challenges of digital availability and its evolution from the user's perspective, including its freedom of navigation. This paradigm shift enables ordinary citizens to share and distribute true and false information. With this availability, various challenges arise, such as balancing foreign policy with diplomatic secrecy, the impact of whistleblowing on foreign policy, and subsequently on international relations, which can be significant or minimal, however, it always creates some constraints, even if only on a trust level, affecting relationships and generating mistrust, which can complicate diplomatic discussions and shape foreign policy. This lack of trust in diplomatic work and efforts, as revealed by Cablegate, not only negatively affected the bilateral relationship with the US but also led Pakistan to reinforce its position and strategic goals in the east. The political involvement with China, through the Belt and Road Initiative, in 2013 led to the establishment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), allowing Pakistan to reinforce its importance as a geopolitical actor to China. Having in mind the delicate content of Cablegate, the relationship between Pakistan and the US was undoubtedly harmed and began to decrease.

The diplomatic instruments analysis, such as the official representative visits of each state to the other in the time frame of ten years prior and ten years after the event, as the agreements, protocols, and treaties celebrated in the same timeframe, concludes the existence of a decrease in the bilateral relation between both states. Comparing the first analysis period with the second, the visits valued at 2 points (High Diplomatic Relevance) decreased from 12 trips to only 2 in the second decade. The visits valued at 5 or 6 points (Operational Diplomatic Importance), increased from one visit valued at 6 points in the first decade to three visits valued at 5 points in the second decade. However, this increase occurred in the lower-valued interaction and still appears in the decade when fewer visits took place. The same applies to treaties, agreements, and protocols, whose celebration decreased from eight to only one in the second decade, shifting from security, economic, military, and scientific domains to a security domain, specifically regarding the reconstruction of a road for NATO supplies. The increase in lower-valued

interactions, while high-value interactions decreased sharply, evidences the impact this case had on the direct diplomatic relationship between the two states.

Our analysis highlights a different approach from the first decade to the second decade, regarding US foreign policy towards Pakistan and vice versa. The data concludes that from 2001 to 2010, the relationship between both countries was prospering and creating fruitful domains of cooperation, advancing not only US interests in the region but also developing Pakistan from within, thanks to economic aid coming from the US. Then, Cablegate happened, and from that moment on, the relationship became turbulent and involved in this feeling of mistrust and suspicion, undermining what had been built to date. From 2011 to 2020, the relationship was characterized by low interactions; nevertheless, there was a concern to maintain the image that both countries were still cooperating, while in fact, Pakistan was turning towards Asia, and the US was approaching closer to India, also a rival to Pakistan.

Despite the analyzed data, neither state officially recognized the impact of Cablegate. This lack of recognition can be explained if we take into consideration theoretical perspectives focusing on whistleblowing and its direct effects on trust. According to the previously described theories, the first being realism, the disclosure of sensitive and classified information is viewed as a threat to national security and state power, necessitating a failure to acknowledge the true impact of such an event. This recognition of weakness can lead to the exploitation of external rivals, aligning with the US's lack of reaction. Additionally, according to Liberalism, the failure to acknowledge this event arises from the fear of damaging a relationship that has been developed over decades. Recognizing this damage implies admitting that the foreign policy in practice has been compromised. From this perspective, Pakistan did not officially recognize the mistrust it faced following the document leak, as it still needed a "relationship" with the US, even though it could never replicate the same dynamics and objectives that existed before Cablegate. However, even though neither the US nor Pakistan officially recognized the danger and seriousness of Cablegate, several reactions from different US actors highlighted the undermining of trust mentioned previously. For instance, <sup>16</sup>Robert Gibbs, a former White House spokesman, stated that the cables would compromise private discussions and could deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests but also those of our allies and friends around the

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<sup>16</sup> Aljazeera. (2010). Massive trove of confidential US diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks draws a variety of responses. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/11/29/reaction-to-wikileaks-documents>.

world. Additionally, Roger Cressey, a former US cybersecurity and counterterrorism official, remarked that it was devastating and that the leak jeopardized the most basic of diplomatic requirements for the future. Also, do not forget the documents are classified as SECRET and NOFORN (No Foreign Dissemination). This highlights the need to protect the information being transmitted. If the documents were classified with SECRET, which according to the National Security Agency means “unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the nation”, such as ‘jeopardizing the international relations of the United States’, then the content was important and could affect the relationship between both countries, which was verified.

The hypothesis being considered was that Cablegate could somehow reinforce cooperation, in the sense that both parties would try to “fix” the damage and get closer to each other, conveying the image that despite efforts to undermine their relationship, Cablegate ultimately brought them closer and that there was nothing serious to address. However, this was not the case, and for this reason, we cannot assume that whistleblowing acts as a catalyst for diplomacy. On the contrary, it catalyzes separation and mistrust, creating a barrier that becomes increasingly difficult to overcome and achieve results. For diplomats, it becomes more challenging to advance their state’s interests and to establish coherent and strong channels of communication and diplomacy.

In conclusion, Cablegate was an event that undermined U.S. foreign policy worldwide, creating a significant diplomatic impact on U.S. relations with Pakistan, as shown by the data examined in this dissertation. Contrary to the hypothesis that whistleblowing can catalyze diplomacy, it does not; instead, it produces the opposite effect.



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# Attachments

## Attachment A. Military Messaging Handling System: Biden Doubts Pakistan's Support for U.S. Goals

DATE 2009-02-06 15:03:00

SOURCE Embassy Islamabad

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000270

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034 TAGS: PREL, PTER, MARR, PGOV, PK SUBJECT: CODEL BIDEN'S MEETING WITH COAS KAYANI AND ISI PASHA

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Summary: Senators Biden and Graham met with Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Kayani and Director General of ISI LTGen Pasha on January 9 to underscore bipartisan support for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Senator Biden emphasized the need for the American people to see results soon in Afghanistan, and he wanted to be sure the U.S. and Pakistan had the same enemy as we moved forward. Senator Biden sought Kayani's views about what kind of Afghanistan would represent success for Pakistan.

2. (S) Kayani said the U.S. and Pakistan were on the same page, but there would be tactical differences. Cooperation with U.S. military, with whom he had excellent relations, had improved. Kayani stressed the military's support for Pakistan's civilian government. He described his campaign in Bajaur and plans to confront the insurgents in the rest of the tribal agencies. Kayani said he urgently needed help for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Kayani was candid that the government has essentially abandoned the Swat valley. Senator Graham emphasized the need to prosecute the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leaders involved in the Mumbai attacks and to incorporate the tribal agencies into Pakistan's legal system. End summary.

3. (S) Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), accompanied by Ambassador and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Director Antony Blinken, met with COAS Kayani and DG ISI Pasha January 9 for ninety minutes. Senator Biden asked Kayani to describe his view of a stable Afghanistan.

4. (S) Senator Graham added his presence emphasized bipartisan support for Pakistan. (He had just visited Pakistan three weeks ago.) Senator Graham said he was going to support the Biden-Lugar bill, but he needed to convince his constituents of the value of investing in schools in Pakistan instead of South Carolina. Pakistan needed to prosecute those involved in the Mumbai attacks and be seen as a country that observed the rule of law.

5. (S) Kayani replied that Pakistan and the US had a convergence of interests. Kayani's goal was a peaceful, friendly and stable Afghanistan. Kayani said he had no desire to control Afghanistan. In fact, he said, anyone who wanted to control Afghanistan was ignorant of history, since no one has ever controlled it. Kayani noted there had been confusion about the policy of "strategic depth" but for him "strategic depth" meant a peaceful Afghanistan "on his back." But the Pashtuns have to be accommodated, Kayani added. Biden asked if Kayani made a distinction between the Pashtuns and the Taliban. Kayani replied that the Taliban were a reality, but the Afghan government dominated by the Taliban had had a negative effect on Pakistan.

6. (S) Kayani recalled he told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen that the U.S. needed realistic expectations of what the Pakistani military could achieve and that these expectations had to be clearly articulated. Kayani described his campaign in Bajaur and his plans to confront the insurgents in other tribal agencies, but he repeatedly said he had capacity problems, particularly regarding equipment. Kayani said he needed urgent support for the 150,000 people displaced from the fighting. He said the military had undertaken hundreds of sorties in Bajaur, and the population of Bajaur was so far supportive of the military efforts. Senator Graham mentioned the success of the CERP program in Iraq and Afghanistan which had put money in the hands of commanders for urgent community needs.

7. (S) Kayani recounted the situation in Swat in which the provincial government had made accommodations with the militants, requiring the army to retake the area repeatedly. Kayani also said the population, once it saw the army pull out, was far less likely to support it the second time around. The military had to be followed by civilian agencies or the local support would diminish.

8. (S) Kayani said military efforts needed the political support of the civilian government. He recalled that when

ISLAMABAD 00000270 002 OF 003

the Federal Investigative Agency headquarters in Lahore had been hit by suicide bombers, the citizens of Lahore had demonstrated against the government rather than against the suicide bombers. While the army had sent the message in Bajaur that it meant business, there had to be follow-up support from the civilian agencies. Kayani said as his campaign moved through the tribal agencies, the army should ideally need to use diminishing force. When they have to fight for the same ground repeatedly, it becomes increasingly difficult and demoralizing to the troops.

9. (S) Senator Biden asked Kayani if he had the capacity and could obtain sufficient resources, would he then move against Taliban leaders like Baitullah Mehsud, Commander Nazir, and the Haqqanis. Senator Biden asked Kayani if he were prepared to move into the Waziristans.

10. (S) Kayani replied that Bajaur had been the "hardest nut to crack" militarily: the Pakistani military had undertaken an operation in South Waziristan last October, but the army had moved out because of the elections. The Pakistani military had also had a fort in the middle of Waziristan which had been cut off by militants. Kayani said he was painfully aware that the army had to retake South Waziristan since ninety percent of the suicide bombers came from Baitullah Mehsud. "He has to be cut down to size," said Kayani.

11. (S) But, Kayani said, the Pakistani military could not fight everyone at once. They would have to go after Mehsud and Nazir sequentially (a point Pasha confirmed). Biden said it was important to be in agreement on this issue. Pasha said the United States and Pakistan needed to have confidence in each other. Pasha said he was hurt about the inference that he did not have a relationship of trust with CIA. He had gone to Washington for a frank talk with CIA Director Hayden and he often briefed, and sought the advice of, the RAO Chief in Islamabad. Senator Biden repeated he was not going to revisit the past. Pasha replied that there was no reason for ISI to be protecting "these people" and he had no interest in saving them.

12. (S) Senator Biden said he needed to know that the situation had changed. Senator Biden said he understood that the Pakistani military lacked capacity, but would the situation change if they had additional resources. It was important to know if we had the same enemy: the U.S. needed to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan's part of the bargain. Graham added that "General Musharraf had cut deals, but those deals didn't work out."

13. (S) Kayani repeated there had been considerable cooperation on the technical level with U.S. forces. But this did not mean that there would not be differences of opinion on tactics. On Afghanistan, Kayani stressed ) "past, present, and future" -- we are on the same page.

14. (S) Regarding LeT, Kayani said Pakistan would not allow small groups to dictate state policy. Pakistan had not waited for evidence and they had moved immediately. The information they had now was based on confessions. Pakistan needed Indian cooperation to move the investigation forward. Kayani also insisted that any information available about upcoming attacks be shared with Pakistan. He understood that information about the attack had been provided to India but not to Pakistan. He said repeated discussion about "the next attack and all bets were off" only provided an incentive for another attack. Biden said that what was important was Pakistan's action against LeT and similar organizations. Senator Biden said he would share what he had heard with Admiral Mullen and emphasized the need for results.

15. (S) General Kayani said he appreciated the Senators' frank response. He repeated his need for help with IDPs. Senator Biden said the system of reimbursement through Coalition Support Funds would be reexamined. Kayani said that the military had only received about \$300 million of the \$1 billion ostensibly reimbursed for military expenses. He was not implying that the money had been stolen, but had been used for general budget support.

ISLAMABAD 00000270 003 OF 003

16. CODEL Biden has cleared this message. PATTERSON

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**DESTINATION**  
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TO	RUEHC/SECSTATE	WASHDC	IMMEDIATE	1371
INFO	RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY	KABUL	PRIORITY	9783
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY	LONDON		PRIORITY	9608

RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY	NEW	DELHI	PRIORITY	4409
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL		KARACHI	PRIORITY	1023
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL		LAHORE	PRIORITY	6720
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL		PESHAWAR	PRIORITY	5644
RHEFDIA/DIA		WASHINGTON	DC	PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT	STAFF	WASHINGTON	DC	PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF		WASHINGTON	DC	PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA		WASHDC		PRIORITY
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## Attachment B. Military Messaging Handling System: Pakistan's Leader Worries About Threat from Own Army

DATE 2009-04-03 22:17:00

SOURCE Embassy Santiago

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTIAGO 000324

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019 TAGS: OVIP (BIDEN, JOSEPH), PREL, ECON, PGOV, SOCI, UK, PK, AF SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 27 MEETING WITH BRITISH PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN

SANTIAGO 00000324 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Simons for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

1. (U) March 28, 2009; 8:30 am; Vina del Mar, Chile.

2. (U) Participants:

U.S. Joseph Biden, Vice President Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor to the Vice President Brian McKeon, Deputy National Security Advisor to the Vice President Brian Harris (notetaker), Political/Economic Officer, U.S. Embassy Guatemala City

United Kingdom Gordon Brown, Prime Minister Thomas Fletcher, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Stuart Wood, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister Douglas Alexander, Secretary of State for International Development

3. (C) Summary: During a bilateral meeting on the margins of the Progressive Governance Leaders Summit in Chile, Vice President Joseph Biden and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown discussed the economic crisis in terms of the upcoming G-20 Summit and Afghanistan and Pakistan. On economic issues, Brown pressed Vice President Biden to push the Germans to move forward with \$250 billion in special drawing rights (SDRs) for the IMF, to use IMF gold sales to support poorest countries and to take the initiative to restart





momentum for the rest of the world, including India, to re-engage in the discussions. Opening new sectoral discussions on Doha would garner the Administration international support without needing to make difficult political compromises or commitments for the time being.

9. (C) UK Secretary of State for International Development Douglas Alexander said it was important to find a way to move forward on the Doha Agreement. Trade discussions are like riding a bike, i.e., you have to keep moving forward or you fall down. If we do not proactively move forward and eventually come to a successful conclusion to the Doha round, the United States could be blamed in some quarters. The Doha round was meant to be the &development8 round of negotiations with significant aid from donor nations contingent upon the agreement's successful conclusion. If it did not pass, some governments that stand to lose aid, such as Brazil, would likely blame the United States.

10. (C) Vice President Biden did not commit on any of these issues but noted that labor interests in the United States were not satisfied and were looking to the Administration to establish its labor &bona fides.8 In a year, he said, movement on economic and trade issues would either be easier or impossible depending on the direction of the world economy.

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AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN  
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11. (C) Turning to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Vice President Biden described the importance of combating terrorism and noted the different elements of the Obama administration's policy. First, the focus in Afghanistan is on Al Qaida. The Obama administration will not make an open-ended commitment to building freedom and democracy in Afghanistan because it is not realistic. Second, there is no real possibility of defeating Al Qaida without also dealing with Pakistan. Third, he recognized that the United States cannot solve the problem on its own. The whole world needed to engage.

12. (C) Vice President Biden said he worried that NATO countries in Europe underestimated the threat from the region and viewed the problem as an economic development issue rather than a security issue, despite the fact that Afghan opium is primarily exported to Europe and Europe has been the victim of several terrorist attacks originating from the region. Vice President Biden described the complex nature of the security problem in Afghanistan, commenting that &besides the demography, geography and history of the region, we have a lot going for us.8

13. (C) Vice President Biden noted that the current U.S. commitment of 63,000 troops to Afghanistan is the result of a vigorous internal policy debate and would not be sustainable politically for more than two years without visible signs of progress. After two years, the extraordinary cost of maintaining a robust military presence in Afghanistan would make additional commitment increasingly difficult. After Afghan elections the Administration intends to review the situation again. Currently there is little capacity for the Afghan government to execute many of the functions of government. In many areas of the country, local officials have close to no knowledge of how to govern or even basic knowledge of payroll or budget. Part of the reason the Taliban is strengthening is since the Taliban has the local capacity to settle basic disputes quickly while central government courts can take six to eight months to process a case.

14. (C) The idea of a strong rule of law under a centralized

SANTIAGO 00000324 003.2 OF 003

Karzai government was not realistic. New policy towards the Taliban should reflect the reality of the Afghan government's lack of capacity. Our policy should first aim to stabilize the urban areas and surrounding rural communities and then seek to exploit divisions within the Taliban, co-opting moderate elements rather than simply defeating militarily all elements of the Taliban.

15. (C) On Pakistan, Vice President Biden commented that it was difficult to convince Pakistan to commit to developing its counter-insurgency potential. The threat from India leads Pakistan to devote the bulk of its defense spending to conventional warfare capabilities. However, something must be done in the meantime. We need to develop our relationship with Pakistan beyond its current transactional nature to a long-term strategic partnership. We should begin with \$1.5 billion per year in economic assistance that is unconditional and supplement that with military assistance that is conditioned on the modernization of its command structure and active action in the field to combat insurgents. It would be difficult to convince Congress to support such a plan, particularly the unconditional civilian component.

16. (C) Vice President Biden noted that the United States wants to empower the UN and wants active European participation in resolving the threats in Pakistan and Afghanistan. With the exception of the UK and a few others, very few Europeans are taking action. Germany completely dropped the ball on police training but NATO countries should continue to provide assistance that is within their capacity to deliver.

17. (C) Brown agreed that there was a significant terrorist threat emanating from the region. More than 30,000 Pakistanis travel back and forth to the UK each year and two-thirds of the terrorist threats that UK security forces investigate originate in Pakistan -- including one on-going investigation. The roots of terrorism in Pakistan are complicated and go beyond the madrasas to, in some areas, a complete societal incitement to militancy. Zedari's commitment to combating terrorism is unclear, although he always says the right things.

18. (C) Brown agreed on the need for a shared commitment and noted that the only way to reduce the threat and eventually draw down NATO's commitment to the region was by increasing the capacity of Afghanistani and Pakistani security services. Dividing the Taliban would greatly reduce its effectiveness, though doing this made the Iraq problem look easy by comparison.

19. (S) Vice President Biden commented that Zedari had told him two months ago that ISI director &Kiyani will take me out.<sup>8</sup> Brown thought this unlikely and said that Kiyani did not want to be another Musharraf, rather he would give civilian leadership scope to function. However, he was wary of the Sharif brothers and Zedari.

20. (U) The Office of the Vice President cleared this message. SIMONS

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**DESTINATION**

VZCZCXRO9502

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RUEHROV

DE	RUEHSG	#0324/01	0932217
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O	032217Z	APR	09
FM	AMEMBASSY		SANTIAGO
TO	RUEHC/SECSTATE	WASHDC	IMMEDIATE 4751
INFO	RUCNMEM/EU	MEMBER STATES	COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY	ISLAMABAD	PRIORITY	0060
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY	KABUL	PRIORITY	0020
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL	KARACHI	PRIORITY	0018
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL	LAHORE	PRIORITY	0013
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 0248			

## Attachment C. Military Messaging Handling System: Ambassador's concerns about nuclear material

**DATE 2009-05-27 16:32:00**

**SOURCE Embassy Islamabad**

**CLASSIFICATION SECRET**

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S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 001152

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2019 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, KNNP, MNUC, PK  
SUBJECT: U.S. REMOVAL OF PAKISTAN RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL ON HOLD

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)

1. (S) Kamran Akhtar, Disarmament Director in Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Poloff on May 26 that the recent spate of media attention on Pakistan's nuclear security has led the GOP to delay an important nonproliferation effort, the removal of U.S.-origin highly-enriched uranium spent fuel from a Pakistani nuclear research reactor. The GOP agreed in principle to the fuel removal in 2007, but has been slow in scheduling a visit by U.S. technical experts to discuss logistical and other issues. In recent months, the Strategic Plans Division and Ministry of Foreign Affairs both indicated progress on the matter and a proposed visit for late May was under review. However, according to Akhtar, a recent GOP interagency review of the program concluded that the "sensational" international and local media coverage of the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons made it impossible to proceed at this time. If the local media got word of the fuel removal, "they certainly would portray it as the United States taking Pakistan's nuclear weapons," he argued. The visit will have to be delayed for 3-4 months or until the political climate makes it more conducive to hosting a U.S. visit, he stated.

2. (S) Comment: As noted in previous post reporting, the GOP is extremely sensitive to media focus on Pakistan's nuclear program. In a sign of their growing defensiveness, the Foreign Office Spokesman took significant time out of his May 21 press conference to address nuclear security, stating categorically, "there is simply no question of our strategic assets falling

into the wrong hands." To a question about reported offers of U.S. help with nuclear security, he responded, "we do not need this assistance." With the postponement of the nuclear fuel removal, it is clear that the negative media attention has begun to hamper U.S. efforts to improve Pakistan's nuclear security and nonproliferation practices. End Comment. PATTERSON

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**DESTINATION**  
VZCZCXRO3997

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DE	RUEHIL		#1152	1471632
ZNY		SSSSS		ZZH
P	271632Z		MAY	09
FM		AMEMBASSY		ISLAMABAD
TO	RUEHC/SECSTATE	WASHDC	PRIORITY	2939
INFO	RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY		KABUL	0361
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY		LONDON		0460
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY		NEW	DELHI	4966
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL		PESHAWAR		6251
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL		LAHORE		7312
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL		KARACHI		1712
RHEHNSC/NSC		WASHINGTON		DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT	OF	ENERGY	WASHINGTON	DC
RUEAIIA/CIA		WASHINGTON		DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF		WASHINGTON		DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT	STAFF		WASHINGTON	DC
RHMFIS/CDR USCENTCOM	MACDILL AFB FL			

## Attachment D. Military Messaging Handling System: Human Rights Abuses by Pakistani Army

**DATE** 2009-09-10 14:40:00

**SOURCE** Embassy Islamabad

**CLASSIFICATION** SECRET//NOFORN

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S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002185

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2034 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PTER, MOPS, MASS, KJUS, PK  
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN SECURITY FORCES' HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

REF: ISLAMABAD 2074

Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d

1. (S/NF) A growing body of evidence is lending credence to allegations of human rights abuses by Pakistan security forces during domestic operations against terrorists in Malakand Division and the Federally Administered Tribal

Areas. While it is oftentimes difficult to attribute with accuracy any responsibility for such abuses, reporting from a variety of sources suggests that Frontier Corps and regular Pakistan Army units involved in direct combat with terrorists may have been involved. The crux of the problem appears to center on the treatment of terrorists detained in battlefield operations and have focused on the extra-judicial killing of some detainees. The detainees involved were in the custody of Frontier Corps or Pakistan Army units. The allegations of extra-judicial killings generally do not/extend to what are locally referred to as "the disappeared" -- high-value terrorist suspects and domestic insurgents who are being held incommunicado by Pakistani intelligence agencies including the Inter-Services Intelligence Division (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) in their facilities.

2. (S/NF) Revenge for terrorist attacks on Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps personnel is believed to be one of the primary motivating factors for the extra-judicial killings. Cultural traditions place a strong importance on such revenge killings, which are seen as key to maintaining a unit's honor. Senior military commanders have equally and repeatedly stressed their concerns that the courts are incapable of dealing with many of those detained on the battlefield and their fears that if detainees are handed over to the courts and formally charged, they will be released, placing Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps troops at risk. This fear is well-founded as both Anti-Terrorism Courts and the appellate judiciary have a poor track record of dealing with suspects detained in combat operations such as the Red Mosque operation in Islamabad and have repeatedly ordered their unconditional release. Post assesses that the lack of viable prosecution and punishment options available to the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps is a contributing factor in allowing extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses of detained terrorist combatants to proceed. There may be as many as 5000 such terrorist detainees currently in the custody of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps from operations in Malakand, Bajaur, and Mohmand. As operations in these areas and other parts of the FATA proceed, this number will increase.

3. (S/NF) NWFP Police have also been implicated in the abuse and extra-judicial killing of terrorist suspects that they believe responsible for attacks on police stations and individuals in the run-up to the conflict. This is a separate problem set from those detained in combat by Frontier Corps and Pakistan Army units. The NWFP Inspector General of Police has publicly announced the establishment of a Human Rights Unit within his office to prevent, investigate, and punish human rights violations committed by his forces. As a component of the police training program that we are now standing up for the NWFP, post intends to offer assistance to the Inspector General of Police and his new unit on education and prevention of human rights abuses and investigations and prosecutions where abuses are suspected.

4. (S/NF) In an effort to stem extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses of these detained in combat by Pakistan security forces, post is proposing a multi-pronged approach as follows:

Short Term:

-- Diplomatic Engagement: Continue to privately raise this issue repeatedly and at the highest levels of the Pakistan government and military. Ensure that expressions of concern over the alleged extra-judicial killings coupled with calls for transparent investigations and, as appropriate, prosecution are included in the talking points of all senior USG civilian and military visitors in meetings with Pakistani civilian and military counterparts. Timeline: Ongoing. Funding: None required.

-- Offer Assistance: Coordinate with the British High Commission on an offer of assistance to the Defense Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). To the Defense Minister propose assistance in drafting a new Presidential Order that would create a parallel administrative track for charging and sentencing terrorists detained by the military in combat operations. Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act are already well underway. To the COAS, propose bringing over a team of American and British experts to evaluate the detainee issue and to determine jointly what assistance is required from coalition partners. If COAS agreement is forthcoming, bring over a team of American military lawyers to meet with Pakistan military officials with a view to obtaining concurrence on training in battlefield evidence collection, investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses by military personnel, and assistance on drafting the new Presidential Order proposed to the Defense Minister: Timeline: Meeting with COAS and Defense Minister by end of September 09. Team deployed by October 09. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funding.

-- Evaluate Detainee Situation: Local Pakistan military commanders and FATA/NWFP officials have approached various offices with request for assistance on dealing with detained combatants under the guise of reintegration. Post proposes bringing over a senior representative from INL's prison reform office to lay the groundwork for a visiting team that would conduct a formal assessment of conditions and infrastructure/personnel/systems needs of the local prison system for potentially housing these detainees. This report would form the baseline for development of an assistance strategy to help the GOP address the issue. Timeline: INL initial visit in September 2009. Followed by assessment mission in October 2009 with report to be completed by November 2009. Funding: INCLE funds will need to be reallocated.

#### Medium Term

-- Draft Ordinance: Get UK agreement to lead a team of British, and possibly American, experts to work with the Pakistan Defense Ministry and Army to draft a new Presidential Ordinance for the administrative prosecution and punishment of terrorists detained in combat operations (this process is already underway in Pakistan). Representatives of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will need to agree to participate in the drafting process. Post will approach the HRCP at an appropriate time but will require Washington/Geneva assistance in obtaining ICRC agreement. Adoption of the Presidential Ordinance would offer a credible way for the Pakistan military/government to prosecute and punish terrorists detained in combat operations. Timeline: Deploy team by December 09 with a view to completing ordinance by April 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funds.

-- Pakistani JAG and Intelligence Officer Training: Offer Detainee Operations training for Pakistan's JAG and intelligence officers. This five-day course would cover evidence collection on the battlefield, proper detainee handling, interrogations, international humanitarian law, laws governing internal armed conflicts, and war crime prosecutions. Timeline: Training courses to begin by January 2010. Funding: IMET funds have been allocated for this training.

#### Long Term

-- Assist in Implementation of Ordinance: Provide training to Pakistan military and Frontier Corps personnel on collection of battlefield evidence

and its use in prosecution. Coordinate with British on providing appropriate training for personnel of administrative structure to be established through Presidential ordinance. Timeline: Training courses to begin by May 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing IMET and other Foreign Assistance funding.

-- Prison Reform: Design and fund a prison reform program to construct/rehabilitate existing federal/provincial prisons to accommodate terrorists detained in combat operations both pre-trial and post-conviction. Convince other donors to assist GOP in developing post-release programs to reintegrate into their communities detainees deemed not fit for trial or those who have served their sentences. Timeline: Launch prison reform program by October 2010. Approach donors on reintegration by September 2010 through SRAP. Funding: New INCLE funds will be needed.

4. (S/NF) Comment: Post fully recognizes that there is little that the USG can do to change the culture of revenge that underlies many of the extra-judicial killings taking place in the Malakand Division and FATA. However, it is our view that if senior commanders are offered a viable alternate to deal with detained combatants and a credible detention facility under control of the Prisons Department is established, the prevalence of human rights abuses will diminish. Post recognizes that much of this is dependent on goodwill within the Pakistan military and civilian establishment that can easily erode if too much public criticism from USG officials over these incidents is forthcoming. For this reason, post advises that we avoid comment on these incidents to the extent possible and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy outlined above. End Comment.

PATTERSON

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DESTINATION							
INFO	LOG-00	MFA-00	EEB-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	A-00	ACQ-00
INL-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	DS-00	DHSE-00	EUR-00		OIGO-00
FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VCI-00	OBO-00	H-00	TEDE-00		INR-00
IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	MOFM-00	MOF-00	VCIE-00		NEA-00
DCP-00	NSAE-00	ISN-00	OIC-00	NIMA-00	PA-00		PM-00
GIWI-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	ISNE-00	DOHS-00		FMPC-00
SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	STR-00	NCTC-00	ASDS-00		CBP-00
SCRS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00		NFAT-00
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FM			AMEMBASSY				ISLAMABAD
TO	SECSTATE		WASHDC		IMMEDIATE		4799
INFO	CIA		WASHINGTON		DC		IMMEDIATE
JOINT	STAFF		WASHINGTON		DC		IMMEDIATE
SECDEF		WASHINGTON		DC			IMMEDIATE
CDR	USCENTCOM		MACDILL	AFB	FL		IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY							KABUL
AMEMBASSY			NEW				DELHI
AMEMBASSY							LONDON
AMCONSUL							KARACHI
AMCONSUL							LAHORE
AMCONSUL							PESHAWAR
USMISSION							GENEVA
USCENTCOM	INTEL		CEN	MACDILL	AFB		FL
NSC WASHINGTON	DC						



## Attachment E. Messaging Handling System: Will Extra Aid Persuade Pakistan to Cut Ties to Extremists?

DATE 2009-09-23 15:09:00

SOURCE Embassy Islamabad

CLASSIFICATION SECRET//NOFORN

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S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002295

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, EAID, PK  
SUBJECT: REVIEWING OUR AFGHANISTAN - PAKISTAN STRATEGY

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 b and d

1. (S/NF) Summary: In response to queries posed by the National Security Council, Embassy Islamabad believes that it is not/not possible to counter al-Qaeda in Pakistan absent a comprehensive strategy that 1) addresses the interlinked Taliban threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2) brings about stable, civilian government in Afghanistan, and 3) reexamines the broader role of India in the region. As the queries presuppose, the ending of Pakistani establishment support to terrorist and extremist groups, some Afghan-focused and some India-focused, is a key element for success. There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India. The only way to achieve a cessation of such support is to change the Pakistan government's own perception of its security requirements. End Summary.

2. (S/NF) Al-Qaeda can operate in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) largely because the Taliban-related groups in these areas continue to challenge the writ of the Pakistani government. Unilateral targeting of al-Qaeda operatives and assets in these regions is an important component of dealing with the overall threat. It is not/not, however, sufficient in and of itself to force al-Qaeda out of the FATA, so long as the territory remains largely ungoverned space. Increased unilateral operations in these areas risk destabilizing the Pakistani state, alienating both the civilian government and military leadership, and provoking a broader governance crisis in Pakistan without finally achieving the goal. To be effective, we must extend the writ of the Pakistani state into the FATA in such a way that Taliban groups can no longer offer effective protection to al-Qaeda from Pakistan's own security and law enforcement agencies in these areas. We should be under no illusion, however, that this effort will not require a multi-year, multi-agency effort.

3. (S/NF) Taliban groups in Pakistan and the regional threat posed by al-Qaeda, however, cannot be effectively dealt with absent a broader regional strategy that leads to stability in Afghanistan. Fear that the ISAF mission in Afghanistan will end without the establishment of a non-Taliban, Pakhtoon-led government friendly to Pakistan adds to the Pakistani establishment's determination not to cut its ties irrevocably to the Afghan Taliban. They

fear that withdrawals of NATO countries on a date certain from Afghanistan is only the thin edge of a wedge that will be followed by other coalition partners, including the United States. Discussions of deadlines, downsizing of the American military presence, or even a denial of the additional troops reportedly to be requested by Gen. McChrystal are taken as evidence that reinforces this perception. General Kayani has been utterly frank about Pakistan's position on this. In such a scenario, the Pakistan establishment will dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which they see either as ultimately likely to take over the Afghan government or at least an important counter-weight to an Indian-controlled Northern Alliance.

4. (S/NF) Most importantly, it is the perception of India as the primary threat to the Pakistani state that colors its perceptions of the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan's security needs. The Pakistani establishment fears a pro-India government in Afghanistan would allow India to operate a proxy war against Pakistan from its territory. Justified or not, increased Indian investment in, trade with, and development support to the Afghan government, which the USG has encouraged, causes Pakistan to embrace Taliban groups all the more closely as anti-India allies. We need to reassess Indian involvement in Afghanistan and our own policies towards India, including the growing military relationship through sizable conventional arms sales, as all of this feeds Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and Kashmir-focused terrorist groups while reinforcing doubts about U.S. intentions. Resolving the Kashmir dispute, which lies at the core of Pakistan's support for terrorist groups, would dramatically improve the situation. Enhanced USG efforts in this regard should be considered.

5. (S/NF) Money alone will not/not solve the problem of al-Qaeda or the Taliban operating in Pakistan. A grand bargain that promises development or military assistance in exchange for severing ties will be insufficient to wean Pakistan from policies that reflect accurately its most deep-seated fears. The Pakistani establishment, as we saw in 1998 with the nuclear test, does not view assistance -- even sizable assistance to their own entities -- as a trade-off for national security vis-a-vis India. The lack of faith in USG intentions in Pakistan and in relation to India makes such a bargain untenable in the eyes of the Pakistani establishment. Development assistance in the context of the Pakistani counter-insurgency strategy must be accelerated and refined in order to extend the government writ to the FATA, to stabilize regions at-risk for insurgent activity and recruitment, and to offer incentives for those that desire to leave terrorist groups. It can and should not/not be viewed as a pay-off for behavior change by the Pakistani establishment.

6. (S/NF) In the final analysis there is no short-cut to dealing with the al-Qaeda problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is inextricably linked to and cannot be divorced from the Taliban problem in both countries. Nor can we hope to develop a strategy for minimizing Taliban influence and thereby al-Qaeda operational space in Pakistan's FATA absent a strategy that brings about stability in Afghanistan; the notion that precision or long-range counter-terrorism efforts can suffice are equally illusory. Afghan instability by definition leads the Pakistani establishment to increase support for the Taliban and thereby, unintentionally, create space for al-Qaeda. No amount of money will sever that link. Rather, we must reassess our regional approach and find ways to reassure the Pakistanis that they can address their long-standing national security objectives most effectively -- both to the east and to the west -- by working closely with the U.S.

PATTERSON

SECRET

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**DESTINATION**

ACTION							SCA-00
INFO	LOG-00	EEB-00	AID-00	A-00	ACQ-00	CA-00	CCO-00
CG-00	CIAE-00	COME-00	CTME-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00		DS-00
EUR-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VCI-00	H-00	TEDE-00		INR-00
INSE-00	L-00	MOFM-00	MOF-00	M-00	VCIE-00		NEA-00
NRC-00	NSAE-00	ISN-00	OCS-00	OES-00	OMB-00		PA-00
PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SCT-00	ISNE-00	DOHS-00		SP-00
SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USSS-00	IIP-00	PMB-00		DSCC-00
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FM			AMEMBASSY				ISLAMABAD
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AMEMBASSY		NEW		DELHI			IMMEDIATE
NSC		WASHINGTON		DC			IMMEDIATE
CIA		WASHINGTON		DC			IMMEDIATE
SECDEF		WASHINGTON		DC			IMMEDIATE
JOINT	STAFF		WASHINGTON		DC		IMMEDIATE
CDR	USCENTCOM		MACDILL	AFB	FL		IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL			KARACHI				PRIORITY
AMCONSUL			LAHORE				PRIORITY
AMCONSUL			PESHAWAR				PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY							LONDON
USCENTCOM	INTEL	CEN	MACDILL	AFB	FL		

## Attachment F. Military Messaging Handling System: Closer Military Ties with Pakistan

**DATE 2009-10-09 07:25:00**

**SOURCE Embassy Islamabad**

**CLASSIFICATION SECRET**

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002449

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2034 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK SUBJECT:  
(S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING U.S. SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL  
TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS

REF: ISLAMABAD 2116

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c), and  
(d)

1. (S) Summary: The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved  
deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military

operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in Bajaur Agency, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces. The developments of the past two months thus appear to represent a sea change in their thinking. End Summary.

2. (S) Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed ODRP that it approved a request from the Army's 11 Corps Commander, Lt. General Masood Aslam, for U.S. SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to **XXXXXXXXXXXX** South Waziristan and **XXXXXXXXXXXX** North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice to the 11 Corps' **XXXXXXXXXXXX**. The 11 Corps had informally approached ODRP about our providing such support approximately one week ago; ODRP responded positively.

3. (S) SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the **XXXXXXXXXXXX** and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video. SOC(FWD)-PAK's initial CONOPs envision deployment of six personnel each to **XXXXXXXXXXXX**. In order to finalize our planning and obtain formal go-ahead from CENTCOM, ODRP has requested additional information on the timing and purpose of the 11 Corps' planned military operations from Brigadier General Amjad Shabbir, the Army's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO).

4. (S) This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC) at **XXXXXXXXXXXX**, in Bajaur Agency in the FATA, provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location.

5. (S) In recent days, the FC informally approached ODRP for a repeat deployment of SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to **XXXXXXXXXXXX**. SOC(FWD)-PAK is preparing a CONOP while the FC obtains approval from GHQ.

6. (S) Comment: U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent approval by GHQ -- almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to Bajaur and the Waziristans appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we do not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel into the field with them for operational advice and other support. In addition, the success of the initial deployment to **XXXXXXXXXXXX** likely helped catalyze the follow-up requests for new and repeat support.

7. (S) Comment Continued: These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related

matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance. End Comment.

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RHEHNSC/NSC		WASHINGTON		DC
RUEAIIA/CIA		WASHINGTON		DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT	STAFF		WASHINGTON	DC
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## Attachment G. Military Messaging Handling System: U.S. Opposed A.Q. Khan's release.

DATE 2008-04-10 22:26:00

SOURCE Secretary of State

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

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S E C R E T STATE 037957

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018 TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PK, PREL SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RELEASE OF A.Q. KHAN

Classified By: SCA Richard A. Boucher, Reasons: 1.4 B C AND D

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SUMMARY	AND	Action	request
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1. (C) Washington is concerned that the government of Pakistan may release A.Q. Khan. Washington requests Post to please draw from points in para 4, as appropriate, with senior government officials including the Director General of Strategic Plans Division Lt. Gen (retd) Kidwai.

End summary and action request.

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OBJECTIVES  
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2. (S/NF) Post should achieve the following objectives:

-- Inquire about the accuracy of press reports indicating that Dr. Khan will soon be released from house arrest.

-- Express Washington,s strong opposition to the release of Dr. Khan and urge the Government of Pakistan to continue holding him under house arrest.,

-- Explain the possible negative consequences that the release of Dr. Khan will have on Pakistan,s image in the international community. Note that it would undermine the positive steps Pakistan has taken on nonproliferation.

-- Urge Pakistan to consider the long-term gains it could garner from the international community by continuing Dr. Khan,s current status rather than the short-term domestic political gains that could result from his release.

End objectives.

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BACKGROUND  
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3. (S/NF) Recent press reports indicate a plan for Dr. Khan,s release was approved for delivery to Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani. We should determine the accuracy of the reports and clearly indicate to the new government, as well as Director General Kidwai, our strong opposition to Khan,s release. Dr. Khan was the central figure in the most egregious violation of nonproliferation norms to date and his release would likely indicate to the international community a disregard by Pakistan for the dire threat still posed to international security by Dr. Khan,s activities. It could also undermine ongoing prosecution efforts underway in other countries to punish Khan associates and would be a setback to our ongoing bilateral nonproliferation efforts with Pakistan.

End background.

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Talking  
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Points

4. (S/Rel Pakistan) Begin Talking Points for Pakistan:

-- Pakistan has taken positive steps over the past few years to demonstrate its commitment to nonproliferation, including enacting its 2004 export control law, establishing the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV), and joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

-- We are deeply troubled by press reports that Pakistan may consider releasing Dr. Khan. We hope that these press reports are not accurate.

-- We urge you not to change Dr. Khan,s current status. While the release of Dr. Khan would be viewed positively by some in Pakistan, it would undermine Pakistan,s broader nonproliferation efforts and signal to the international community that Pakistan is no longer concerned about the harm caused by Dr. Khan and his network.

-- When Dr. Khan was pardoned by President Musharraf, Pakistan was widely criticized in the international community for not having prosecuted him or anyone else associated with his proliferation activities.

-- The damage done to international security by Dr. Khan and his associates is not a closed book. Other countries continue efforts to prosecute those involved. The U.S., and other countries, as well as the IAEA, are expending enormous amounts of time and resources to address the threats that resulted from Dr. Khan,s engagement with Iran, North Korea, and possibly other states.

-- Because of Khan,s actions, the international community must contend with the reality that the uranium enrichment technology and nuclear weapons designs that were sold to Libya are now available to other states and non-state actors. This will make it much harder to combat nuclear proliferation in the future.

-- The U.S. and Pakistan have worked together to address the problems caused by Dr. Khan,s proliferation to other countries and we look forward to our continued close cooperation on this and other related issues.

End talking points for Pakistan.

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REPORTING DEADLINE  
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5. (U) Please report response if possible by April 17, 2008.

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POINT OF CONTACT  
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6. (U) Department point of contact is Chris Herrington ISN/CPI, 647-5035. Please slug all responses for ISN, T, and SCA. Washington appreciates Post,s assistance. RICE

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