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**The role of managers' bases of power in the relationship between
perceived organisational politics in performance appraisal and
impression management**

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Master's Degree in Human Resource Management and Organisational Consulting

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I would like to thank my dear parents, my beloved grandmothers, and my awesome sisters for their unconditional support throughout this time.

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Abstract

This dissertation aims to study the role of managers' bases of power in the relationship between perceived organisational politics in performance appraisal and impression management. The data was collected in a survey made in Qualtrics, and it was published on social media and distributed among people who already have some work experience (N= 142).

Furthermore, conducting a 2x2 design vignette study, this study manipulated OPPA and bases of power within the four scenarios. Before the statistical analysis was done, it was checked whether the manipulation had worked.

Based on the data analysis, while the hypotheses were not supported, I found that the two power bases (positional and personal) are negatively correlated which depicts the different natures of these two power bases. Also, OPPA is positively correlated with Positional Power and negatively correlated with Personal Power which is in line with the arguments made in the hypotheses. In addition, OPPA has a significant and negative correlation with C.B.'s gender. Furthermore, among the relationship between OPPA and impression management, only one significant relationship was found (OPPA and exemplification). In addition, personal power was shown to have a positive effect on self-promotion. Finally, self-promotion has a significant and positive correlation with ingratiation; exemplification has a significant and positive correlation with ingratiation and supplication, and supplication also has a significant and positive correlation with ingratiation which shows these impression management dimensions go hand in hand.

Keywords: OPPA; Impression Management; Bases of Power.

Resumo

Esta dissertação visa estudar o papel das bases de poder dos managers na relação entre a percepção da política organizacional na avaliação do desempenho e na gestão de impressão. Os dados foram recolhidos num inquérito realizado no Qualtrics, e foram publicados nas redes sociais e distribuídos entre pessoas que já trabalham (N= 142).

Realizei um estudo vinheta com o design 2x2, que tem como objetivo manipular o OPPA e as bases de poder nos quatro cenários apresentados. Antes de ter sido feita a análise estatística foi verificado se a manipulação tinha funcionado.

Com base na análise dos dados, embora as hipóteses não sejam suportadas, descobri que o poder posicional e o pessoal estão negativamente correlacionados, o que demonstra as suas diferentes naturezas. O OPPA está positivamente correlacionado com o poder posicional e negativamente correlacionado com o poder pessoal, o que está de acordo com os argumentos das hipóteses.

O OPPA e a gestão de impressão, só tem apenas uma relação positiva significativa – a do OPPA com a exemplificação. Demonstrou-se também, que o poder pessoal tem um efeito positivo na auto-promoção e que o OPPA tem uma correlação significativa e negativa com o género de C.B.. Por fim, a autopromoção tem uma correlação significativa e positiva com a ingratização; a exemplificação tem uma correlação significativa e positiva com a ingratização e a suplicação, e a suplicação tem também uma correlação significativa e positiva com a ingratização, o que demonstra que estas dimensões da gestão de impressão andam de mãos dadas.

Palavras-chave: OPPA; Gestão de Impressão; Bases do Poder.

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1 Introduction

Nowadays, all organisations suffer from the shortcomings of performance appraisals and how to do them more effectively and fairly (Fletcher & Perry, 2001). As we know, performance appraisals rarely have the consensus of the rated and the rater. There is often disagreement and there are several employees who do not agree with assessments or with the way they were carried out (Latham & Dello Russo, 2008). Moreover, sometimes, employees realize that there are organisational politics influencing their performance evaluations and that the ratings have nothing to do with their efforts or dedication to their work (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992). For this reason, some employees may end up revolting or even giving up on giving their best at work. Others may take advantage of these organisational politics and might use impression management to influence their evaluations.

In addition, the power of the manager who does the evaluations may also influence how employees react to their ratings. Thus, two bases of power in this dissertation were considered: positional and personal. Positional power is based on the organisational hierarchy given by superiors and is related to authority, punishment, and coercion. While personal power is based on a person's individual characteristics, it is associated with the reference, example and technical competencies. (Rosenfeld et al., 1994). In this regard, positional power substantially affects impression management more than personal power. A leader with positional power uses behaviours that may cause fear, lead workers to show less of their personality, and create a distrustful organisational environment.

On the other hand, the definition of personal power shows why it has less notorious effects on impression management. The leader with personal power is a reference and someone they trust and admire (Raven, 2008). Moreover, employees do not need to engage in impression management behaviours often because they trust their manager to be fair and considerate. For all these reasons, the basis of the manager's power was taken into consideration in this dissertation.

Therefore, this dissertation aims to study the role of managers' bases of power in the relationship between perceived organisational politics in performance appraisal and impression management.

In this regard, using a 2x2 vignette study with multiple scenarios, I collected my data using a survey made in *Qualtrics*, published it on my social media and distributed it among my network of people who already have some work experience. The goal was to collect around 400 responses hoping to achieve 320 valid responses.

This dissertation contributes to research by explaining the effects and consequences of organisational politics in performance appraisals (OPPA) on the behaviours employees would engage in as a result, considering the rater's power. The objective of the research is to understand if higher perceptions of OPPA result in higher impression management and if positional power (in comparison to personal power) of the leader moderates the relationship between OPPA and impression management.

The practical implications of this research will allow organisations to take steps to create a functional and progressing organisational environment. By identifying the problems with the politics in the performance appraisal, managers will be able to understand where the organisation is failing and, therefore, identify the missing needs of their employees. Following the results of this study, it may be possible for some managers to change some less correct or more political behaviours and actions they have towards their workers to create a more favorable organisational environment for all.

Finally, at the end of this study, the limitations and future research will be described in detail to conclude and finalise this dissertation.

This research is part of a larger project entitled as REAL PAL which is founded by the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation (FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia). The reference number of the project is [PTDC/PSI-GER/29124/2017](#).

2 Theoretical background

The research question involves three concepts, namely organisational politics in performance appraisal (OPPA), impression management and bases of power. In what follows, I will explore how these concepts relate to each other.

2.1 Organisational Politics in Performance Appraisal (OPPA)

By definition, organisational politics are self-interest behaviours that are implemented by individuals or groups, but that are not sanctioned by the organisation (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992). Conflicts are aggravated in the workplace when there is self-interested political behaviour (Kacmar & Baron, 1999). Thus, when organisational politics increase in organisations, conflict increases too (Latham & Dello Russo, 2008). The perception employees have about the political nature of their work environment influences how they work and how they feel about the company they work for (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992). Such perception often brings serious negative results for workers, such as high levels of turnover, stress and lower levels of job satisfaction and organisational commitment. In this way, a highly political organisation, even unintentionally, rewards its employees for affinity and power and not necessarily for their job performance (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992). When an employee gives his best and dedicates himself to his job to reach the maximum effort, he expects to receive a reward, and when this expectation is not met due to an unfair reason, it results in a decrease in his commitment and his motivation (Varma et al., 1996). Thus, high perceptions of organisational politics lead to low expectations because workers fail to see the effort-reward relationship. A work environment that is not considered political, is a place where employees know that their efforts will be rewarded or valued, and where employees perform better to help the organisation reach its goals (Latham & Dello Russo, 2008).

On the other hand, performance appraisal is a human resource management tool that has received much attention in the last decades. Performance appraisals have been used as inputs to salary adjustments, promotions, training, and other decisions that influence employees' attitudes and behaviours (Fletcher & Perry, 2001).

Performance appraisal has a crucial role in evaluating employees' behaviour for attaining the goals of the organisation (Dello Russo et al., 2017). The goal of adopting the employee performance appraisal in the enterprise is to guide and motivate employees' activities in line with the organisational objective and leading to the creation of organisational performance (Farndale & Kelliher, 2013).

However, as we know, it is difficult to assess someone's performance in the best way, because we never know if we are doing it in the right way or with the best instrument possible (Com et al., 2015). The truth is that being human leads to the occurrence of mistakes and preferences that directly or indirectly influence our decisions (Staw & Cummings, 1992). This leads to evaluating performance with some limitations. Moreover, performance appraisals are prone to politics and such organisational politics in performance appraisals (OPPA) have negative effects on employees (Tziner & Murphy, 1999). For example, performance appraisals that are made by a manager who wants to avoid conflicts with his subordinates and does not want to give negative feedback to avoid confrontation, cannot be considered fair (Curtis et al., 2005). Thus, an unfair performance appraisal, as well as a perception of politics, give employees a negative attitude towards work, which does not help to create a good working environment in an organisation (Farndale & Kelliher, 2013).

2.2 Impression Management

By definition, impression management is a process in which individuals try to influence the perception people have about something (a person, an event or a project). In other words, as Rosenfeld and colleagues (1994) argue, impression management is the process whereby people seek to influence the image others have of them. In that case, impression management can be considered a politically motivated behaviour that places personal goals above group or organisational goals. Therefore, impression management is a purposive and goal-directed behaviour (Leary et al., 1986). Furthermore, impression management occurs when someone wishes to create a specific identity or tries to control and manipulate others' impression (Bolino & Turnley, 1999). In a context where an employee perceives that political behaviour is widespread in the organisation, especially in the way his performance is evaluated, this employee may use impression management

tactics to enhance or protect his share of organisational resources and benefits, to the extent that such conduct becomes purely self-serving.

2.2.1 Self-promotion

Self-promotion is used by workers when they want to promote their growth and make themselves look good (Latham & Dello Russo, 2008). It is also used by employees who try to show their superiors that they are competent and talented. OPPA can influence self-promotion in the case when workers perceive that their performance appraisal is evaluated politically. In such cases, they may engage in promoting themselves so that their superior takes into account their competencies and talents and, for that reason, evaluates them better.

2.2.2 Ingratiation

Ingratiation is the purposeful use of flattery, elevating others, or participating in opinion conformity in which an individual accepts another person's ideas to build a connection with the targeted individual (Ralston, 1985). In truth, it is possible to affirm that this type of impression management will be used more when the employees perceive that there are politics going on in the performance evaluations (Yan et al., 2020). Perceiving that the evaluation tends to be unfair and that there is more possibility of a better performance appraisal, employees may tend to flatter and agree with their chiefs.

2.2.3 Exemplification

Exemplification is defined as an impression management strategy whereby employees wish to model and demonstrate to others their willingness to do more or better than is necessary for an effort to control how they are perceived (Long, 2017).

Additionally, exemplification is described as an impression management technique in which employees want to demonstrate to others their commitment, doing more than is required to influence how they are viewed.

The word exemplification comes from the word exemplar, in the organisational context, it is an exaggerated demonstration of perfection and fulfilment of work tasks, such as working more than the regulated hours or not taking holidays for many months in a row. When the perceptions of OPPA are high, employees may engage in exemplification so that their leader can better evaluate them, considering their exacerbated efforts to show their "exemplary" behaviour.

2.2.4 Supplication

By definition, supplication is a behaviour in which an employee wants to create an impression of neediness and vulnerability by describing his weaknesses (Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 2013). Supplication aims to request attention from other people (Rosenfeld et al., 1994). When perceptions of OPPA are high in an organisation, employees may use supplication to appeal for empathy, for their weaknesses, to their superior when they are doing the performance appraisal.

As a result, of the four impression management variables, it is possible to see that one of the adverse effects of OPPA can be impression management becoming widespread. This leads us to the first hypothesis:

H1. Higher perceptions of OPPA result in higher impression management (a) self-promotion, b) ingratiation, c) exemplification, d) supplication) among employees

2.3 Bases of power

The typology of social power bases, originally developed by French and Raven (1959), is the best-known framework for studying social or interpersonal power. Social influence is defined as a change in the belief, attitude, or behaviour of an individual -the target of influence-, which results from the action, or presence of another person or group of people -the influencing agent. Moreover, social power can be seen as the potential for such influence. However, as Raven (2008) describes, "The bases of power differ in the manner that the social change is implemented, the permanence of such change, and the ways in which each basis of power is established and maintained." (p. 2). Therefore, there are two categories of bases of power: positional and personal.

Leaders with positional power are leaders who can exert influence over an ethical climate by virtue of the position held - it is based on obedience to authority, rewards, and punishments (Randall, 2012). In a situation where employees perceive their performance appraisal to be political and the leader who does the political evaluations is the one with positional power, i.e. due to their hierarchical position, he or she can reward, punish or fire their employees. For this reason, it can be argued that employees will engage in more impression management behaviours to impress the powerful leader. This leads us to the second hypothesis:

H2: Positional power of the leader moderates the relationship between OPPA and IM. Those who have a leader with positional power will engage more in IM (a) self-promotion, b) ingratiation, c) exemplification, d) supplication) when OPPA is high.

However, leaders with personal power are leaders who can exert influence over an ethical climate by virtue of their own abilities and personalities- which relies upon the skills, abilities and traits of a leader (Randall, 2012). Personal power is more of a person's attitude rather than an attempt to maneuver or control others. In contrast to positional power, leaders with personal power have greater connection with their workers. For this reason, the manager does not need the employees to try to impress him/her for something other than their job, and workers do not feel the need to have to impress their manager for extra-work matters.

In consequence, in a situation where employees perceive their performance appraisal to be political and the leader who does the political evaluations is the person with personal power, i.e. whose power relies on his skills and abilities, it can be argued that employees will engage in less impression management to impress the adept leader. This leads us to the third hypothesis:

H3: Personal power of the leader moderates the relationship between OPPA and IM. Those who have a leader with personal power will engage less in IM (a) self-promotion, b) ingratiation, c) exemplification, d) supplication) when OPPA is high.

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3 Preliminary model

Figure 1 depicts the preliminary model of this study.




Figure 1 - Preliminary Model

H1. Higher perceptions of OPPA result in higher impression management (a) self-promotion, b) ingratiation, c) exemplification, d) supplication) among employees

H2: Positional power of the leader moderates the relationship between OPPA and IM. Those who have a leader with positional power will engage more in IM (a) self-promotion, b) ingratiation, c) exemplification, d) supplication) when OPPA is high.

H3: Personal power of the leader moderates the relationship between OPPA and IM. Those who have a leader with personal power will engage less in IM (a) self-promotion, b) ingratiation, c) exemplification, d) supplication) when OPPA is high.

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4 Methodology

In this empirical research, a vignette study was conducted in which multiple scenarios were used to manipulate variables such as OPPA and bases of power. Vignette studies use short descriptions of situations or people (vignettes) that are often shown to respondents in surveys to obtain their judgments about scenarios (Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010).

Vignettes are more effective than other studies as they draw on the strengths of classical experiments and research methodology, counterbalancing the weaknesses of each of these forms of study (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). Traditional surveys have a high external validity and therefore a high representativeness, but in turn, classical experimental designs have a controlled mode of intervention. Individual experiments have low external validity and therefore, little representation, but their configuration is excessively simplified (Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010). Therefore, vignette studies try to overcome these limitations by combining the traditional survey with a vignette experiment.

4.1 Sample

Between May 2022 and August 2022, I collected my data using a survey made in *Qualtrics*. I published it on my social media (*Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and LinkedIn*), and I distributed it among my network of people who already have some work experience.

I collected a total of 548 responses. From this total, only 142 met the requirements I was looking for. The requirements were the following: 1) the questionnaire had to be 100% complete; 2) the scenario had to be read in at least 30 seconds since we believe that it is only after these 30 seconds that people read the scenario carefully.

Given the above requirements, 406 responses were removed from the analysis - 384 were incomplete, and 22 were removed because the scenario was read in less than 30 seconds.

4.2 Procedure

In this vignette study, a 2x2 design is used to manipulate OPPA and bases of power, as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, four scenarios were designed. Each scenario begins with this introduction: “You are working at “Unique Solutions”, an international company that sells customized managerial solution software for businesses. You work in the Marketing & Sales department in a team of five members, including yourself, Carlos, Maria, Paulo and Catarina. All of you are supervised by C.B., the Sales Manager”. The name C.B. is used since it is a neutral name and will not directly influence the answers given by respondents.

The four scenarios were as follows: Scenario 1 accounts for a situation in which the manager uses politics in the way s/he evaluates the subordinates. In this scenario, the manager is shown as someone with personal power. Scenario 2 depicts a situation where the manager uses politics in the performance appraisal s/he makes. Also, this manager is portrayed as someone with positional power. Scenario 3 where the imaginary manager does not use politics in the evaluation s/he makes on the respondent’s performance. Moreover, descriptions are provided that show that the manager has personal power. Scenario 4 in which OPPA is low, meaning that the imaginary manager does not use politics in evaluations s/he makes on the respondent’s performance. Moreover, examples depict the manager as someone with positional power.

The number of responses in each scenario is shown in Figure 2.

		Power Bases	
		Positional	Personal
OPPA	Low	35	33
	High	30	44

Figure 2 - 2x2 design for the vignette study

Being part of a larger project, respondents were presented with some questions that are not presented in this dissertation. For this study, after the scenario, there were questions dedicated to the manipulation checks (for OPPA, personal and positional powers), impression management, and demographic information.

4.3 Measurements

4.3.1 OPPA and bases of power

This study manipulated OPPA and bases of power within the scenarios. Therefore, for these constructs, manipulation checks were added to the survey.

Respondents were asked about the two types of power, positional and personal, with this question: "How do you see C.B. as a manager?". There were six items (three referring to positional power and the other three referring to personal power) to rate their agreement with each item. Five-point Likert scale (1 "strongly disagree" to 5 "strongly agree") was used. Checking the reliability of the items, Cronbach's alpha was measured for the items related to personal and positional power. Cronbach's alpha for personal power was $\alpha=0.78$. The Cronbach's alpha for positional power was low ($\alpha=0.28$), so two of the items were removed. Therefore, the manipulation checks were done for the remaining item. Results demonstrate that the manipulation check for positional power was successful ($\chi^2=42.31$, $df=3$) since the chi-square was significant ($p<.001$). The chi-square for personal power was also significant ($\chi^2=32.229$, $df=3$, $p<.001$).

To check whether manipulating OPPA worked or not, the respondents were asked: "How do you characterize the usual performance evaluation done by C.B.?" and they had five items to rate their agreement with each item (five-point Likert scale from 1 "strongly disagree" to 5 "strongly agree" was used). Cronbach's alpha for OPPA was $\alpha=0.89$, therefore the measures were reliable. From the answers given to these items, it was possible to understand whether the OPPA manipulation was well executed or not. Results demonstrate that the OPPA has ($\chi^2=144.510$, $df=60$, $p<.001$). The chi-square was significant and therefore the manipulation was successful.

4.3.2 Impression management

To assess this construct, 20 items from Bolino and Turnley (1999) on self-promotion, ingratiation, exemplification, and supplication were used. Items such as “Talk proudly about experience or education.” and “Make C.B. aware of your talents or qualifications.” were used for Self-promotion; items such as “Compliment C.B. so be seen as likeable.” and “Take an interest in C.B.’s personal life to show C.B. your friendliness.” were used for Ingratiation; items such as “Try to appear like a hard-working, dedicated employee.” and “Stay at work late, so C.B. will know you are hard-working.” Were used for exemplification; and finally, items for Supplication include “Act like you know less than you do, so C.B. will help you out.” and “Try to gain assistance or sympathy from C.B. by appearing needy in some area”.

Five-point Likert scale from 1 (never behave this way) to 5 (often behave this way) was used for these items. The items related to self-promotion had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.92, the items related to ingratiation had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.92, the items related to exemplification had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84 and the items of supplication had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85.

4.3.3 Control variables

Among the respondents' demographic information, the age, gender, education, and work sector of the respondents, together with the age and gender of their actual managers as well as C.B.’s gender were considered as control variables. After cleaning the data, the final sample consisted of 142 complete responses, from which 92 answers (64.8%) were from female respondents, and 50 (35.2%) were from male respondents.

When asked about C.B.’s gender, 82 respondents answered “male” (57.8%), and 60 answered “female” (42.3%). When asked what gender their manager was, 94 respondents (66.2%) answered “male”, and 48 (33.8%) chose “female”.

The average age of the respondents is 47.67 years-old ($SD = 14.5$). The average age of their managers is 51.60 years-old ($SD = 10.1$). Regarding education, the sample has 15 respondents with secondary school completed (10.6%), 85 respondents have a bachelor’s degree (59.9%), 37 respondents completed a master degree (26.1%) and five respondents have a PhD (3.5%). Most of the respondents (30.98%) were from technology, media or communications sector.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations between variables. Based on the findings. The two power bases (positional and personal power) are negatively correlated ($r=-.490$, $p<.001$). This shows that the two power bases are indeed different in nature.

Another interesting finding is that OPPA is positively correlated with Positional Power ($r=.421$, $p<.001$) and negatively correlated with Personal Power ($r=-.396$, $p<.001$). These results prove that there might be a relationship between the perception of OPPA and the type of power exercised.

Also, OPPA has a significant and negative correlation with C.B.'s gender ($r=-.175$, $p=.037$). Based on these results, employees perceive less politics in their performance appraisals if their managers are females. Thus, the gender of the superior may influence the perception of politics in performance evaluation.

Furthermore, self-promotion has a significant and positive correlation with personal power ($r=.165$, $p<.05$). This was expected, in fact, if an employee has a leader with personal power, he will want to impress him and showcase his competencies rather than engaging in other forms of impression management.

In addition, self-promotion has a significant and positive correlation with ingratiation ($r=.313$, $p<.001$). Also, exemplification has a significant and positive correlation with ingratiation ($r=.574$, $p<.001$), and with supplication ($r=.639$, $p<.001$). Supplication also has a significant and positive correlation with ingratiation ($r=.577$, $p<.001$), which may mean that when one of these behaviours is used, another impression management behaviour might be used.

In addition, age has a significant and negative correlation with ingratiation ($r=-.280$, $p<.001$), a significant and negative correlation with exemplification ($r=-.392$, $p<.001$), a significant and negative correlation with supplication ($r=-.215$, $p=.010$). Thus, looking at the sample, the ages of the respondents have a range between 30 and 60 years, it is interesting to think if they are young or old employees.

Finally, manager age has a significant and negative correlation with ingratiation ($r=-.206$, $p=.014$), and with exemplification ($r=-.208$, $p=.013$) and with supplication ($r=-.219$, $p=.009$), which may mean that the greater the age of the manager, the lower the use of these behaviours.

Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between variables

	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1.Positional power	3.2	1.33	--													
2. Personal power	3.68	0.81	-.490**	--												
3.OPPA	2.88	1.09	.421**	-.396**	--											
4.SelfPromotion	3.89	1.15	-0.076	.165*	0.033	--										
5.Ingratiation	1.91	0.83	0.045	0.069	0.075	.313**	--									
6.Exemplification	2.57	1.056	0.159	-0.018	0.154	0.064	.574**	--								
7. Supplication	2.023	0.98	0.038	-0.093	0.056	-0.023	.557**	.639**	--							
8.C.B. Gender	1.42	0.50	-0.121	0.024	-.175*	0.042	0.047	-0.116	-0.046	--						
9.Gender	1.65	0.48	0.002	-0.100	0.146	0.002	-0.056	-0.030	-0.002	-0.026	--					
10.Age	47.67	14.45	-0.029	-0.016	0.029	-0.054	-.280**	-.392**	-.215*	.181*	-0.039	--				
11.Education	2.23	0.678	.200*	0.019	0.094	0.000	0.070	0.151	0.037	-0.011	-0.016	0.039	--			
12.Manager Gender	1.34	0.47	0.047	0.114	-0.077	-0.147	-0.012	0.083	0.006	0.052	0.153	-.187*	-0.084	--		
13.Manager Age	51.60	10.08	-0.020	0.003	0.059	-0.012	-.206*	-.208*	-.219**	0.050	-0.037	.417**	-0.053	-.243**	--	
14.Sector	7.76	4.044	0.086	-.178*	0.134	-0.017	-0.004	-0.032	-0.096	-0.038	0.055	-0.135	-.278**	-0.102	0.016	--
			0.311	0.034	0.111	0.837	0.960	0.705	0.253	0.657	0.516	0.109	0.001	0.229	0.851	
**. The correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed).																
*. The correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed).																

5.2 Hypotheses testing

The linear regression and moderation analyses, shown in Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5, were performed in several analyses to obtain a deeper understanding of the variables of this study.

In Table 2, in the moderation analyses on self-promotion, it was possible to find a significant and negative relation with the variable manager gender in all of the models. In Table 3, in the moderation analyses on ingratiation, it was possible to find a significant and negative relation with the variable Age in all of the models. In Table 4, in the moderation analyses on exemplification, it was possible to find a significant and negative relationship with the variable age in all off the models. Finally, in Table 5, it was possible to find a significant and negative relationship with the variable Age in model 2, 3 and 6.

The first hypothesis suggests a direct relationship between perceptions of OPPA and impression management. Hence, when OPPA perceptions are high, it is expected that the employees' impression management will also be high. Contrary to our assumption in Hypothesis 1, the relationships between OPPA and a) self-promotion ($B=.035$, n.s.); b) ingratiation ($B=.068$, n.s.); c) exemplification ($B=.150$, n.s); and d) supplication ($B=.043$, n.s) were not significant. However, in Table 4, in the moderation analyses on exemplification, it was possible to find a significant relationship with the variable OPPA in model 2 ($B=.169$, $p=.03$, $R^2=.216$). Nevertheless, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.

While the main effect (OPPA influencing impression management) was not significant, I was anticipating non-significant results for the moderation analysis. However, the results are presented here for the sake of doing the analysis.

The second hypothesis was about a given situation where employees view their performance appraisal as political, and the leader who conducts the evaluations politically is the person with positional power, the result may be: that employees would participate in more impression management actions in order to please the influential leader

To test the moderation effect Andrew Hayes' Process was used. As described in the Process official website: "Process is an observed variable OLS and logistic regression path analysis modelling tool.

It is widely used through the social, business, and health sciences for estimating direct and indirect effects in single and multiple mediator models (parallel and serial), two and three way interactions in moderation models along with simple slopes and regions of significance for probing interactions, and conditional indirect effects in moderated mediation models with a single or multiple mediators or moderators."

Using Model 5 in Table 2, it was possible to analyze the interaction effect between the dependent variable self-promotion, the independent variable OPPA and the moderator, positional power ($B = -.055$, n.s, $R^2 = .049$), which was found not to be significant.

In Table 3, using Model 5, we analyzed the interaction between the dependent variable ingratiation, the independent variable OPPA and the moderator positional power ($B = -.050$, n.s, $R^2 = .132$). In Table 4, using Model 5, the interaction between the dependent variable exemplification, independent variable OPPA and the moderator positional power ($B = -.031$, n.s, $R^2 = .220$). In Table 5, using Model 5, the interaction between the dependent variable supplication, independent variable OPPA and the moderator positional power ($B = -.018$, n.s, $R^2 = .094$). Also, OPPA is positively correlated with Positional Power ($r = .421$, $p < .001$), which is in line with the arguments made in this hypothesis. However, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

The third hypothesis was about a given situation where employees view their performance appraisal as political, and the leader who conducts the evaluations politically is the person with personal power, the result may be: that employees would participate in less impression management actions in order to please the influential leader.

To determine once again if the hypothesis was rejected or not, I used the Andrew Hayes Process. Using Model 6 in Table 2, it was possible to analyze the interaction between the dependent variable self-promotion, the independent variable OPPA and the moderator personal power ($B = -.062$, n.s, $R^2 = .086$). In Table 3, using model 6, it was possible to analyze the interaction between the dependent variable ingratiation, the independent variable OPPA and the moderator personal power ($B = .102$, n.s, $R^2 = .148$). Also, in Table 4, using model 6, it was possible to analyze the interaction between the dependent variable exemplification, the independent variable OPPA and the moderator, personal power ($B = .123$, n.s, $R^2 = .227$). Finally, in Table 5 using model 6, it was possible to analyze the interaction between the dependent variable supplication, the independent variable OPPA and the moderator, the variable personal power ($B = .050$, n.s, $R^2 = .322$).

Besides, OPPA is negatively correlated with Personal Power ($r = -.396$, $p < .001$), which is in line with the arguments made in this hypothesis. Also, in Table 2, in the moderation analyses on self-promotion in model 3, it was possible to find a significant relationship with personal power, ($B = .264$, $p = .04$, $R^2 = .070$). Nonetheless, for all the statistics presented below, it is possible to conclude that Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Table 2 – Linear Regression and Moderation Analyses on Self-Promotion

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<i>Constant</i>	4.648*** (.760)	4.574 (.777)	3.601*** (.891)	4.726*** (.772)	5.1433*** (1.000)	2.342*** (1.682)
1. <i>Age</i>	-.008 (.008)	-.008 (.008)	-.007 (.008)	-.008 (.008)	-.007 (.008)	-.007 (.008)
2. <i>Manager Age</i>	-.002 (.011)	-.002 (.011)	-.003 (.011)	-.002 (.011)	-.003 (.011)	-.004 (.011)
3. <i>Gender</i>	.072 (.207)	.056 (.209)	.120 (.205)	.069 (.207)	.049 (.211)	.086 (.206)
4. <i>C.B. Gender</i>	.159 (.201)	.176 (.205)	.153 (.198)	.143 (.203)	.169 (.205)	.201 (.201)
5. <i>Manager Gender</i>	-.447* (.222)	-.447** (.220)	-.503** (.218)	-.438* (.221)	-.443* (.224)	-.512** (.218)
6. <i>Sector</i>	-.016 (.026)	-.018 (.026)	-.007 (.026)	-.013 (.026)	-.018 (.026)	-.012 (.026)
7. <i>Education</i>	-.046 (.151)	-.057 (.153)	-.041 (.149)	-.022 (.156)	-.042 (.158)	-.067 (.151)
8. <i>OPPA</i>		.047 (.095)			-.105 (.255)	.371 (.405)
9. <i>Personal Power</i>			.264** (.121)			.529 (.359)
10. <i>Positional Power</i>				-.049 (.077)	-.215 (.190)	
11. <i>OPPA X Personal Power</i>						-.062 (.107)
12. <i>OPPA X Positional Power</i>					.055 (.068)	
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	-.013	-.019	.014	-.018	.005	.002
<i>R²</i>	.037	.039	.070	.040	.049	.086
<i>N</i>	142	142	142	142	142	142

Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male C.B. Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male Manager Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male B values; (std. error)

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .00$

Table 3 – Linear Regression and Moderation Analyses on Ingratiation

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<i>Constant</i>	3.407*** (.627)	3.238*** (.637)	3.093*** (.747)	3.353*** (.637)	2.834*** (.938)	3.839*** (1.39)
<i>1. Age</i>	-.019*** (.006)	-.019** (.006)	-.019** (.006)	-.008** (.008)	-.019* (.006)	-.019** (.006)
<i>2. Manager Age</i>	-.011 (.009)	-.011 (.009)	-.012 (.009)	-.011 (.009)	-.011 (.009)	-.129 (.009)
<i>3. Gender</i>	-.108 (.170)	-.143 (.172)	-.094 (.172)	-. (.207)	-.153 (.173)	-.130 (.171)
<i>4. C.B. Gender</i>	.210 (.166)	.250 (.168)	.208 (.166)	.221 (.168)	.247 (.169)	.269 (.167)
<i>5. Manager Gender</i>	-.181 (.181)	-.171 (.181)	-.197 (.183)	-.191 (.183)	-.153 (.184)	-.182 (.181)
<i>6. Sector</i>	-.006 (.021)	-.011 (.021)	-.003 (.022)	-.008 (.022)	-.008 (.022)	-.005 (.022)
<i>7. Education</i>	.089 (.125)	.066 (.126)	.091 (.125)	.072 (.129)	.079 (.129)	.052 (.125)
<i>8. OPPA</i>		.107 (.078)			.279 (.209)	-.222 (.336)
<i>9. Personal Power</i>			.079 (.102)			-.166 (.299)
<i>10. Positional Power</i>				.034 (.063)	.125 (.156)	
<i>11. OPPA X Personal Power</i>						.102 (.089)
<i>12. OPPA X Positional Power</i>					-.050 (.056)	
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	.068**	.074**	.065**	.063**	.005	.009**
<i>R²</i>	.114**	.127**	.118**	.116**	.132	.148**
<i>N</i>	142	142	142	142	142	142

Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male C.B. Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male Manager Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male B values; (std. error)

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .00$

Table 4 – Linear Regression and Moderation Analyses on Exemplification

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<i>Constant</i>	3.712*** (.642)	3.444*** (.646)	3.928*** (.765)	3.556*** (.647)	3.115*** (.950)	4.901*** (1.423)
<i>1. Age</i>	-.028*** (.006)	-.028*** (.006)	-.028** (.007)	-.028*** (.006)	-.0284*** (.007)	-.029*** (.007)
<i>2. Manager Age</i>	-.004 (.009)	-.005 (.009)	-.004 (.009)	-.004 (.009)	-.004 (.009)	-.005 (.009)
<i>3. Gender</i>	-.102 (.174)	-.158 (.174)	-.112 (.176)	-.097 (.174)	-.152 (.176)	-.155 (.174)
<i>4. C.B. Gender</i>	-.103 (.170)	-.039 (.170)	-.102 (.170)	-.071 (.170)	-.033 (.171)	-.028 (.171)
<i>5. Manager Gender</i>	.051 (.185)	.067 (.183)	.061 (.187)	.023 (.185)	.060 (.186)	.078 (.185)
<i>6. Sector</i>	-.010 (.022)	-.017 (.022)	-.011 (.022)	-.015 (.022)	-.017 (.022)	-.013 (.022)
<i>7. Education</i>	.241 (.128)	.204 (.127)	.239 (.128)	.192 (.131)	.191 (.131)	.194 (.127)
<i>8. OPPA</i>		.169** (.079)			.250 (.212)	-.273 (.342)
<i>9. Personal Power</i>			-.057 (.106)			-.353 (.304)
<i>10. Positional Power</i>				.098 (.064)	.130 (.152)	
<i>11. OPPA X Personal Power</i>						.123 (.091)
<i>12. OPPA X Positional Power</i>					-.031 (.057)	
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	.146***	.168***	.141***	.154***	.002***	.010***
<i>R²</i>	.188***	.216***	.190***	.202***	.220***	.227**

Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male C.B. Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male Manager Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male B values; (std. error)

p*<.05 *p*<.01 ****p*<.00

Table 5 – Linear Regression and Moderation Analyses on Supplication

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
<i>Constant</i>	3.358*** (.533)	3.250*** (.543)	3.821*** (.631)	3.310*** (.674)	3.208*** (.801)	4.415*** (1.199)
<i>1. Age</i>	-.010 (.005)	-.010** (.005)	-.010* (.005)	-.010 (.005)	-.011 (.005)	-.010* (.005)
<i>2. Manager Age</i>	-.013 (.008)	-.014 (.008)	-.013 (.008)	-.013 (.008)	-.013 (.008)	-.013 (.007)
<i>3. Gender</i>	.008 (.145)	-.015 (.146)	-.014 (.145)	0.09 (.145)	-.016 (.148)	-.024 (.147)
<i>4. C.B. Gender</i>	-.010 (.141)	.016 (.143)	-.007 (.140)	.007 (.142)	.016 (.144)	.010 (.144)
<i>5. Manager Gender</i>	-.141 (.154)	-.135 (.154)	-.118 (.154)	-.150 (.155)	-.131 (.157)	-.111 (.155)
<i>6. Sector</i>	-.026 (.018)	-.029 (.018)	-.030 (.018)	-.028 (.018)	-.029 (.018)	-.030 (.018)
<i>7. Education</i>	-.008 (.106)	-.023 (.107)	-.011 (.106)	-.024 (.110)	-.023 (.111)	-.023 (.107)
<i>8. OPPA</i>		.068 (.066)			.125 (.178)	-.144 (.288)
<i>9. Personal Power</i>			-.117 (.086)			-.255 (.256)
<i>10. Positional Power</i>				.031 (.054)	.055 (.133)	
<i>11. OPPA X Personal Power</i>						.050 (.076)
<i>12. OPPA X Positional Power</i>					-.018 (.048)	
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	.038	.039	.044	.033	.001	.003
<i>R²</i>	.086	.093	.098	.088	.094	.322
<i>N</i>	142	142	142	142	142	142

Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male C.B. Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male Manager Gender: 1=Female; 0=Male B values; (std. error)

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .00$

6 Discussion

6.1 Contributions to Theory and Research

While the hypotheses were not supported in this study, still the findings of this study have the potential to extend previous theory and research on the effects and consequences of organisational politics in performance appraisals (OPPA) on the behaviours of the employees, considering the rater's power and demographic characteristics.

It is essential to state that performance appraisals are, in our days, a significant subject in organisations. However, it depends on raters, who may or may not be able to assess performance accurately and whether they want the result to benefit the employee and the organisation rather than themselves.

When well applied, performance appraisals have countless positive organisational values (Fletcher & Perry, 2001). Their purpose is to train and develop the company's human potential and, in this way, to grow and create even more potential and motivation in the organisation. When evaluations are used for one's benefit, departmental, or organisational interests and not for the employee's benefit and the teamwork, the effect is the opposite of the one listed above.

In fact, in a study conducted by Longenecker & Sims (1987), the authors list the main factors that lead an organisation to have a political culture, for example: "The economic health and growth potential of the organization; the extent to which top management supported and, more importantly, did or did not practice political tactics when evaluating their own subordinates; the extent to which executives sincerely believed that evaluation was a necessary and valid management practice or just a bureaucratic exercise; the extent to which executives believed that their written evaluation of their subordinates would be evaluated and scrutinised by their superiors; the extent to which an organisation was willing to train and coach its managers to use and maintain the performance appraisal system; the extent to which the appraisal process was openly discussed between executives and subordinates; the extent to which executives believed that the appraisal process became more political at the higher levels of the organisational hierarchy." (p.187).

The first hypothesis of this dissertation argues that employees, realizing that there are high organisational politics on performance appraisal (OPPA), use more impression management. In this sense, was found in Table 4 model 2 a relationship between OPPA and exemplification, which may mean that employees' perceptions of OPPA influence their use of exemplification behaviours. This was expected, as when employees perceive that policies are being used, they try to show that they are exemplary to influence their evaluations.

However, due to the limitations of this study (low number of respondents per scenario), I did not find more significant results, and for this reason, I still believe that this relationship can be tested in future studies.

Furthermore, it was hypothesized (H2 and H3) that power bases (personal or positional) would be related to impression management when perceptions of OPPA were high. Moreover, it was expected that the superior acts would influence employees' behaviours and how much they use impression management. Also, leaders with positional power use their power with authority, rewards, and punishments. For this reason, it was perceptible that employees would want to manage impressions since they did not trust their boss. The opposite would happen with leaders with personal power, who are leaders who can exert influence through their abilities and personalities and who, in turn, create more trust in the leader.

In spite of this, in this dissertation I found some significant relationships that can deepen the scientific study of the variables OPPA, impression management and the bases of power. In this regard, it was possible to find a correlation between positional power and personal power, proving the different nature of these two power bases. Moreover, another found in this study was that OPPA has a correlation with positional power and with personal power, which can prove a relationship between perceptions of OPPA with the two power bases. It was found a significant correlation and a significant result in moderation analyzes between self-promotion and personal power, in Table 2 model 3. This relationship is perceptible since if an employee has a leader with personal power, he will want to impress and showcase his competencies.

In this study, it was impossible to support hypotheses 2 and 3, since we did not have statistically significant results due to the small sample size (total 142 respondents, around 30 respondents per scenario).

It was also found a significant relationship between self-promotion and the variable manager gender, in Table 2 in all of the models. This may mean that the manager's gender influences the use of self-promotion behaviours,

In addition, relationships were found between the impression management variables: self-promotion and with ingratiation, exemplification and ingratiation; exemplification with supplication; supplication with ingratiation. It is interesting because one impression management behaviour might be used when one of the other behaviours is used.

Another significant finding was the negative correlation between OPPA with C.B.'s gender. Based on these results, it was possible to understand that employees perceive fewer politics in their performance appraisals if their managers are females. It is possible to conclude that the gender of the superior may influence the perception of politics in performance evaluation.

Moreover, I found a significant correlation between the variables: ingratiation, supplication and on exemplification with the variable age. We can conclude from this analysis that the age of the respondents can influence the use of ingratiation, exemplification and supplication. Furthermore, the variable manager age negatively correlates with ingratiation, exemplification and supplication, which may mean that the greater the manager's age, the lower the use of these behaviours.

6.2 Practical Implications

After reading this dissertation, organisations will be able to start thinking and developing a better organisational environment. Managers will be able to understand what OPPA is and the difference when employees have high levels or, on the other hand, lower levels of perception of OPPA. Given the results of this study, was possible to understand that employees perceive fewer politics in their performance appraisals if their managers are females. In this sense, if organisations want to have fewer perceptions of OPPA they should have more women in managerial roles.

Furthermore, a relationship was found between impression management and the employees' age, which says that the older the employees are, the lower the use of impression management behaviours.

In this sense, if an organisation wants to decrease impression management behaviours in a work team, one of the measures that can be taken is to acquire older people for the team. Finally, a relationship was found between impression management and the manager's age, which says that the higher the manager's age, the lower the use of self-promotion behaviours. If an organisation wants to decrease the use of self-promotion behaviours, something they can do is choose an older manager to manage the team.

6.3 Limitations and Future Research

This research was limited by its sample size. The lengthy questionnaire may have caused high attrition as many respondents did not complete the survey and dropped out halfway through. In fact, out of 548 questionnaire responses, 406 had to be withdrawn because they did not meet the requirements I have listed above. This has also caused us to have around 30 respondents per scenario which is the minimum requirement and reduces the statistical power of the study.

Another limitation could be related to the fact that I did not have a scenario where the manager did not have power, only testing OPPA. For instant, it would have been interesting to see if no power in comparison to having power would have led to different results.

Finally, another limitation could be related to how we measured positional power in the manipulation checks. In fact, the three items did not have high correlations with one another and this could have had an effect on the results.

For future research, it will be essential to explore more deeply the relationship between the three main variables of this study (OPPA, Bases of power and Impression Management) with a larger sample. Also, it can be interesting to study deeply the connection between leaders' bases of power (personal and positional) and perception of OPPA among their employees.

In addition, in the time we live in and in the extreme change in the thought of the positioning of women as leaders and responsible for high positions in organisations, it would be essential to think in depth about the relationship between manager's gender and perception of OPPA (where we found a correlation).

The continued presence of men in positions of power in organisations over the last centuries may explain why people believe that organisational politics is more perceptible in the leadership of men. It seems that the presence of women in managerial positions can reduce the perception of OPPA among employees. Therefore, future studies can focus on this topic to provide more insights in this regard.

The Personal Power also proved to be an interesting variable that connects with the self-promotion variable. Maybe a deeper study of this power base could be relevant.

Finally, the variable age has negative correlations with ingratiation and supplication and exemplification which shows that the older employees will engage less in impression management tactics. Therefore, studying employees' age concerning how they behave towards their superiors may be another subject to explore.

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7 Conclusion

To conclude, this dissertation studies the role of managers' power bases in the relationship between the perception of organisational politics in performance appraisal and impression management.

It was not possible to find significant results and support the hypotheses, but it was possible to study this theme and deliver results that, although not significant, are results that can help in the future studies on this topic.

Ultimately, I believe that in a future study, the most crucial thing will be to have a larger sample for meaningful results.

8 References

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9 Appendices

9.1 Appendix A

9.1.1 Bases of Power – Positional and Personal Power

Table 6 – Reliability Statistics for Personal Power

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0,775	0,776	3

9.1.2 OPPA

Table 7 – Measure OPPA

How do you characterize the usual performance evaluation done by C.B.?
1- A performance appraisal affected by whether one controls resources or not.
2- A performance appraisal affected by returning favors.
3- A performance appraisal affected by personal liking.
4- A performance appraisal affected by relationships.
5- A performance appraisal which is inflated.

Table 8 – Reliability Statistics for OPPA

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0,891	0,889	5

9.1.3 Impression Management

Table 9 – Reliability Statistics for self-promotion

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0,919	0,920	5

Table 10 – Reliability Statistics for ingratiation

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0,917	0,917	5

Table 11 – Reliability Statistics for exemplification

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0,840	0,847	5

Table 12 – Reliability Statistics for supplication

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0,852	0,868	5

9.2 Appendix B - Survey

Caro Participante,

Esta investigação faz parte de um projeto maior, coordenado pela Unidade de Investigação Empresarial (ISCTE-IUL, Lisboa, Portugal), financiado pela Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia Portuguesa (FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), conduzido pelos investigadores abaixo indicados.

O objetivo desta pesquisa é conseguir perceber melhor como é que diferentes acontecimentos afetam uma organização e de que forma os indivíduos reagem e o que pensam sobre os mesmos.

A participação é voluntária e tem o direito de desistir do estudo a qualquer momento, durante ou após a conclusão da pesquisa. No entanto, considere que a sua participação é essencial para o sucesso do projeto, por isso agradecemos muito a sua ajuda.

As respostas serão totalmente anónimas, já que os dados se destinam apenas ao processamento estatístico e nenhuma resposta será analisada ou relatada individualmente.

Na primeira parte, encontrará um pequeno texto que descreve uma situação de trabalho comum. Leia por favor com atenção o texto e imagine que é o protagonista da história, uma vez que de seguida faremos algumas perguntas sobre o que pensa e o que sente sobre a situação descrita. Na segunda parte, faremos perguntas demográficas básicas.

Esta pesquisa deve levar cerca de 15 minutos para ser concluída. Por favor, leia atentamente as instruções de cada pergunta e seja honesto nas respostas que der. Para responder às perguntas, é importante que tenha experiência de trabalho.

Não há riscos significativos associados à participação no estudo e pedimos que entre em contato connosco se tiver alguma dúvida sobre o mesmo. Se concordar em participar, clique na caixa no fundo desta página.

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Leia o seguinte texto com muita atenção e imagine que é o protagonista da história:

Imagine que está a trabalhar na “Unique Solutions”, uma empresa internacional que vende softwares de gestão de soluções para empresas. Trabalha no departamento de Marketing e Vendas numa equipa composta, a contar consigo, por 5 membros, o Carlos, a Maria, o Paulo e a Catarina. Todos são supervisionados pelo/pela C.B., o/a Gerente de Vendas.

O/a seu/sua supervisor/a C.B. consegue fazê-lo sentir-se valorizado, importante e aceite. C.B. é muito respeitado por si e não quer discordar dele/dela. Vê C.B. como alguém com quem se identifica. Geralmente, orienta o seu trabalho de acordo com aquilo que observa nos comportamentos de C.B.

C.B. sabe melhor como se faz o seu trabalho e tem também maior conhecimento técnico. C.B. dá-lhe boas sugestões técnicas e partilha consigo a sua formação e a sua experiência. C.B. dá-lhe conselhos sobre o trabalho e o conhecimento técnico necessário.

C.B. dá-lhe boas razões para mudar a forma como trabalha. Quando C.B. sugere mudanças, consegue ver o porquê de ter de mudar, percebendo que as críticas foram feitas para o bem-comum.

Quando se trata de classificações de desempenho, C.B. dá classificações mais altas do que o merecido aos funcionários que controlam recursos organizacionais valiosos ou aqueles que têm acesso a fontes valiosas de informação. C.B. também dá classificações de desempenho mais altas do que o merecido, a fim de obter apoio ou cooperação dos funcionários, ou para retribuir favores.

C.B. inflaciona as classificações de desempenho aos funcionários que possuem características especiais, como altos índices de popularidade ou que são capazes de obter serviços, favores ou benefícios especiais para ele/ela. Além disso, C.B. fornece classificações de desempenho que refletem em parte o gosto ou a aversão pessoal pelos funcionários.

C.B. faz classificações de desempenho que são influenciadas pelos funcionários partilharem ou não os mesmos valores que ele/ela. Nas classificações, também é levada em consideração a capacidade dos funcionários de transmitir o seu entusiasmo em relação a C.B..

C.B. dá classificações de desempenho que refletem a qualidade do relacionamento pessoal supervisor-empregado ao longo do período de avaliação, baseando-se no facto de o relacionamento ter sido tenso ou calmo, confiante ou desconfiado, amigável ou hostil. Além disso, existiram alturas em que C.B. deu classificações de desempenho que fazem com que ele/ela pareça melhor para os seus superiores.

Também já houve ocasiões em que C.B. deu uma classificação de desempenho inflacionada a fim de evitar sessões de feedback negativo com empregados. Também já aconteceu C.B. dar uma classificação de desempenho baixa para dar uma lição a um empregado insubordinado.

Como vê C.B. como gerente?

	Discordo totalmente	Discordo	Não concordo nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo totalmente
Alguém que pode fornecer benefícios especiais	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Alguém que pode dificultar o trabalho	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Alguém que o faz perceber que tem compromissos a cumprir	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Alguém que pode fornecer o conhecimento técnico necessário	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Alguém que o pode fazer sentir-se valorizado	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Alguém que pode dar boas razões para mudar a maneira como faz o seu trabalho	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Como caracteriza a avaliação de desempenho habitual feita por/pela C.B.?

	Discordo totalmente	Discordo	Não concordo nem discordo	Concordo	Concordo totalmente
Para mim a avaliação de desempenho é afetada pelo controlo de recursos	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Para mim a avaliação de desempenho é afetada pela retribuição de favores	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Para mim a avaliação de desempenho é afetada pelo gosto pessoal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Para mim a avaliação de desempenho é afetada por relacionamentos	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Para mim a avaliação de desempenho está inflacionada	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Passou uma semana desde que teve a sua avaliação de desempenho com C.B.
C.B. tem um novo projeto e precisa atribuir funções aos membros da sua equipa.

Qual é a probabilidade de ter os seguintes comportamentos:

	Muito improvável	Improvável	Mais provável que não	Mais provável que sim	Provável	Muito provável
Falar com C.B. com orgulho da sua experiência ou educação.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dar a conhecer a C.B. os seus talentos ou qualificações.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dar a conhecer a C.B. a sua mais valia para a organização.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dar a conhecer a C.B. a sua reputação de ser competente numa determinada área.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Dar a conhecer a C.B. as suas conquistas.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Elogiar C.B. para ser visto como alguém agradável.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Mostrar-se interessado pela vida pessoal de C.B. para mostrar a sua simpatia.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Elogiar as conquistas de C.B. para ser considerado uma pessoa simpática	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ser bajulador e realizar favores para que C.B. goste mais de si.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fazer favores pessoais a C.B. para mostrar a sua simpatia.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tentar parecer um funcionário dedicado e trabalhador.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ficar no trabalho até tarde para que C.B. saiba que está a trabalhar muito.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tentar parecer ocupado, mesmo nos momentos em que as coisas estão mais calmas.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Chegar cedo ao trabalho para parecer dedicado.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Ir ao escritório à noite ou nos fins de semana para mostrar que é dedicado.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Agir como se soubesse menos do que sabe para que C.B. o ajude.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Agir como se soubesse menos do que sabe para que C.B. o ajude.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Tentar obter ajuda ou a simpatia de C.B. parecendo necessitado em alguma área.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fingir não perceber algo para obter a ajuda de C.B.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Agir como se precisasse de ajuda para que C.B. o ajude.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fingir saber menos do que sei para evitar uma tarefa desagradável.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Acha que C.B. é um homem ou uma mulher?

Homem

Mulher

Nesta seção, as perguntas não têm qualquer relação com o cenário e com as personagens fictícias elencadas em cima.

As próximas perguntas são realizadas com o intuito de perceber o que pensa sobre a organização em que trabalha e sobre os seus chefes.

Por favor, leia as seguintes afirmações e indique até que ponto concorda ou discorda com cada uma delas:

Para concluir, vamos fazer algumas perguntas demográficas.
Por favor, responda a cada uma das perguntas abaixo:

Género:

Masculino

Feminino

Qual é a sua idade?

Educação (concluída):

Secundário

Licenciatura

Mestrado

Doutoramento

Qual é o sexo do seu chefe?

Masculino

Feminino

Qual é a idade do seu chefe? (aproximadamente)

Qual é o setor de trabalho que melhor descreve a sua organização?