



INSTITUTO
UNIVERSITÁRIO
DE LISBOA

The Chinese discourse for Africa: The importance of FOCAC and the Forum Macau on China's regional diplomacy

Patrícia Alexandra Correia da Silva Marrafa

Master's in International Studies

Supervisor:

Professor Cátia Miriam Costa, Integrated Researcher,
CEI-Iscte - Centre for International Studies (ESPP)

October, 2022

History Department

The Chinese discourse for Africa: The importance of FOCAC and the Forum Macau on China's regional diplomacy

Patrícia Alexandra Correia da Silva Marrafa

Master's in International Studies

Supervisor:

Professor Cátia Miriam Costa, Integrated Researcher,
CEI-Iscte - Centre for International Studies (ESPP)

October, 2022

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DEDICATION

My greatest appreciation goes to professor Cátia Miriam Costa who has been my biggest guidance during this past year. The patience she exercised throughout my struggle with this project, as well as the academic material she introduced to me and the sound advice given that helped me transform this work from an aspiration to what I hope might come to be a tangible contribution to the study of international relations will forever be appreciated, and never forgotten.

My deepest affection goes to my loved one and my family, who with unwavering support was there for me, never stopped believing in me, and held me high when my confidence failed, and I felt like I was unable to continue forward on the hardest days of this research. To my friends, Tiago Palma, David Peralta, Mariana Araújo, Filipa Calapez, Rita Bastos, Catarina Cruz, and Miguel Martins who have accompanied my journey since the start of my bachelor's throughout my master's and that have been a constant pillar in my life.

I would also like to show appreciation to Professor Luis Nuno Rodrigues and all the teaching staff from the Master's in International Studies at Iscte-University Institute of Lisbon for the dedication, patience, and love put into the organization of the master's, for allowing me to learn with them and extend my horizons of knowledge. And for giving me unwavering support regarding my difficulties and doubts at the beginning of this process.

Lastly, I would like to remember and dedicate this work to my grandfather, José Pereira da Silva Marrafa who died on March 2012, my biggest friend, who I miss dearly and to whom I made the promise to never give up on my studies and to become the first member of my family to achieve higher education, he would have been proud that I have reached thus far, however modest this achievement might be.

RESUMO

A China tem vindo a investir no desenvolvimento de fóruns de cooperação que têm como foco complementar os mecanismos bilaterais já existentes. Estes novos fóruns foram acompanhados por uma expansão e crescente investimento em iniciativas de softpower, indo além do aspeto cultural, e incorporando mecanismos de política externa e económica na abordagem diplomática da China com os seus países parceiros. Torna-se então imperativo considerar os discursos produzidos por políticos e representantes chineses como importante material de estudo para entender as mensagens da China para a comunidade internacional, e como o envolvimento da China com importantes organizações internacionais afeta a sua posição política internacional, ajuda na projeção de softpower, e promove o modelo de desenvolvimento chinês.

A presente investigação propõe assim analisar a evolução do discurso chinês dentro do FOCAC e Fórum Macau e para isso, o nosso trabalho será dividido em duas fases: (I) perspetiva diacrónica da evolução dos laços diplomáticos entre a China e África, juntamente com a importância dada pela China aos países em desenvolvimento e a razão pela qual é essencial olhar para este relacionamento através de uma lente complementar disponibilizada pelas teorias de relações internacionais chinesas. (I) Análise de como o discurso da China para a África foi moldado sob o FOCAC e o Fórum Macau e de que forma pode este contribuir para o desenvolvimento das relações entre a China e a África e para a conexão dos fóruns com a *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI).

Palavras-chave: China, África, FOCAC; Fórum Macau; Análise de Conteúdo; Análise de Discurso.

ABSTRACT

From the start of the 21st century, China has invested in the development of cooperation mechanisms with specific groups of countries that complement the already existing bilateral mechanisms through the form of regional forums. These new cooperation forums have been accompanied by an expansion and growing investment in soft power initiatives, going beyond the cultural aspect, and further incorporating foreign policy mechanisms and economic statecraft in China's diplomatic approach to their partner countries. It becomes then imperative to consider discourses produced by Chinese politicians, representatives, and researchers as important material of study to understand China's intentions and messages for the international community, and how the country's increased involvement with important organizations expands her international political stand, helps in the projection of soft power, and additionally promote China's development model.

As such, we aim to analyze how China's discourse for Africa evolved under FOCAC and Forum Macau, by dividing our work into two phases: (I) Delivery of a diachronic perspective of the evolution of China-Africa ties, together with the importance given by the country to the global south and why it is important to look at this relationship through a complementary lens of Chinese international relations theories, and (II) Analyze how China's discourse for Africa has been molded under her multilateral forums and how can it help in creating relations between Africa and China as well as creating an economic route through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Keywords: China; Africa; FOCAC; Forum Macau; discourse analysis; content analysis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DEDICATION	iii
RESUMO	v
ABSTRACT	vii
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS	xi
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Theoretical framework: China’s use of Softpower discourse on Africa	4
1.2. Research Goals	6
1.3. Core concepts	7
1.5. Methodological framework	9
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW.....	11
2.1. International Relation’s perspectives on the Global South.....	11
2.2. China and the South-South cooperation.....	15
2.3. The evolution of China-Africa ties	16
2.3.1. China’s support for the liberation movements in Africa	16
2.3.2. Political and economic developments in China-Africa relations from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping.....	19
CHAPTER 3 – THE CHINESE DEVELOPMENT MODEL	23
3.1. Chinese public diplomacy for Africa	26
3.2. The Belt and Road Initiative.....	27
CHAPTER 4 – CHINA’S FORUMS IN AFRICA	31
4.1. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)	31
4.2. The Forum Macau.....	33
CHAPTER 5- CONTENT AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS.....	37
5.1. Methods and Procedures	37
5.1.1. Sample of Study.....	37
5.1.2. Instruments of the Study.....	38
5.2. Findings.....	39

5.2.1. Content Analysis.....	39
5.2.2. Discourse Analysis.....	43
5.2.3. Comparative analysis of the FOCAC and Forum Macau discourses	47
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS.....	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY	52
ANNEX	61
Annex A - Table of resources analyzed	61
<i>Table A1 – Materials analyzed for FOCAC.....</i>	<i>61</i>
<i>Table A2 – Materials analyzed for Forum Macau</i>	<i>65</i>
Annex B – Categories.....	69
<i>Table B1 -Percentage and number of occurrences on the samples analyzed for FOCAC ...</i>	<i>69</i>
<i>Table B2 -Percentage and number of occurrences on the samples analyzed for Forum Macau</i>	<i>70</i>
Annex C - Analysis of categories	72
<i>Table C1- Analysis of the categories extracted from fifteen selected discourses delivered under FOCAC.</i>	<i>72</i>
<i>Table C2- Analysis of the categories extracted from fifteen selected discourses delivered under Forum Macau.</i>	<i>77</i>

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FORUM	Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-
MACAU	speaking Countries (Macau)
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSAR	Macau Special Administrative Region
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PRC	Popular Republic of China
PSC	Portuguese speaking countries
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WTO	World trade Organization

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

China's foreign policy might be seen as taking contradictory directions ever since the late 1970s social, political, and economic reforms during Deng Xiaoping's leadership. These reforms combined socialist thoughts with new market-opening measures and created what is now dubbed by the current leaders in their bilateral discourses as *Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*¹. These contradictory directions mainly match an assertive attitude, that seeks to legitimize the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while ensuring access to the necessary resources for China's growth, on one side, and a pragmatic attitude that seeks to settle China's role as an international actor that is responsible and attentive to the world's needs, and that is promoted in her domestic affairs as a reason of pride for its citizens. Feeding the nationalism promoted by the leaders of the CCP and ensuring the stability needed for their regional economy. (Mendes, 2010, Pp. 039-046)

With the arrival of the 21st century, China's growing external dependence on strategic resources and the need to carve out a position for her enterprises in the global market, combined with a swelling of the foreign exchange reserves, led the country to implement a new policy that would come to be known as the *going global*² strategy. (Alves, 2013) As a consequence, China's current relations with Africa saw a development remarkably different in context from those of the previous era. (Alden, 2008) Through the political operation factor of *win-win cooperation*³ Africa became a desirable international partner in this *going global* strategy because of its explosive combination of strategic natural resources, fertile lands suitable for exploration, and reserves of sweet water and rare minerals. A true virgin market for big consumers and a scenario much different from the *afro-pessimism*⁴ that was circulating at an international level, because of Africa's unstable social and political reality. (Lechini, 2013) In addition to this, there was also the factor of the continent's low position on most of the infrastructure indications, especially in low-income countries, as the investment hardly can keep up with the demographic growth of those regions. (Alves, 2013) In fact, according to the African Development Bank, Africa's infrastructure investment gap was estimated to be more than USD 100 billion per year at the beginning of 2022. (African Development Bank, 2022)

¹ Group of political theories and policies of the CCP that are seen by their advocates as taking Marxism–Leninism theories and adapting them to Chinese circumstances and specific time periods. It englobes principles dating from the time of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin (Three represents) and Hu Jintao (Scientific outlook on development) and combines them with Xi Jinping's thoughts for a new era.

² Effort initiated in 1999 by the Chinese government to promote Chinese investments overseas.

³ Initiated in the “Proposals for the 11th Five-Year Plan on National Economy and Social Development” passed in the 5th Plenary Session of the 16th CCP Central Committee, it is considered a major accomplishment of the Chinese diplomatic innovations in the XXI century as it reflects the fundamental characteristics and core values of socialism through its established roots on traditional Chinese cultural values of peace and cooperation and close relationship with the theory of peaceful development. (Chen, 2017)

⁴ The term refers to a perception of Africa as a poverty-ridden place with too many problems that impose obstacles to the imposition of good governance and economic development. Most referred in studies regarding Sub-Saharan Africa. (Schorr, 2011)

However, China was aware of the advantages that could be gain from an increased development with the continent. As such, with China playing a considerably bigger role in the global economy and with the establishment of regional forum's such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macau), the country seems to be further asserting her contributive role as a major actor for development both in Africa and globally. (Alden, 2008) In fact, in October 2000, the Chinese government organized in Beijing the first Sino-African administerial conference, an important step towards a new age of China-Africa diplomatic relations and for the enhancing of Africa's place in the international system. (Lechini, 2013) Looking at the evolution of this renewed cooperation with the global south it's possible to verify a highlight regarding the principles of justice, rationality, equality, and mutual benefits added to a no-strings attached policy. (Alden, 2008) To this policy the only exception seems to be the support for the *one-china*⁵ principle, for which the African continent is a deeply valuable partner. As can be seen for China's initiative on inviting Taiwan-recognizing African states⁶ to attend the ministerial-meetings of FOCAC as observers. (Alden,2008)

Since then, the Chinese have used various tools for their expansion in the world, creating a set of ideas that constituted the guideline to accompany the reintegration of China in the international scenario – such as the concepts *peaceful rise*, *peaceful development* and *harmonious world*. (Lechini, 2013) The term *peaceful rise* was coined in 2003 by Zheng Bijian to assuage western fears over Chinese growth, and to show China as a kind power that respects the established rules. In 2004, President Hu Jintao replaced this idea with the expression *path of peaceful development*, which was widely used until it was replaced by the current concept of *harmonious world* - the first global strategy offered by the Chinese for the construction of the future international order. These notions fit into the conception of a multipolar world, where security is established with mutual benefit, equality, and coordination, advocating the need to increasingly democratize international relations. (Lechini, 2013)

Taking this into consideration we should now focus on the current scenario that follows Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2012, together with the implementation of a new development model and as its support, a massive infrastructure project meant to stretch at a global level - The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The implementation of this initiative launched China to grab her place as a central player in the global politics of the world. And so, for Xi's China, safeguarding the sovereignty, security, and development interests, as well as fostering a friendly international environment with other countries, became important aspects that needed to be put into practice.

⁵ Principle sustained on the notion of national unity and that considers Taiwan as an inviolable part of China, and the government of the PRC as the sole legal government representing the entirety of the country. (Wei, 1999)

⁶ Since 2000, Beijing was able to reach out to Taiwan-recognizing states through the FOCAC and manage to switch the recognition to their side from countries such as: Liberia, Chad, Senegal, Malawi, Gambia, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Burkina Faso. At present, in the African continent, Taiwan is only recognized by the Kingdom of Eswatini.

It is in the context of the BRI that China sees an opportunity to approach once again the global south, through the old door opened by Zhou Enlai in the 1955 Bandung conference⁷ in Indonesia. It was in this conference that China stood her ground in the North-South conflict, choosing to place herself next to the countries that suffered at the hands of western imperialism. It was Zhou Enlai's discourse that gave China the essential tools to position herself as a partner to the countries of the global south and not as one that tells these countries what they should or should not do in their political cooperation. (Costa, 2020, pp. 202-205)

In terms of discourse, the Chinese leaders generally affirm that their relationship with African countries aims to promote South-South economic cooperation for the construction of a new, fairer, and more equalitarian international order, in which China assumes herself as a developing country and, therefore, identifies herself with her African partners. (Lechini, 2013) We can then, look at China's new development plan for Africa as an embodiment of China's discourse towards these countries, sustained in a long history of interchange, and enhanced through the policy of building relations based on an optimist outlook for the future. While also searching for a way to participate in the international scene and contribute to the global order, without defending the international intervention directly in domestic affairs, Chinese foreign policy has come to focus on practical approaches and solutions based on her national culture of balance, as we shall see further ahead. In this sense, the policy of non-intervention clearly stands as an essential pillar for the principles of peaceful coexistence while the main topic of the Chinese international discourse is always about peaceful resolution of international conflicts, as well as respect for domestic policies. (Costa, 2020)

However, such approach found difficulty on being understood by the western world as their theoretical perspectives regarding international relations alone could not fully represent and explain not only China's evolution and current approach to world politics but also other emerging countries on the developing world. For this, international theories centered on the scope and characteristics of these countries are also necessary as a complement to understand and comprehend the advances of emerging countries such as China. Examples of these are the 天下 *Tianxia* theory, the 关系 *Guanxi* theory, and the 共生 *Gongsheng* theory that will be further analyzed on chapter 2. These theories are strongly influenced by China's culture and symbolism, which might explain the lack of studies around them in the scope of international relations.

China is aware, that to promote a new international way of cooperation sustained on these concepts, needs firstly to make her diplomatic partners and the international community understand the principles of harmony, win-win cooperation, mutual trust and equality that proposes to defend. (Costa, 2020) We believe that in the case of China's collaboration with Africa it is here that FOCAC

⁷ First international assembly of Asian-African nations, aimed to promote world peace and cooperation, and freedom from colonialism and imperialism. The Conference was attended by 29 Asian and African countries. (UNESCO, 2014)

and Forum Macau and the discourse built under the platforms they compose contribute for this achievement. To better explore this proposition, however, a complete content and discourse analysis shall be made on Chapter 5, and a concluding comparison shall be made between the results of the sample analysis of the discourses belonging to both forums, to understand if there has been an adaptation of the discourse under each case of study, in accordance with the realities and cultural characteristics of their audiences.

1.1.Theoretical framework: China's use of Softpower discourse on Africa

In the report from the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on October 18th, 2017, Xi Jinping stated “(...) *socialism with Chinese characteristics is now flying high and proud for all to see. It means that the path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence (...)*” (Xi, 2017, p.10) alluding to China's rise as a global player and promoting not only her proximity with the developing countries but also her turn to a *softpower* discourse with Chinese characteristics.

The concept of *softpower* has been adapted from the writings of American scholar Joseph Nye, dated from the early 1990s, on the importance of culture, values, and ideals to shape the global norms. Nye also defines it as an analytical tool capable of filling a deficiency in the way analysts used to think about power, but that gradually took on a more political resonance and is now used by states for more specific purposes as *if a state establishes its power legitimacy, through softpower means, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes* (Nye Jr, 1990) Indeed, China has been gaining spotlight for its use of *softpower* integrated into her policy discourses and initiatives. It was under President Hu Jintao that China took her decisive turn to *softpower* as an instrument for emphasis on the perpetuation of its friendly image and the promotion of its cultural values to the global world. (Mirza et al., 2020). However, to further understand China's turn for a *softpower* approach in her international discourse, we need to first investigate the discrepancy existent between how China sees itself and how the world looks at China.

Such discrepancy can be found summarized in the work *SoftPower in China (2008)* edited by Jian Wang. In here, Wang numerates three key divergences in common perceptions of China: (I) Divergence between how China sees herself and how the world sees China; (II) Divergence between China's politics, that represents mostly critical views, and China as a culture, which represents mostly admiring views; (III) Divergence between how China sees the United States, mostly positive, and how the United States view China, mostly negative. (Sun, 2015) This awareness regarding the above-mentioned discrepancies grew at rapid levels in China, especially after the country ascended to the

World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, successfully won the right to hold the Olympic Games in 2008 and hosted the World Expo in 2010. All these markers called the attention of Chinese leaders to the fact that the country should start to adapt itself to be the focus of international attention and as such should build an image of a responsible power. (Zhao, 2016, p.540). So, for the Popular Republic of China (PRC) soft power has not only been regarded as a significant factor in the determination of their political power distribution, inside the party and at a national level, but also a gateway for continuous proposals of contribution for global governance, under the rhetoric of also supporting the voices of developing countries. (Zhao, 2016, p.540)

This expansion and growing investment in *softpower* have consequently enhanced China's international discourse, allowing the country to go beyond the cultural aspect, and further incorporating foreign policy mechanisms and economic statecraft in her approach. As such, focus on relations based on equality and partnerships, as well as economic diplomatic initiatives such as trade, aid, investment, and integration models based on the BRI compose, contributed to what can be considered as (...) *the beauty of China based on attraction* and exemplified the need to trace out and evaluate the strategies of Chinese *softpower* and its link with China's foreign policy at length. (Mirza et al. 2020)

In Africa, China's *softpower* push has been growing ever since the founding of FOCAC in 2000, driven primarily by her growing economic clout and increasing need for energy and commodities to sustain its development. Africa is strategically important to China for several reasons. Its resource-rich profile stands as a natural choice for China to secure her energy and commodity needs. According to Liang, 2012 article *China's softpower in Africa*, 28% of China's total oil imports are from thirteen of the seventeen oil-producing African countries, mostly from Angola, Sudan, and Congo. These three countries, along with Equatorial Guinea, compose part of the top five African trade partners with China. (Liang, 2012) In addition to this, Africa has the biggest number of representants on the United Nations Security Council, which makes the continent and the countries it embraces, a valuable ally in delicate political matters of international interest, such as the Taiwan issue and human rights accusations.

In the implementation of her *softpower* efforts in Africa, China has also increased and polished her political discourse, through choosing to deliver her discourses at high-level international events of multilateral forums in front of representatives of the African countries and relying on the advantages of international communication. (Costa, 2020, p.27). This can be taken both as an act of media diplomacy and as an act of public diplomacy, as government officials usually engage in media diplomacy hoping to reach the government officials of a foreign country in their negotiations for purposes of promoting mutual interests. By contrast, in public diplomacy, state and non-state actors use the media and other channels of communication to influence public opinion in foreign societies for purposes of promoting one's national interests (Sun, 2015, P.4)

It is, however, also important to bear in mind the relevance of cultural diplomacy in China's discourse as when combined with media diplomacy it creates an important and symbolic discursive space within which a nation's everyday experiences, values and identities are narrated and represented. (Sun, 2015, P.4) As such, the present research shall investigate China's political discursive evolution and organization inside the Forums on which they were delivered, together with the cultural, moral, and intellectual resources behind them.

1.2. Research Goals

After an initial theoretical and political background, it will be interesting for the present research to explore the following questions: What are the possible political implications reflected on China's discourse for Africa under her regional forums? Is there a general discourse for the whole African continent or did China opt for a specific discourse for the Portuguese-speaking countries? Consequently, these initial questions, which are wide-ranging, divide into specific goals, which will support and connect the different phases of our work. In this research, we will mainly aim to:

- Deliver a diachronic perspective of the relationship between the PRC and Africa, together with the importance given by the country to the global south and why it is important to look at this relationship through a complementary lens of Chinese international relations theories
- Analyze the organizational structure and objectives of FOCAC and Forum Macau, as well as their future challenges.
- Understand how the FOCAC supports China's discourse for the African countries.
- Understand the symbolism of Forum Macau as a bridge connecting China to the Lusophone world, and how this bridge further supports China's discourse for the African countries.
- Analyze how China's discourse for Africa has been molded under her multilateral forums and how can it help in strengthening the relations between Africa and China as well as creating a new cooperation route through the BRI.

1.3.Core concepts

To achieve the proposed goals for the present research a factual and reflective analysis of the commitments and statements made to date by China to the African countries shall consider the following concepts:

The Belt and Road Initiative which incorporates the notion of inclusive development, hopes to maximize China's influence and as consequence raise her position to one of importance in the international community. The initiative consists of two great projects: The Silk Road Economic Belt⁸ and the XXI Century Maritime Silk Road⁹. It mainly represents China's new discursive thinking about exporting her development model and hopes to build a path for inclusive, mutually beneficial, and cooperative ventures of land and sea-based economic and trade corridors connecting Asia with the Eurasian, European, and African markets. (Mirza et al, 2020)

The evolution of China-Africa relations, considering that China and Africa have enjoyed a strong relationship since the wave of African countries fights for independence in the 1960s, and the changes that followed. Passing through the most significant growth in China-Africa relations, felt ever since the late 1990s and fueled by a growing discourse centered on a win-win partnership between both sides. Ultimately, it is expected to culminate this approach in today's relations and how these affect China's political discourse under its institutional representatives in Africa.

Finally, for the Chinese model of development, it will also be sought to understand how China works towards the construction of her political path, and how the country's discourse is adapted at a global level in her search for a way to transmit China's national identity and culture in a way that the international community understands and recognizes her perspectives.

⁸ Trans-continental passage that links China with southeast Asia, south Asia, Central Asia, Russia and Europe by land. (EBRD, n.d.) It aims to promote infrastructural development and connectivity while stimulating economic integration across the Eurasian continent. Additionally, it also imposes important strategic implications, and security dynamics in many of the states with which China is partnering in a significant way. (Ghiasy, 2017)

⁹ It mainly consists of a development strategy that aims to boost infrastructure connectivity throughout southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean and East Africa. (Green, 2018) It is expected that this arm of the BRI will take advantage of the fact that seven of the world's ten biggest harbors are situated in China. (Gómez, n.d)

1.4. Topic relevance

For this research and a better analysis of China's discourse for the African countries two forums were considered as the object of study for our discourse analysis: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Macau), also known as Forum Macau.

FOCAC has established itself as a platform with big and significant impacts on China-Africa relations while also enriching Sino-African cooperation. The forum provides a unique diplomatic mechanism that promotes dialogue between China and Africa, while also facilitating the development of a common political and economic agenda sustained in an evolving discourse of South-South cooperation for mutual benefit. (ISS, 2008) It is in this context that China and Africa seek a stronger voice for the developing world both on the international scene and in international institutions such as the United Nations, the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank.

China hopes to reinforce her position as a partner of the African continent in its struggle to democratize the international alliances, as well as reshape the global development agendas. For this, the PRC has committed through the FOCAC to develop Africa's infrastructure and to further support educational, agricultural, and economic development, rather than simply seek an exploitative relationship based on oil and mineral extraction. (ISS, 2018) The relevance of FOCAC for this research is sustained in its importance for a complete understanding of China's agenda for political, economic, and social interaction with Africa, allowing us to understand how China's commitment to non-intervention in African domestic affairs and the determination to build partnerships based on equality and mutual respect became widely welcomed on the continent, thus generating a significant growth potential. (ISS, 2018)

On the other side we have the Forum Macau, which denomination is given because of its permanent secretariat being localized in the Macau Special Administrative Region (MSAR), which serves as a link between China and the Lusophone world, and further enhances China's foreign policy strategy through the use of the Portuguese cultural heritage as a diplomatic instrument in her approach to the Portuguese speaking countries (PSC), easing the economic and commercial negotiations and partnerships between both sides. (Mendes, 2013, p.1) From a political perspective, this approach to the Lusophone world can also be seen as seeking to evade Taiwan's recognition as a sovereign state and conquer support on the international organizations, making use of its relations with Brazil and Africa to grab the place of a bigger position on the international scene. Through this we may look at the Forum Macau as a new way of trans-regional cooperation, with the establishment of regular contacts between the participants and the use of China's attractive economic reality to gain a place in this scene. (Veloso, 2015, p.54)

The Forum seems to be particularly important in cases where the countries bilateral ties seem to weaken, a curious aspect if we take into consideration Portugal's history with Africa and Macau, but it is extremely interesting when we remind ourselves that the main topic of this research befalls the analysis of discourse from China to Africa. A discourse that has built roots in the proximity to the developing world and in the feeling of having both suffered at the ends of the colonial powers of the west. This highlight on China's use of Portugal's good relations with its ex-colonies, is what spikes our interest in uncovering how exactly China molds its discourses for Africa? Is there a general discourse for the whole continent? Or did China create a specific one for the Portuguese-speaking countries?

1.5. Methodological framework

After reviewing the literature gathered and assessing some of the goals and challenges surrounding the two regional forums to be studied, the research will be sustained in the hypothesis that China's discourse for Africa allowed for a strengthening of the political and commercial ties with the continent through an adaptation to its realities and cultural characteristics not only at an international level, but also at a regional one through the role of both FOCAC and Forum Macau.

As such, our research methods will consist of a selection of discourses delivered by political figures representing the Chinese government under the above-mentioned forums. These discourses will be selected from the official websites of FOCAC and Forum Macau and shall englobe a variety of speeches, reports, and interviews. These discourses will be downloaded in their written format and subjected to three working phases: (I) Content Analysis; (II) Discourse Analysis and (III) Delineation of conclusions.

For the preliminary content analysis, we shall work in four steps: (I) Counting of the words present in the chosen samples and organization according to their order of frequency. This will allow us to understand what the most important and prominent terms are used in each conjunct of samples. (II) Application of a sample number of 30 for the more frequent words in the samples analyzed, and (III) reduction of the initial sample number to 10, taking into consideration not only the frequency of their use but also how these may be valued inside our scope of study, these 10 will then act as our categories. (IV) Finally, the categories shall be analyzed in accordance with their connotation on the samples and their tone value (Neutral, Positive, or Negative). It shall also be investigated in which samples these categories appear, their localization, what is their context and what are the concepts to which they are associated throughout the totality of the study samples.

Afterwards, a Discourse Analysis will be conducted, with the adoption of Hans Robert Jauss theory of Reception/Horizon of Expectations¹⁰, which will allow us to focus on the way values, belief and assumptions that are communicated and how the language present in the data relates to its social, political, and historical context. This method of research will help us distinguish social aspects of communication and the ways in which the language is used to achieve specific effects such as the building of trust, the creation of doubt, the evocation of emotions, or the management of conflict. For this phase three steps shall be implemented: The verification of any existence of historical and cultural events that can foster a particular direction for the speech or adaptation to the audience will be investigated and referred. In association with the categories already analyzed it will be investigated the figures of speech present in the totality of the samples. Finally, on the last step, a comparative analysis shall be made, taking into consideration Jauss theory, to delineate conclusions regarding the construction of the discourse under both forums to verify: (I) how the delivered discourses help on strengthening the reactions between Africa and China, and (II) if there are hints for the strengthening of a new cooperation route through the BRI.

¹⁰ Structure by which the audience comprehends, decodes, and appraises any text based on cultural codes and conventions particular to their time in history, being then historical variable. This includes textual knowledge of conventions and expectations, in accordance with genre and style, and social knowledge, in accordance with the moral codes. (Baldick, 2008)

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. International Relation's perspectives on the Global South

To better understand the importance of South-South Cooperation for China it is necessary to investigate the contributions of the south in international relations and world politics. It is also important to contextualize the assumptions surrounding the study of the south in international relations and whether these are, or not, already adequate to account for southern experiences and voices. The Global South has for long been associated mainly with Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania regions, denoting mainly areas localized outside Europe and North America and primarily encompassing low-income countries that are often politically and culturally marginalized. (Dados and Connell, 2012, p. 1-2)

The term *Global South* originated in the anti-colonialism sentiment from the XX century, the 1955 Bandung Conference, the 1961 Non-Aligned Movement¹¹, and Cuba's *internationalism*¹². (Grovoqui, 2011). However, it was only at the end of the Cold war that, with the falling in disfavor of the use of the term *Third World*, that Global South became more referenced. Such change did not signify the renouncing of the word, but its use captured the spirit of these countries' engagements. (Grovoqui, 2011) In a world where geopolitical power relations were gaining terrain over a focus on development and cultural differences, it continued to invite re-examinations of the international system's intellectual, political, and moral foundations. The notion of south is also greatly wrapped in concerns of states regarding questions of security, autonomy, or territorial integrity, while also worrying greatly with the communities that make up the developing world (Alden et al. 2010) However, it is also essential to bear in mind that one developing country does not represent in her totality of characteristics every developing post-colonial state. As such, not only the existence of rifts between the North-South realities, but also the ones within the southern states might justify, to a certain degree, the need for a specific approach and discourse in establishing diplomatic and strategic partnerships.

It is not to say, however, that the traditional international relations theories are not relevant to understanding the weight of the south in world politics. Several IR theories contributed to the

¹¹ The Non-Aligned Movement is a major forum for political coordination that was developed and founded at the height of the Cold War, with the fall of the colonial system and the start of the independence battles from the people in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and other parts of the world. It is composed by 120 countries that are not formally aligned with or against any major global power, composed mainly of countries from the developing world, despite there also being 17 other countries and 10 International organization that hold an observer status. (Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, 2012)

¹² Cuba's policies of internationalism provided a considerate support for the national liberation movements against imperialism in every region of the world, humanitarian assistance to people in at least 90 countries, as well as solidarity with progressive governments. (Harris, 2009, p.27)

construction of the present perspective about the Global South. The Dependency theory¹³, for example, served as a legitimizing force supporting the demands of the New International Economic Order (NIEO)¹⁴ while also providing a set of principles that helped the developing southern states in the creation of organizations within the United Nations, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This theory, however, saw its sustain in an approach that defended the impossibility of understanding a nation's economic system without referencing the world system to which they belong. (Alden et al., 2010) In another perspective, the realists looked at the potential of developing countries as allies or adversaries considering the cold-war events, rendering their foreign policies aligned with the USA or the Soviet Union, and invalidating their separate identity and rationale. Additionally, constructivism focuses on the constitutive role of south institutions in the foreign policy of the developing states, resting on the notion that it is a nation's belief systems, rather than the outright pursuit of material interests, that explain its foreign policy efforts and behavior.

Despite the great variety of theoretical approaches to the developing countries study on the IR scene, it would be incorrect to refer to a single perspective as the sole representation of a region or country. The emergence of new strong economies from the south like China, Brazil, and India raised new concerns, among the western academia, regarding new issues of marginalization and dominance among states already marginalized by the North. As such, referring to a single perspective as the only representation of a region or country, let alone most of the world's population, would be inaccurate. (Benabdallah, 2017)

In the case of China, scholars have since of late argued about the need to incorporate traditional Chinese ideas into the already established international relations theory given the country's international prominence. This theory was advocated in its early age as relying on the concepts of the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*¹⁵, *anti-hegemonism*, and *independent foreign policy*. However, the Chinese IR community was skeptical of the advocacy of a theory incorporated with Chinese characteristics, for it was perceived as a legitimization of China's official interpretation of world affairs. Acharya (2011) describes how new attempts were made to build a Chinese school of IR

¹³ The theory was originally developed during the late 1960s following the outcome of the World War II to explain the problems of development in Latin America, and it holds that the establishment of connections between developing countries and developed ones work in detriment of the former as their resources flow in great volume and enrich the developed countries. (Akhiapor, 1985, p. 536)

¹⁴ Promulgated as a United Nations declaration in 1974, the NIEO was the most widely discussed transnational governance reform initiative of the 1970s, and its main objective was one of completing the geopolitical process of decolonization and a creation of democratic global order of fully sovereign states. (Gilman, 2015)

¹⁵ The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

theory entailing the basis of global harmony and incorporating historical ideas and institutions, including but not limited to Confucianism¹⁶. (Acharya, 2011)

Grydehoj and Su (2022) reflect about the theories that came from these attempts, exemplifying how the concept of *harmony* was grounded in ancient Chinese while being constructed to address the politics of the current age. In traditional Chinese thought, 和谐 (*hexie*)¹⁷ refers to inner harmony, harmony among people, or harmony between people and the universe. (Grydehoj and Su, 2022) In Confucianism, for example, harmony involves a willingness to differentiate and not treat everything equally, regardless of virtue and ability. While in Taoism¹⁸, the ideal of harmony flows differently than in Confucianism, and it is defended that things should follow their natural course. Meanwhile, both differ from the Mohist¹⁹ utilitarian ideal that defends the correct action to be taken should be assessed based on what brings about the best results for the society and the world. (Grydehoj and Su, 2022) Despite their differences and divergences, these intellectual traditions influenced one another and developed in their dialogue, interacting in the process with other intellectual traditions and folk religions.

Because of the interactions had between these intellectual traditions, four essential characteristics of harmony have been identified until today. Those are the *notion of balance in the world*, *coordination in difference*, *order in complexity*, and *unity in diversity*. These characteristics have since involved with three specific approaches rooted on the concept of harmony: The 天下 *Tianxia*²⁰ theory, the 关系 *Guanxi*²¹ theory, and the 共生 *Gongsheng*²² theory. (Grydehoj and Su, 2022)

The 天下 *Tianxia* theory was recognized as the prominent Chinese School of International Relations and modernized by the Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang (1961-Present), who defends that the theory can be understood at three levels: The physical world, the psychological world, and the institutional world. It rests on the principle that all lands and people should be included and no one,

¹⁶ Philosophy and belief system from ancient China, which has existed for over 2,500 years and laid the foundation for much of Chinese culture. It was based on the thoughts of Confucius, a philosopher and teacher who lived from 551 to 479 BCE. There is still to this date debate over whether Confucianism can be considered a religion as it is best understood as an ethical guide to life and to a strong character. Confucius himself is worshipped as a spirit and not as a god. However, it is possible to find temples dedicated to Confucianism and which hold important community and civic rituals. (National Geographic Society, 2022)

¹⁷ Literal translation: harmonious, harmony.

¹⁸ Religion and philosophy from ancient China, greatly famous during the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD), that influenced both folk and national belief. It is essentially connected to the philosopher Lao Zi, who wrote the main book of Taoism, the 道德经 (Dao de Jing), around 500 BCE. (National Geographic Society, 2022)

¹⁹ Philosophical, social, and religious movement from ancient China that was predominant during the warring states era (479-221 BCE). It came from the teachings of the philosopher Mo Zi who together with his followers initiated philosophical argumentation and debate in China and played an essential role in articulating and shaping many of the core concepts, assumptions, and issues of classical Chinese philosophical discourse. (Fraser, 2022)

²⁰ Literal translation: land under the heaven. It can also be translated as: the whole world, and the whole of China.

²¹ Literal translation: relations, relationship.

²² Literal translation: symbiosis.

nor nothing, should be left behind, and presents the theoretical basis for a new world system, which does not rely on imperial dominance or hegemony, but thrives through cooperation, exchange of best practices, and equality. (Grydehoj and Su, 2022)

On the other hand, the 关系 *Guanxi* theory, developed by Qin Yaqing (1953-present), positions itself as an opposition to both the western and Chinese ways of thinking and acting. It discards their knowledge framework and looks at the world as a person would see it, focusing on the person's relationship with other people and things around them. It is attentive to the details of world politics as they relate to specific social actors with which they relate. (Grydehoj and Su, 2022) Finally, the most recent of the three theories is the 共生 *Gongsheng* theory, which emerged in the early 2010s and can be studied through two different stances. On the first one, some scholars defend that the theory combines classical Marxism with traditional Chinese discourses of harmony in its application to the analysis of world politics. On the other hand, some scholars defend that the theory explicitly seeks to offer an alternative to the IR theories of the west.

This last theory is built on the notion and acceptance of the existence of differences and diversity rather than similarities between and among people and things and is ultimately based on four fundamental assumptions: (I) that we live in a plural world, (II) the existence between things in the world, (III) the peaceful coexistence between things in the world based on equality and (IV) the cooperation for advancement. The theory ultimately defends that, states should seek a *symbiotic peace, harmony, inclusiveness, and cooperation rooted in an acceptance of difference, and those states should be mutually dependent and not merely coexist*. (Grydehoj and Su, 2022) Setting the tone for the concept of a community of common destiny or 人类命运共同体 (*renlei mingyun gongtongti*) that president Xi Jinping greatly emphasizes today and is reflected by Chinese IR literature in its application to the globalized present. (Grydehoj and Su, 2022)

Through this analysis we can see that there should exist an improved dialogue among academia, not only with China but with the whole diversity of states on the global south to proceed with the development and understanding of International Relations regarding studies of the Global South. Not only could the international relations field benefit from integrating other perspectives and methodologies into its studies, but non-western theories could also open the floor for new insights that would be beneficial and could ultimately help finding more sustained conclusions about the international system and the countries from which they emerge.

2.2. China and the South-South cooperation

When referring to the notion of south-south cooperation, one usually refers to the cooperation among developing countries in the Global South with the vision of sharing knowledge skills and support initiatives in specific areas such as agricultural development, human rights, urbanization, health, and climate change. According to a United Nations official news article from 2019, this notion of established cooperation between developing countries derives from the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries by 138 UN member states in Argentina on September 18, 1978, and *Established for the first time a framework for this type of cooperation and incorporated in its practice the basic principles of relations between sovereign states: respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and equality of rights, among others.* (UN, 2019)

These principles also resonate with the *Ten Principles of Bandung*²³, which incorporated China's five principles of peaceful coexistence, propelling China as an active actor in the developing world and contributing to legitimize its perception as a model of social engineering, economic growth, and cultural revitalization. While founding the ideals that would come to serve as foregrounding for China's discourse for Africa and other developing regions, as well as strengthen China's emergence as a significant power in global politics. The intensification of relations between the Global South states also promoted the exchange of knowledge and policy regarding development models. Liu (2022) argues that the viability of such exchanges is based upon *Commonalities, shared goals, mutual benefits, and respect for sovereignty among non-western nations as well as the aspirations each for economic development and nation-building.* (Liu, 2022). This shared framework can also help us understand the popularity of China's development model in Africa.

²³ The ten principles of Bandung are: (I) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. (II) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. (III) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small. (IV) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country. (V) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. (VI) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the interests of any of the big powers, abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries. (VII) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. (VIII) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. (IX) Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation. (X) Respect for justice and international obligation. (Xinhua, 2005)

2.3. The evolution of China-Africa ties

China's contact with Africa dates as far as the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), when the emperor commanded the admiral Zheng He to set sail on a series of expeditions. Expeditions that would take him to reach the eastern African coast at approximately the same time as the Portuguese were already exploring Africa's Atlantic coast. However, the origins of modern China-Africa relations date back to the 1950s, when the colonial rule in Africa was coming to an end and the cold war was intensifying. The starting point of these relations was marked by the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955. At this conference, leaders of developed countries came together to choose their sides in the cold war scenario. Zhou Enlai, the PRC's prime minister at the time, appealed for increased cooperation between Asian and African countries through the presentation and development of the *Ten Principles of Bandung* that still are to this day fundamental on China's foreign policy. (Alden, 2007)

Despite this cooperation being described through a rhetoric of continuity, the truth is that China's diplomatic relations with Africa have shifted from periods of intense activity in the 1960s-1970s to ones of neglect in the 1980s, that resulted mainly from global issues, as well as political and economic developments in China. On one side, the Chinese party government urgently needed to restore its historical standing as a great nation. On the other, they had to deal with the country's development challenges, such as little technological advances and poverty. (Alden, 2007)

2.3.1. China's support for the liberation movements in Africa

Under the intensification of the cold war and entering the 1960s, Africa was registering a wave of revolution and pro-independence movements and seeking the end of the colonial presence in the countries of the continent. It was also in part, as a segment of the growing need for independence from the imperialist nations that, in 1974, Mao Zedong's vision on the class struggle mode of thinking, under the scope of a new understanding of the *three worlds*²⁴ theory, was applied by the then vice-premier Deng Xiaoping in a speech at the 6th special session of the United Nations General Assembly during the NIEO presentations to explain the PRC's economic cooperation with non-communist countries. Through this theory, China presented herself as an ally of the developing countries, putting herself in a position of mutual comprehension to create a united front against the United States and the Soviet Union. Afterwards, with the beginning of the normalization of relations with the United States

²⁴ Initially presented by Deng in his speech at the Sixth Special session of the UN General Assembly on the 9th of April 1974. The theory is more famously credited to President Mao Zedong by the Chinese leaders. The theory, in itself, defends that the two superpowers of the time: The United States and the Soviet Union, constituted the First world, while the developing countries in Asia, African and Latin America, as well as other frail regions formed the Third World. (Yee, 1983)

through the famous Ping-pong diplomacy²⁵ in 1971, the Soviet Union started to become the primary focus of international attacks from China, as its recent change of leadership²⁶ fell out from Mao Zedong's political vision. (Shinn, 2019).

The operationalization of China's *three worlds* theory is clear in the country's relations with Tanzania, which received China's support starting from the Tanganyika's independence in 1961 and Zanzibar's in 1963 and was perpetuated through the extension of China's diplomatic ties to the republic of Tanzania that would then form from the union of these both regions. (Martin, 1975) In 1964 Tanganyika had become the tenth African state to recognize the PRC and the first to do it only days within the achievement of its independence. (Martin, 1975) However, mainland Tanzania continued to suffer of military and political unrest during the 1960s, and with the Zanzibari Revolution on January 12, 1964, the Chinese influence on the regions and both countries ties were severely enhanced as China immediately recognized the new regime and offered to provide military aid. A similar situation was recorded some days later, on January 19, 1964, in the face of a mutiny from the Tanganyikan army, where China was the first country to answer president Nyerere's request for military assistance to the Tanzania People's defense Force, paving the way for China to become the major supplier of military assistance to Tanzania and its largest bilateral source of development aid. (Martin, 1975)

On another side and looking at the case of Angola for example, China was able to form and break alliances with the three nationalist movements based on pragmatic calculations and which appeared to be the most powerful at the time. When the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) assumed the primary responsibility for launching the anti-colonial struggle in the early 1960s, China supported the movement. However, with the split of China-Soviet Union relations in 1963, both sides started to influence groups to take sides in their dispute demanding that they aligned themselves with one or another. (Jackson, 1995) This pragmatic competition stood on one side of the factors that caused the separation of China's support from the MPLA, shifting it to the side of the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), as the MPLA had close ties with the Soviet Union, the other was that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had recognized the FNLA because of MPLA's indecisiveness between Agostinho Neto (1922-1979) e Viriato da Cruz (1928-1973). However, China's connection with the FNLA had no prospects of evolution and as such, China turned her support to the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), which received military aid at the time by the United States of America and South Africa. (Jackson, 1995)

²⁵ In April 1971, nine players from the U.S. Table Tennis team made a historic trip to China, becoming the first delegation of Americans to visit the country in decades. Following the Chinese revolution on 1949, diplomatic ties were ceased, the trade was limited. These athletes' trip was the start of what became known as ping pong diplomacy as it helped lay the groundwork for establishing official diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC. (The National Museum of American Diplomacy, 2021)

²⁶ The Sino-Soviet divide resulted from an ideological disagreement between Soviet first secretary Khrushchev's De-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence initiatives and Mao Zedong's ideology. (Christensen, 2011)

In the end, however, neither UNITA, nor FNLA were victorious on the war in Angola and the power ended in the hands of MPLA, that was supported by the Soviet Union. The presence of China in Angola became silent on the following years, having resumed in a major way in 2004 because of Angola's needs for external support in their post-conflict reconstruction program and Jiang Zemin's *going global* strategy that sought to position China as a key player in the global world by extending and consolidating the countries commercial links throughout the world. (Malaquias, 2012)

As we could see, political forces of the time were delineated inside Mao Zedong's *three worlds* theory to meet the PRC's strategic requirements, which were then determined by the Chinese perception and analysis of the overall situation of the global system at the time. Essentially, this theory could be modified and adapted to new situations by changing or shifting the composition of political forces in these three described worlds. (Yee, 1983, p.241) At the same time, as more African countries became independent and joined the United Nations, China saw an opportunity to strengthen her political ties with the continent and gain their support in the Security Council, to replace the Republic of China (ROC), based in Taiwan. Thus, in October 1971, the PRC was admitted to the United Nations, replacing the ROC on the Security Council with twenty-six African countries supporting the PRC and fifteen against it. Of the fifteen countries against, ten would come to recognize the PRC in the next few years (Shinn, 2019, pp.64-65).

2.3.2. Political and economic developments in China-Africa relations from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping

With the arrival of the 1980s, China-Africa ties saw a stagnation on the development of their relations as Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms were implemented. The communication between China and Africa stopped being mainly focused on a revolutionary tone marked by the side one stood in the cold war and changed to one more on developing cooperation based on commercial contracts, joint ventures, and technical services. (He, 2006, pp.6-8) Deng Xiaoping also changed China's weaponry transfer policy to one centered on the earning of hard currency from weapon sales, declining the level of transfers to African countries other than Egypt, all of these vectors led to a drop in total trade from 2.6% in 1980 to only 1% in 1988. (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, p.112-113)

In 1983, Zhao Ziyang presented to the African partners a new shift in China's strategy with the country prioritizing its economic development and long-term strategic interests during his visit to eleven African nations composed of Algeria, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). It was also during this tour that a revised foreign aid policy, called the *Four Principles*²⁷, was announced, where the principles of equality and mutual advantage were once again mentioned, and where it was stated that the cooperation proposed would be independent of any political conditionality apart from the *One China* Policy which ruled out the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign entity. (Gaye, 2008, p.140) Scholars were keen on observing this discourse from Zhao Ziyang, having noted a foreboding change in the countries' approach to Africa. The focus on support for the liberalization movements was overshadowed by a more business and investment-oriented perspective, approaching China-Africa relations to the more modernized relations that China has established with the rest of the world since the beginning of the 80s. (Gaye, 2008, p.140)

Afterward, Jiang Zemin served as General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee from late 1989 until late 2002, having had to deal with the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident²⁸. The

²⁷ The four principles were as followed: equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversification in form, and economic development.

²⁸ Beginning in April 1989, protesters from across China congregated at Tiananmen Square in Beijing to express their frustration with the slow progress of promised reform and to mourn the passing of liberal Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang. The gathering evolved into non-violent demonstrations that expanded throughout China's provinces as participants, primarily students, started to demand an end to new political and economic reforms. Numerous student protestors in Tiananmen Square began a hunger strike on May 13 to demand discussions with Communist Party leaders. One million people, according to estimates, participated in the rallies in Beijing to show their solidarity for the students who were participating in a hunger strike and to call for reform. Party officials went to the student demonstrations on May 19 and the protesters ended their hunger strike that evening. (Amnesty International UK, 2019) However, the next day martial law was declared in Beijing and on the weeks that followed that declaration, hundreds of thousands of people once again protested on the streets of Beijing, with similar demonstrations taking place in cities across China. On the night from June 3 to June 4, the government ultimately sent armed troops and military vehicles into the city center to

exciting aspect of this point is that while the west was highly critical of China's handling of the Tiananmen Square protests, the African countries did not pronounce themselves and, in some cases (e.g. Burkina Faso, and Angola) seemed to back China's actions. The Jiang Zemin period established then a base for expanding China-Africa's ties in the twenty-first century with a tremendous increase in high-level visitors from China to Africa (Shinn, 2019).

Additionally, the establishment of FOCAC on the year 2000 came to be one of the main instruments and mechanism for dialogue and cooperation between China and Africa. The first example of this role would come in the Addis Ababa ministerial meeting, held in 2003. In this meeting, Hu Jintao introduced to the African countries the concept of *Peaceful Rise* 和平崛起 (heping jueqi), one of the first new concepts to be introduced into China's official foreign policy under his administration, which argued that China's rise would avoid the fate of colonialists and imperialists of the past, as it would not seek external expansion and instead would propose to uphold the concepts of peace, mutual cooperation, and joint development. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007)

According to Zheng Bijian's speeches regarding the *Peaceful rise* theory, it is stated that it would prevent hostile relations with major powers. Through the pursuit of a path based on a peaceful rising, socialism and capitalism would uphold a healthy competition while learning from each other and enjoy peaceful relations. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007) However, significant concerns soon started to surface regarding the designation *peaceful rise*, as all the statements proclaimed by the Chinese government mentioned: *peace*; *stability*; *tranquility*, and *coexistence* but not directly *peaceful rise* being *peaceful development* 和平发展 (heping fazhan) the term used in its stead. As the term *rise* started to be perceived by critics as threatening, President Hu Jintao stopped using it, replacing it with the already widely used term *development*. (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007)

Following the controversy surrounding the use of the term *peaceful rise*, China introduced the *harmonious world*²⁹ concept at the Asia-Africa summit, signaling the country's change to a new stage of development, more willing to engage in international activities such as peacekeeping operations. China justified this concept by stating that the economic growth pursued by the country would only be possible in a peaceful and good international environment. Such a concept had significant implications for Africa, where China supported the situation and leaned into increasing dependence on African raw materials to fuel its economy. (Shinn, 2019, p.73)

Consequently, the head of state of nearly every African country that recognized the PRC attended the ministerial meeting of FOCAC held in Beijing in 2006. Before the event, China issued its first

enforce martial law and clear the streets of demonstrators, having ended with the death and arrest of thousands of pro-democracy protesters, mostly young students, after three weeks of protests. (Amnesty International UK, 2019)

²⁹ Political catchphrase coined by President Hu Jintao that aimed essentially to lead the government in closing the wealth divide and ease growing social tensions, composing an extension of Hu Jintao's domestic policy into the country's foreign policy. (Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Namibia, n.d.)

white paper on African policy that signaled China's ambition to play a more prominent role in the African continent based on its tremendous amount of foreign aid coupled with various trade and investment activities. The paper once again brought to light the principles of equality, mutual benefit, mutual support, and common development at its core which sustained a promise that by *Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development*. ("White Paper on China's African Policy, January 2006," 2007)

The section dedicated to the principles surrounding China's African Policy closed with a mention of the one-China principle. Described as the (...) *political foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations*, the principle was mentioned as the Chinese government expressed its appreciation for the African countries' refusal to have official relations and contact with them Taiwan. Additionally, stating that *China stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China based on the One-China principle*. ("White Paper on China's African Policy, January 2006," 2007)

Through this, we can see that the political dimension of the first white paper on China's African policy revolved mainly around the following issues: (I) Africa's weight in the UN and other international forums, (II) the need to isolate Taiwan on the international scene, and (III) the promotion, be it in rhetoric or reality, of a new world order based on the *five principles of peaceful coexistence*. This first installment, however, seemed to arise some contradictions. Despite stressing China's noninterventionist policy and anti-colonial affinities with the continent based on working towards establishing a new international and economic order, it also stressed China's inclination to neutrality and a diplomacy that specifically served China's economic needs. These contradictions are taken by some authors as a manifest of the transitional state of China's foreign policy and strategic thinking. (Meidan, 2006, pp.69-93)

Today, however, China's influence has expanded beyond its borders. The country has significantly advanced in asserting its place as a global player as it continues to prioritize her engagement with the developing world regarding strategy, knowledge transfer, resource location, and institutionalization. In Africa, China stands as Africa's leading partner regarding trade, having registered a growth of 1 billion dollars in 2000 to 182,5 billion dollars in 2018. (Liu, 2022) Additionally, we have come to notice, since the start of Xi Jinping's administration, the mark of a generational shift in Beijing's political scenario. Being the first generation in which the leaders do not carry directly from their predecessors. (Vaz-Pinto, 2014) Xi Jinping is the first CCP General-Secretary born after the establishment of the PRC, having even been in re-education camps in his teenage years following his father's purge during the Cultural Revolution. Such happenings contributed to the

hardening of his political views and propelled his rise to the top of the party with a renewed perspective regarding national and international politics.

Consequently, and inside the spectrum of China's current foreign policy, we can highlight a more nationalistic and assertive approach to global matters following the announcement of president Xi's main international project, the BRI, which involves numerous investment projects in Asia, Europe, South America, and most importantly for our research, Africa, as in he seems to be seeking a redefinition of China's relationship with Africa, including the incorporation of the continent more overtly into the CCP's vision for China's future centrality in world affairs. (Large, 2021.p.4)

CHAPTER 3 – THE CHINESE DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Following the past chapters, we can ascertain that China's fundamental goal has been, ever since the reform period of 1979, to achieve comprehensive national strength by focusing on her development process while promoting peaceful cooperation at a global level and in regional environments. This can be tracked as far as the fundamental principles of China's foreign policy described during Deng Xiaoping's era as (...) *observe developments soberly, maintain our position, meet challenges calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, remain free of ambition and claim leadership*. (Zheng, 2005) and posteriorly elaborated by Jiang Zemin in 1993 as (...) *enhancing confidence, reducing troubles, expanding cooperation*. (Zheng, 2005)

It is important to note that, as mentioned on chapter 2, Chinese foreign policy had taken a different path from the military interests of the Mao era, seeking a tone of peace and collaboration in development strategies. In fact, during the post-cold war period, China's primary interests had been promoting its domestic economic growth and stability and advocating for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of developing countries while also seeking to safeguard citizens and businesses abroad. These points of focus in China's foreign policy help us not only to understand the main ground for China's international behavior and attempts to change the international system but also provide us context for China's objectives as it builds spheres of influence in these regions, portraying herself as an alternative global power. (Murphy, 2022)

However, from 1996 onward, this approach was replaced with accurate policy content prompted by the Chinese leadership's realization of China's international growth. Moreover, her assertive regional policies regarding Taiwan and the South China sea alarmed her neighbors, giving way to the criticism of the Western countries in which it was defended that China's influence on the developing world could threaten these countries. (Zheng, 2005)

By this time Deng had already yielded his chairmanship of the Military Commission in 1989 to the more authoritarian Jiang Zemin (Dittmer, 2003, p.3), and his direct involvement in the government had declined in the past decade, despite having regained his influence until the time of his death in 1997. Due to the international tension and worry regarding China and with the government in peril recovering from so many years of non-recognition and the continued imposition of sanctions against China for the June 4, 1989 killings in and around Tiananmen Square. Deng's references to never claiming leadership, hiding capacity and binding time fell in their usefulness, having the terms been replaced by Jiang Zemin's *peaceful rise* that aimed to assure the international community that China's growth would not impose a threat to international peace and security. (Zheng, 2005) Jiang, however, did not discard Deng's policies having kept them during most of his mandate. The PRC wanted to establish at an international level that the country's intentions were not one of hegemony or predominance in the affairs of the world but ones of advocating a new international political and

economic order, one that, in the words of Zheng (2005) can be *achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of internal relations*. (Zheng, 2005)

Posteriorly, during Hu Jintao's time in office, China's *peaceful rise* policy started to be advocated to reassure the international community that China's growing political, economic, and military power would not threaten international peace and security. Being this policy one that sought to characterize China as a responsible world leader that avoids unnecessary international confrontation, emphasizes soft power, and vows that China is committed to its internal issues and improving the welfare of its people before interfering in world affairs (He, 2006)

After the 2008 global financial crisis, Beijing used active state-initiated programs to promote growth and ameliorate the injustices inflicted by the unbridled market. These punctual changes over the decades show us that the China model differs from traditional socialism mainly in its use of a market system in the economy and can be characterized as having four corners. First, it seeks to defend the state-owned economy and its interests in advanced economic management without the constraints of the western value package. (He, 2015) Second, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, the China model acquired normative and policy significance as it was used to challenge the intellectual pillars of the *washington consensus*³⁰. (He, 2015) Third, Chinese scholars defend that China should promote democracy through good governance, not via direct national elections, suggesting that the CCP sees a need to address social issues through a combination of better services and more robust police work rather than through western-style electoral democracy, as the discussion about the policies to be followed usually take place within the CCP. (He, 2015) Fourth, there is a widespread view in the west that China's success results from her vast and cheap labor supply, as well as her attractive internal market for foreign investment and strong government support, which provides a perfect counterpart for China's exports and high savings rate. (He, 2015)

However, some studies are more skeptical regarding exporting a Chinese development model. According to the report of the 19th Party Congress on China's strategic goals for 2050, it is stated that (...) *by 2035, China will reach the level of a modernized, mid-level developed country, being 15 years ahead of their original schedule, which was to achieve the goal by 2050*. (A. Hu et al., 2020) This progress shows that China has been implementing policies fostering development in both a faster and more balanced way and giving response to challenges that could block this progress, such as shortage of resources, environmental pollution and a low rate of recycling, lack of coordination between economic and social development as well as tensions between high GDP growth and social progress. (Zheng, 2005).

³⁰ Term initially used in 1989 by the English economist John Williamson, the Washington consensus composes a set of ten economic policy prescriptions considered to constitute a reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries institutions settled on Washington D.C such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and United States Department of the Treasury. (Williamson, 2017)

As such, this 2035 development objective includes strategies in economic construction, political construction, cultural construction, People's livelihoods and social advancement, ecological civilization, and the construction of National Defense and Armed Forces. From these, we highlight Economic, political, and cultural construction. In economic construction, China proposes to enhance economic strength where China hopes to maintain her medium-high economic growth rate with the prediction of this one being around 4.8-5.6% between 2020-2035, as well as achieving a proportion of China's GDP as a share of the total world GDP around 27.25-31.45%, consequently benefiting the growth of individual incomes in the step of the economic development. (A. Hu et al., 2020)

Second, it proposes to complete the building of a modern economic system through the formulation of several globally competitive world-class enterprises in order to create several valuable global brands and double the proportion of the new economy in the national economy and work its way so that the added value of the modern service industry in GDP reaches 66% in 2035 as predicted (A.Hu et al., 2020). Thirdly, China proposes significantly enhancing her economic and technological strength to become a global leader in innovation. For this, the country will increase her total factor productivity, in which research and development expenditure will account for more than 2.8% of GDP.

In cultural construction, China proposes to significantly enhance its cultural soft power and international influence of Chinese culture. (A. Hu et al., 2020) Finally, in political construction, China proposes to (...) *complete the building of a country, government, and society based on the rule of law, forming an environment in which the legislation will be sound, law enforcement will be strict, and the administration of justice will be impartial*. Further affirming that everyone will observe the law and that national systems will be implemented more effectively, transparently, and equitably. (A. Hu et al., 202)

Additionally, in a previous 2019 "White Paper: China and the World in the New Era," China continued to elaborate on ways her development could serve as a model for other developing countries while also providing insight into some of China's thoughts on the current manifestations of the new and non-discriminatory world order that it is working towards achieving. The paper also approached concepts and initiatives such as (...) *a global community of shared future, a new model of international relations, the Belt and Road Initiative, the principles of upholding the greater good and pursuing shared interests, a vision of common comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable energy, mutual learning, inclusiveness* (...). (State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2019)

In the African continent, China has taken hold of strategic initiatives and opportunities in her interactions, contributing to the rapid development of the China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation. In addition, China has been Africa's largest trading partner and the most significant infrastructure contractor since 2009. African markets became essential destinations for the exportation

of Chinese products. Africa became China's second-largest overseas engineering market and the fourth-largest investment destination. All these signs of progress in the two countries' economic ties are sustained in the discourse of close relationship of cooperation and win-win development promoted by China for the African Country (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2013, as stated by Ding et al., 2020).

This progress is essential if we take into consideration that authors such as Walia (2005) defended that one of the significant limitations of the China development model would be the underdevelopment of the rule of law, leading to the self-ruling class and rampant corruption, not allowing for liberation and individual freedom to be materialized and concretized. (Walia, 2005). Additionally, there was also a feeling of uncertainty in the academic world regarding whether China's experience provides valuable lessons or not for other developing countries. Since the country's experience has progressed from unique initial conditions that are not common to other developing countries, it requires ample fiscal resources, technological sophistication, a well-trained and loyal security apparatus, and sufficient political discipline within the regime so as not to take power struggles public. (He, 2015).

3.1. Chinese public diplomacy for Africa

Looking back to the past decade, Xi Jinping has presented a China that seems to be heavily engaged in promoting the country's cultural values and economic and cultural development to the world. Following this, China has significantly invested in media networks to share the country's narratives and promote people-to-people contacts. In this line, some authors defend that the media has played a vital role in shaping, communicating, and attracting public opinion through positive characterization of China. Especially under Xi Jinping's era, China has started a proactive drive to expand the outreach of the Chinese media while aiming to obtain two primary purposes. (Mirza et al, 2021) First, through the expansion of media outreach, China will be able to reach a larger audience overseas and communicate the narrative of a peaceful and responsible country while countering the western perception of China as a possible threat in the developing world through the promotion of a positive image for China. (Mirza et al., 2021)

Second, it would compete with western narrative-dominated media. An example of this is Xinhua News and CCTV. While Xinhua news agency maintains 170 bureaus and thousands of employees in different parts of the world while also operating online in audio and video content, Chinese Central Television (CCTV) has expanded its outreach and content. The broadcast station has established production units in different parts of Asia, America, and Africa and broadcasts in more than six languages.

However, China's real *softpower* rests with the economic engagement and diplomatic initiatives aimed at cultivating African support for China's foreign policies. These forums can be represented as a

fusion point between China's media and cultural and economic diplomacy for Africa since they are the primary vessels for the propagation of China's narrative regarding the country's foreign policy towards the African continent, through the publishment on websites of information and material regarding ministerial conferences, essential documents and speeches, videos, research achievements and research institutes (in the case of FOCAC), more involved in the cooperation for development at a general level in the African continent. In the case of Forum Macau, by looking at the Forum, we can notice the presence of its mediatic influence, presenting itself directly as a source of news coverage, annual reports, bulletins, investment guides, and a dedicated section to Macau and its importance as a platform that connects the PSC to China.

Regarding the Forum Macau in particular, it is through this platform that China has created what Matias (2010) refers to as a *para-regime* that can defer China's *softpower* in a more leveled and controlled way. She goes further to mention that its actions are not so much intended to instruct on what the Forum is or what was or will be done under its auspices but what the Forum essentially represents, through the ideals of mutually beneficial Sino-Lusophone partnership with Macau as its platform. (Matias, 2010)

3.2. The Belt and Road Initiative

Another important point regarding the PRC's investment in *softpower* strategies is the BRI. Known as President Xi Jinping's more ambitious project since its rise to power in 2012, it consists mainly of diplomatic and developmental conceptions for realizing the Chinese dream³¹. It represents China's new discursive thinking about open development and the going global strategy as it is believed to be based on the concept of *inclusive development*. With its aim being that of maximizing China's influence and raise its position in the international community through (...) *better collaborative socio-economic programs, trade deals, and infrastructural and development projects*. (Mirza et al., 2021)

Chinese President Xi Jinping initially presented the vision for the BRI in Kazakhstan in September 2013. A revised version of the official document on the *vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road*, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China describe the initiative as (...) *a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity and a road towards peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening all-round exchanges. The Chinese government advocates peace and cooperation, openness and*

³¹ Expression coined by Xi Jinping since his election as the secretary-general of the CCP and chair of the Central Military Commission at the 18th party congress in November of 2012, that aims to pursue three objectives: (I) modernization, as conventionally understood in terms of strong GDP growth, a rich and strong nation, and a good life, (II) it should be consistent with what is taken by the PRC as Chinese characteristics, or Chinese national identity, and (III) it should have a coherent vision of how the rest of the world relates itself with the Chinese principles of national security and prosperity. (Dittmer, 2015, pp. 33-35)

inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit. It promotes practical cooperation in all fields and works to build a community of shared interests, destiny, and responsibility featuring mutual political trust, economic integration, and cultural inclusiveness. (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 2017)

This initiative aims to promote a free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources, and deep integration of markets. Focusing on projects in the fields of infrastructure, connectivity, industrial investment, resource development, economic and trade cooperation, financial cooperation, cultural exchanges, ecological protection, and maritime cooperation (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 2017). Like this, it presents an ambitious economic vision that looks forwards to the cooperation among its member countries. This ambition is reportedly sustained in five significant goals: Policy coordination, Facilities connectivity; Unimpeded Trade; Financial Integration, and people-to-people bonds (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 2017)

For this initiative, a massive investment had also to be put into action. This investment is likely to be channeled through new financial institutions that are initiated or led by China. Some examples are the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the dedicated meetings of African Diplomats in China with the Chinese Follow-up committee. An action plan is also published after every FOCAC summit and Ministerial meeting, outlining cooperation strategies and projects for the next three years. (Demissie et al., 2016a)

Despite being announced in 2013, it was only in 2015 that Africa became a focal point of the BRI. After the publications of the original official document on the vision of the BRI was published in March, a leading Chinese economist and former Vice-president of the world bank, Justin Lin Yifu, argued that Africa should also be included in the initiative and that the core task in Africa should be the industrial relocation and infrastructure construction. (Demissie et al., 2016a). Additionally, the Director-General of the Department of African Affairs at China's MFA stated that (...) *China-Africa cooperation development is blessed with shared needs, advantages and opportunities, which will make the African continent an important foothold for the Belt and Road Initiative* (...). (Demissie et al., 2016a) The official document on vision and actions on jointly building the Belt and Road from 2017 also states that the BRI aims to (...) *connect Asian, European and African countries more closely and promote mutually beneficial cooperation to a new high and in new forms.* (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 2017)

An important aspect to note is that in the vision document initially published, the African continent did not have a significant presence, having only six general references. Despite the BRI's initial objective of promoting connectivity with the African Continent, there was none for the FOCAC acting as the leading platform for the China-Africa relations since the year 2000. Instead, a reference to the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) was made, which comprised China and 21

members of the Arab League, 10 of these African countries. From this lack of explicit reference, we can note that it was not China's intention to include Africa. (Demissie et al., 2016a).

Afterward, new indications of China's growing steps for the inclusion of Africa in the BRI were hinted at through the FOCAC Johannesburg Declaration. Stating that China and African countries will (...) *actively explore the linkages between China's initiatives of building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and Africa's Economic integration and sustainable development agenda and seek more opportunities to promote common development and realize our common dreams.*" (Declaration of the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 2015) Moreover, the FOCAC Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018) stated that the *African side welcomes the Chinese side is Championing "The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road", which includes the African Continent, and two sides will promote mutually beneficial cooperation in the blue economy.* (The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016–2018), 2015)

The current scenario, however, is very different from the one in 2015, as China has made significant progress in Africa under the BRI. Since March 2022, the number of countries that have joined the BRI by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China is 147. Of these 147, 18 are in the Middle east and North Africa and 43 are in sub-Saharan Africa. However, for some countries that are listed as having signed the MoU for the BRI the independent information available are contradictory as no independent information was found regarding the signature of a MoU to become an official country of the BRI. (Nedopil, 2022)

CHAPTER 4 – CHINA’S FORUMS IN AFRICA

As we have seen until now, over the past decades China has embarked in a variety of initiatives that are aimed to foster its own unique regional arrangements with the developing world through their investment *softpower* practices. These initiatives are then further supported by China’s forums that help on the projection of the vision of a veritable Chinese form of multilateralism. It becomes then important to this research to understand what are the defining norms and practices that support China’s foreign policy in the international system. (Alden and Alves, 2016)

In this chapter we shall look into two specific forums, The FOCAC and the Forum Macau and analyze their objectives, structure and differences. Relatively to the Forum Macau it will be interesting also to understand the importance of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) for the strengthening of the China-Africa relations and how the Forum supports these relations by acting as a bridge between these two sides.

4.1. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

FOCAC’s establishment in 2000 came essentially from a Chinese initiative and can be contextualized through the convergence of wide-ranging factors, following the economic context of China’s “going out” strategy and its need for key resources abundant in Africa, together with a political need to counter Taiwan’s “dollar diplomacy” on the African continent, which had succeeded in winning back official recognition from several African states by the early 1990s. In addition to this, there was also an increasing need for the revitalization of the diplomatic ties with the developing world after the happenings of Tiananmen square and the weight of the Western sanctions that followed it. (Alden and Alves, 2016) China felt then the need to establish an institutional platform for consultation and cooperation with the African countries to promote the development of their relations, at a time when African countries were also starting to look at their cooperation with other foreign countries, such as Europe, the United States, and Japan, as unattractive for their apparent lack of sincerity, which led them to look forward to a joint development with China on the improvement of their already existing cooperation mechanism. (Zeng & Shu, 2018)

Over the past 12 years, FOCAC has instituted several Conferences and dialogue mechanisms at various levels and in different forms including the Ministerial Conference, which is the highest form of FOCAC gathering, held every third year, although FOCAC Summit is held occasionally in its stead, as was the case in 2015 and 2018. (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Zambia, 2012) To coordinate and strengthen its cooperation with Africa under the FOCAC framework, the Chinese side has set up a Follow-up Committee, which consists of 37 members including departments under the CPC Central Committee, government agencies, civil organizations,

and financial institutions, and which are responsible for coordinating China-Africa cooperation in different fields within the FOCAC framework. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Commerce of China serve as the honorary co-chairmen of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of FOCAC, and ministerial level officials of the two ministries who oversee African affairs serve as co-chairmen. The Secretariat of the Committee is made up of officials at director-general level from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Finance, with the Director-General of the Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the Secretary-General. The Office of the Committee Secretariat is housed in the Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (FOCAC, 2022)

Additionally, the Forum's conferences have since the beginning addressed major issues and measures focusing on the African countries' interests and needs while covering almost all the aspects of pragmatic cooperation. The forum has, as of currently, 55 members composed by 53 African Nations, the PRC, and the Commission of the African Union (AU). Each African state represents itself inside the forum, and all the activities are implemented bilaterally between China and the participating country, while the African Union plays a more official coordinating role. (Murphy, 2022)

China's relationship with the AU has also arguably become closer in the past few years, especially in areas of peace and security. Chinese funding, and construction of a new African Union headquarters in 2012 seem to have paved the way for a new phase of more integrated collaboration between China, African governments, and the continent's top regional organization. The aim to increase China's involvement in African security, working with the AU and in coordination with the UN Security Council, was formalized with a declaration by the ex-president of the PRC Hu Jintao titled *China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security*. (Alden and Alves, 2016) However, cooperation between the AU and China does still withstand some challenges resultant of a wide number of issues. On the AU's side there seems to be a lack on effectiveness in decision-making and autonomy of agenda, much derived from a great financial dependency, (e.g., 61,7% in 2015), from external donors such as the EU and the UN. In 2015, the AU stated that a selection of countries should increase their financial input capable of covering 60% of the organizations budget, which fueled doubts under the remaining members that the priorities of the organization would only be decided according these six countries' national interests, further exposing the AU as lacking in its promotion of unity and solidarity among members. (Carrozza, 2018) The Chinese side, however, expects from the collaboration with the AU a unitary African voice, which for the above-mentioned reasons seems to be a challenging accomplishment for the organization. The impossibility of the AU to forge a strong unity between its member countries stands then as a worry for China, as it contradicts and puts the country's aspiration of deepening a more multilateral cooperation at risk. Consequently, China frequently reverts to its practice of exploiting its solid relationships with the African governments to close transactions more swiftly and effectively, bypassing the AU. However, while Chinese mediation

efforts and its preference for high-level diplomatic encounters may be a good alternative, such efforts need to be more effectively coordinated on a global and bilateral level, as more collaboration is also required with AU representatives to maintain local agency and prevent future conflict. (Carroza, 2018)

Despite the challenges, the future seems bright as it appears that China and Africa's political ties have grown stronger and more comprehensive in recent years. The General Administration of Customs of China recently reported that bilateral trade between the two continents reached 254.3 US\$ in 2021, up 35.3% from 2020. Additionally, China's Customs Data revealed that trade between the two regions surged by 23%, reaching 64.8 million US\$, in the first quarter of 2022, while Africa exported items to China for 105.9 billion US\$, a 43.7% rise from the previous year. (Subban, 2022) Furthermore, as part of China's BRI and the China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, President Xi offered 40 billion US\$ to infrastructure projects in Africa during the 2021 FOCAC summit. The collaboration between China and Africa to advance the continent's capacity for green, low-carbon, and sustainable development was also described, as well as the more than 50 projects that will be launched in the areas of clean energy, wildlife protection, environmentally friendly agriculture, and low-carbon development. Future years are anticipated to provide benefits for the African continent via commerce in sustainable goods and services. (Subban, 2022)

4.2. The Forum Macau

The Forum Macau was established in 2003, one of the first coming from a diplomatic initiative from China, having been preceded only by the FOCAC, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All three of these organizations had in common the multilateral scope and their regional characteristics, however their specificities are very different according to the contexts in which they are inserted. (Costa, 2019) In the specific case of Forum Macau, it stands as a platform in which the countries of the CPLP can participate in a more direct and structural way in matters regarding the collaboration with China, while making use of the shared history and linguistic connection between them. Contrary to FOCAC, Forum Macau is not a pure multilateral organization as China assumes a clear role of leadership, and oversees the nomination of the secretary-general, who is then supported by three Deputy Secretary-general's: one from the Portuguese-speaking countries, another from the government of Macau and the last one from the Chinese government. (Costa, 2019)

The appointment of the Deputy Secretary-General by the PSC is rotative and in alphabetical order, with the position currently held by São Tomé and Príncipe. Through this permanent structure China promotes a closer contact with the Ministry of Commerce in China and helps to improve communication with investors and entrepreneurs through online support, in which their website is used as the main source of useful information and resources regarding the activities and incident areas of the Forum. (Mendes, 2013) Additionally, the monitoring mechanism is composed of a Permanent

Secretariat, based in Macau, which guarantees logistical and financial support, as well as the indispensable link for the implementation of initiatives and projects to be implemented, and a network of focal points in the respective capitals. Contrary to the FOCAC, however, China's presence on the Forum Macau is more prominent which can be an indication of the valorization given by the country to the organization in its foreign policy agenda. (Costa, 2019) This presence is then, complemented by a variety of activities in collaboration with the representatives of its member-states, proving the forum's potential as a strong instrument of *softpower* that enhances the knowledge of the CPLP regarding China. Further contributing for the evolution of bilateral dialogue with each country and transforming it into the perfect platform for China to promote its economic and political discourse in a more direct and accessible way. (Costa, 2019)

The forum has as its main objective to contribute to the development and strengthening of commercial and economic relations between China and its other members while maintaining the principle of mutual benefit and internal development of all the parties involved as part of the forum's goal. A Ministerial Conference is held every three years in Macau to approve the triennial Action Plan for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries. (Direção-Geral das atividades económicas da República Portuguesa, n.d.)

The choice of Macau as the permanent secretariat of the Forum Macau is extremely important in the Chinese context. Not only does the region pride itself for having a diversified and fascinating history of cultural exchanges, today it remains the only place in China where gambling is allowed, with this sector contributing to more than half of the region's GDP, whose values amount to a nominal of 53.9 billion US\$, having already surpassed Las Vegas. According to the statistics prepared in 2018, the annual income generated by gambling was of 37 billion US\$. (Olsen, 2019) However, with the growth of the gaming sector also enhancing profoundly the public space, demography, and local economy in Macau, other sectors, such as the civil construction and real estate, lacked attention. (Costa, 2021) The Chinese government decided then to follow a complementary model³² that would enhance the region's attraction and propel its integration on a broader national plan for the national economic and social development, such as the strategic plan for the Greater Bay area. (Costa, 2021)

However, to better understand the symbology of Macau as a bridge connecting China to the West, and more specifically to PSC, it's interesting for our study to also understand the importance of China's commercial trade with the PSC. According to the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum Macau, and based on the data from Global Trade Flow, commercial trade between China and the PSC reached 43.29 billion US\$ in the period from January to March 2022, representing an 8.87% increase as compared with the corresponding ones from a year earlier, while China's imports from Portuguese-

³² In 2002, the MSAR opened bidding for casino concessions and initiated a strategy to lure investment and to remake Macau's casinos into larger, more wholesome Las Vegas-Style operations capable of attracting conventions and longer-stay tourists, promoting in this way the development of tourism and real estate on the region. (Luke, 2010).

Speaking Countries reached 27.392 billion US\$, an increase of 3,08% compared to the year before. Additionally, within that period of time, China sold goods worth of 15.90 million US\$ to the PSC, amounting to an increase of 20.52%. (Forum Macau, 2022)

For China, Macau is the point of convergence with the Lusophone culture, with The Macau Association for the Promotion of Exchange between Asia-Pacific and Latin America (MAPEAL) even stating that it is (...) *different from Hong Kong and other Chinese cities, through its own historical process of more than four centuries Macau created its unique cultural identity, which can be called as Sino-Latin*. Further highlighting the symbolism of Macau, and by association the Macau Forum in the approach to the CPLP. Now, according to Mendes (2014) (...) *The growing demand for Portuguese Language courses transformed Macau into a privileged place of linguistic and cultural training for Chinese diplomats, interpreters, and businessmen, before they start working in the Portuguese-speaking countries*. which is exemplified by several events, held often with the support of the Forum Macau such as the *Lusofonia Festival*, that is held since 1998 every year in October to promote the culture of the Portuguese-speaking countries and honor this community still living in Macau; International Conferences that gather professions from all the Lusophone countries, and meetings of the Association of Universities of Portuguese Language (Mendes, 2014).

With this we can understand that, for China, the promotion and valorization of the Portuguese language and culture in their discourse, through the MSAR and in collaboration with the countries of the CPLP, seems to be an extremely important instrument of dialogue and diplomacy with these countries, that not only play a great role in the Atlantic Ocean, being advantageously situated in an axis connecting the Southern and Northern hemispheres and allowing for an opportunity to participate in enlarged geostrategic cooperation and reinforce collective security-strategy (Bernardino, 2020). This consequently allows China to establish a closer dialogue with regional blocs of which the countries concerned are part, such as the African Union (AU) and Community for the Development of Southern Africa (SADC) (of which Angola is a member), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ANSA) (of which East Timor aspires to be a member), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (of which Brazil is a member), and the European Union (EU) (of which Portugal is a member), among other regional bodies. (Lopes, 2011)

CHAPTER 5- CONTENT AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

5.1. Methods and Procedures

This chapter aims to understand the possible implications of the PRC's political representatives choice of certain lexical items, words, and tone in their discourse, under FOCAC and Forum Macau during the last 20 years. It also plans to analyze the usage of certain grammatical patterns and how these enrich the construction of the Chinese discourse. To achieve the objective of this study, thirty discourse materials were chosen, a combination of fifteen speeches and reports from 2004 to 2021 delivered under the FOCAC and a combination of fifteen speeches and interviews delivered under the Forum Macau from 2015 to 2022.

For the selection of the texts to be analyzed, we took into consideration if the speaker delivering them were political figures representing the Chinese government and the context in which these were being delivered under the forums. For FOCAC, we explored the category of *Important speeches* established on the official webpage of the forum itself and focused our selection on speeches and reports essentially connected to the ministerial meetings and important conferences and delivered by presidents and ministers of the PRC from 2004 to 2021. For Forum Macau, we relied mainly on interviews and speeches present on the Bulletins and dossiers available on the official webpage of the permanent secretariat of Macau and delivered by representatives of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum Macau, the ministry of commerce of the PRC, the government of Macau and also ambassadors in diplomatic mission on the PSC that through their position are connected to the Chinese government from 2015 to 2022.

We tried to analyze the documents and speeches delivered during a time-period starting from the forum's establishment until the time of writing of this research for a better understanding of their parallel evolution, however, after extensive research on the official webpage of the permanent secretariat of Macau we were only able to assemble a group of speeches and interviews starting on the year 2015, from a collection of official dossiers and bulletins available for consultation. Of this collection the earliest reference was from the year 2014 and in that year no direct transcriptions of speeches or interviews were present on the material.

5.1.1. Sample of Study

China has put great efforts and focus on the development of a foreign policy discourse regarding international cooperation; however, this discourse shows signs of being specifically adapted to the different realities of the countries with which it dialogues. The countries of the African continent are a perfect study case for us to apply such analysis having into consideration its position on the

developing world, and the presence of two great forums for cooperation between China and African countries, being them the FOCAC, and in a more specific way the Forum Macau that counts among its members with the Portuguese-Speaking African countries, being also through these Forums that China “*mainly advocates its discourse, creating a favorable environment for the reception of her political and economic projects*”. (Costa, 2020)

With China’s attempts on exporting the countries approach to development, that had lifted hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty and more recently president Xi Jinping’s emphases in increasing China’s *softpower*, international narrative and communication with the world, especially since the announcement of the BRI in 2013 it is important for scholars to further their scope of research regarding China’s discourse and the if there are deviations or adaptations for a specific group of countries. (Albert, 2018) In this analysis we aim to explore how this discourse has been molded through the years under FOCAC and Forum Macau, if there is a general discourse for the African continent, or if the PRC has sought to build a specific one for the Portuguese-speaking countries.

As previously mentioned, for this analysis fifteen discourse materials were retrieved from the official webpage of FOCAC, from 2004-2021, as seen on Annex A, Table A1. Together with fifteen, discourse materials, from the official webpage of the permanent secretariat of Forum Macau, from 2015-2022, as seen on Annex A, Table A2. For the selection of the discourses to be analyzed we took into consideration if the speaker delivering them were political figures representing the Chinese government and the context in which these were being delivered under the forums.

5.1.2. Instruments of the Study

This study aims to answer the questions of our study which aims mainly to investigate if China’s discourse for Africa allowed for an adaptation to the continent’s realities and cultural characteristics not only at an international level, but also at a regional one through the role of Macau as a platform connecting China and the Portuguese speaking countries. Discourses may reveal general or specific trends regarding the African countries- The following are our analysis questions: (1) What are the possible political implications reflected on China’s discourse for Africa under her regional forums? (2) Is there a general discourse for the whole African Continent or did China opt for a specific discourse for the Portuguese-speaking countries?

Our analysis was done in two parts: Content analysis and discourse analysis. The first is an analysis, based on the creation of categories that will allow us to understand the main themes present in the Chinese discourse, after a selection of texts which are our sample. Afterwards, we developed a discourse analysis, applied to the same samples, and focused on the adaptation of the discourse to the audience. We identify specific references that can be understood specifically by that public and go into deep analysis of the figures of style used along the discourse.

Our Discourse analysis aims to reveal the underlying discursive structures adopting Hans Robert Jauss theory of Reception/Horizon of expectations and it will consist of three steps: (I) The verification of any existence of historical and cultural events that can foster a particular direction for the speech or adaptation to the audience will be investigated and referred. (II) In association with the categories already analyzed it will be investigated the figures of speech present in the totality of the samples. (III) Afterwards a comparative analysis shall be made taking into consideration the Horizon of expectations theory to delineate conclusions regarding the construction of the discourse under both forums and if there were adaptations under each forum for a specific audience.

The selected data is considered a form of political discourses, which are examined in search of stylistic figures or references, such as historical or cultural events, which may encourage a particular direction of speech or adaptation to the audience. The selected discourses were downloaded in their written forms and selected in accordance with the political position of their speakers. It was assured that all the discourses were delivered by Chinese national political figures representing the government of China in the country or in diplomatic missions abroad.

5.2. Findings

5.2.1. Content Analysis

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

Starting with FOCAC, our categories were created by impact of frequency and key-word relevance (Annex B, Table B1) to our topic and research questions. Through this process 30 words were initially identified on the totality of the samples acquired. Afterwards we opted to choose the top 10 words, with a percentage of total frequency ranging from 15.6% to 2,9% respectively, to act as our final categories and undergo an extensive analysis regarding their tone, localization, context, and association to other concepts inside the discourses selected (Annex C, Table C1).

According to the Annex C, Table C1 we can verify that the categories chosen can be allocated to three tones of use: Neutral, Positive and Negative. During our analysis we verified that there is a tendency for the use of a *positive tone* in the totality of the discourses, as can be verified through the categories *Cooperation*, *Development*, *Forum*, *Relations*, *Support*, and *Friendship* that stand to a total frequency of 39.4%. *Cooperation* not only presents itself as the category with the biggest percentage of total frequency (15,6%) but also seems to be carefully used in specific situations on the discourses it appears such as the beginning of paragraphs following greetings to the audience or on the paragraph after the speaker speaks directly to the audience mid discourse. It also presents a deep connection in its

use with other positive concepts such as *mutually beneficial* and *friendship* while holding close and clear the recognition of the audience to which it is directed through the association with the concepts of *China-Africa* and *South-south*.

Development meanwhile registers a bigger frequency of use mid-discourse, and as the third most used category in the totality of the discourses (10,0%) it shows more prominence in association with the accomplishments and new measures resultant of China's cooperation with Africa. Being mainly associated with the term *Africa* shows that there is a care and intention on showing the African countries that China's not oblivious to the development situation of the continent grabbing the attention of the audience to the proposals presented. On the other hand, the category *Forum* shows a scarce reference on the discourses analyzed but through its main use being in association with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, a common line is delineated with the two above-mentioned categories and the term is frequently used in a hopeful tone regarding the forum's role for upholding the good performance of the proposals presented regarding both sides' cooperation for development. Finally, *relations*, *support* and *friendship* appear close in their frequency on the totality of samples, ranging from 3.6% to 3.0% respectfully, and their presence seems to be more complementary to the categories before mentioned as there's an emphasis on a celebratory or optimistic tone of improvement for the cooperation through FOCAC, while echoing to the historical political exchanges between China and Africa in diverse areas of mutual interest.

Additionally, while analyzing the content of the selected discourses it was possible to identify the remaining categories as possessing neutral and negative tones. For the neutral tone we identified the category *countries*, *trade* and *peace*. *Countries* despite being the second most referenced category (10,5%) seems to be used essentially amid the enumeration of actions performed through the cooperation between China and Africa, in a mere informative manner, while at the same time being associated with mentions to the necessity of urging additional action from the developed countries in areas of need close to the developing countries. In an equal manner *Trade* is referenced mainly in an enumerative and descriptive way during the passages where the speaker references the areas of cooperation and development to be discussed under the forum's work plans. In another stance, and despite its more reduced use on the totality of the samples (2.9%), *Peace* registers a more compact use on the sample 15A as a bigger section was dedicated to the China-Africa's cooperation on peace and security. At a general level the promotion of peace is referenced as both a daunting challenge, and important goal and pillar for the cementing of the unity and cooperation among developing countries. The category however doesn't receive great highlight as a stand-alone term and its mainly positioned as a desired achievement resultant from the prosperity of other categories such as *Cooperation* and *Support*.

Finally, for the negative tone we have identified the category *International*, mostly close to the end of the discourses when the speaker refers to the *complex and profound changes; uncertainties* and *volatilities* in the international situation at the time that have gone *unabated*. The category is mostly mentioned associated with *affairs* and *financial crisis* on the totality of the samples and followed by *cooperation* in the tone of a solution for the implied existence of problems associated with it. Despite having been the only category associated with a negative tone it is important to note that it is the fourth more referenced category on the totality of the samples standing at 5.3%.

Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macau)

Regarding the categories of the Forum Macau, these were equally selected by the impact of frequency and key-word relevance to our topic and research questions and can be verified on Annex B, Table B2. Once again, the top 10 words selected from the initial analysis, with a total frequency ranging from 12.0% to 2,5% respectively, were selected to act as our final categories and undergo an extensive analysis regarding their tone, localization, context, and association to other concepts inside the discourses selected (Annex C, Table C2).

According to the Annex C, Table C2 we can verify that the categories chosen can be allocated to three tones of use: Neutral, Positive, and Negative. During our analysis, we verified that similar to FOCAC's analysis there is a tendency for the use of a *positive tone* in the totality of the discourses delivered under Forum Macau, as can be verified through the categories: *Macau*, *Portuguese language*, *Forum*, *Development*, *Platform*, *Commercial*, *Investment* and *Cooperation*. *Macau* (9,8%) is used frequently after reference to *China*, *Platform*, or the *Portuguese language-speaking countries*, and appears throughout the samples as a positive symbol under the form of the Forum Macau that promotes the China-Portuguese language-speaking countries relationship. Meanwhile, *Portuguese language* (9.1%) and *Forum* (5.3%) are referenced as a promoter for the cooperation between China and the CPLP in various areas of mutual interest. *Platform* (3.4%) is used mainly as a direct reference to Forum Macau and is represented as an invaluable agent of connection for the strengthening of China's cooperation with the CPLP.

Additionally, *Commercial* (3.2%) and *Investment* (2.5%) can be found with bigger frequency on the beginning and middle point of the individual samples, used mainly now when the speaker is referring to the areas of cooperation and development to be discussed under the Forum's work plans. Despite this it is taken as the principal area that contributes to *Development* (4.3%) and *Cooperation* (10,2%) being presented as a receiver of the benefits that might come to it through Macau's platform and the use of Portuguese language as one of its work instruments.

Furthermore, while analyzing the content of the selected discourses it was possible to identify the remaining categories as possessing a *neutral tone*, these are: *Countries* and *China*. *Countries* is the category referenced more times throughout the discourses analyzed (12%) and it is mainly used together with the term *Portuguese language*, showing a focused and direct approach to the audience. This is then followed using the second most referenced category *China* (11,1%), in association with *Portuguese language countries*, showing the emphasis given during the discourses to the strengthening of the relationship between China and the Portuguese speaking countries under Forum Macau. Important to note, however that the terms themselves are mainly used as identifiers of the parts that are going to benefit from the establishment of relations under the Forum Macau, not being greatly associated with positive or negative connotations which directed us to situate them on a neutral category.

Finally, after analyzing the content of both Forum's discourses it was possible to note that *Cooperation*, *countries*, *development*, and *Forum* were the mutual categories in both forums, however their frequency of use differed as seen below:

FOCAC		Forum Macau	
% of total frequency	Category	Category	% of total frequency
15.6%	Cooperation	Cooperation	10.2%
10.5%	Countries	Countries	12%
10%	Development	Development	4.3%
3.8%	Forum	Forum	5.3%

Table 1- % of total frequency from the concepts common to both forum's samples.

Through these findings, we can understand that on FOCAC discourses there seems to be a bigger focus on improving the cooperation for the development of China's partner countries, seen as the Forum itself is more deeply enclosed to a diplomatic audience and already very rooted on historical political exchanges. Forum Macau on the other hand, despite also greatly valuing the cooperation among its country members, seems to give a bigger focus to the countries and the forum itself than to the topic of development. This might come from the fact that it is a forum more focused in commercial exchanges and investment, with a more direct discourse, as such it needs to assert itself as a valuable platform on which such exchanges can be delivered so that it might then contribute also to the mutual development of its country members.

5.2.2. Discourse Analysis

Now, despite the results gathered on the section above we felt that it was still insufficient for us to be able to answer the research questions imposed. As such, the present research aimed to go further into our study and all the samples were analyzed in search of additional parts of the discourse, such as figures of speech that appear with a bigger frequency on the samples, and references to historical, cultural, or other events, that might complement the results already acquired from the content analysis done above. The results were as presented below:

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

On the selected samples referent to the FOCAC it was possible to identify historical references, appearing with increased frequency mainly on the first paragraphs after the speaker welcomes or redirects the greetings to the audience (Ex: "Ladies and Gentlemen"; "Mr. Chairman"). The samples referent to the years 2009 and 2006, with the later standing as a year of highlighted interest as the speech was delivered during the celebration of the 50th year anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and some African countries³³. As such, the historical references on this specific year focus on the close relationship and the bond of friendship between China and Africa as being forged based on sincere friendship and equality, win-win mutual benefit and common development, fairness and justice, and progress with times and openness and inclusiveness.

The past is described as an experience that makes both regions close to each other and that opens a path for them to achieve a bright future of cooperation. FOCAC is also mentioned as *a bridge of friendship and a platform of cooperation between China and Africa* in the speech *Building the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership* delivered by Wen Jianbao on November 8, 2009. This use of metaphors not only hints at the role the forum has developed in guiding and promoting the development of China-Africa relations, but also creates a powerful image with a bigger appeal to the audience. Together with this there are mentions of the diplomatic visits of Chinese high officials to Africa and references to the role of Africa in *upholding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity* while also enhancing the path of development chosen by China and how it allowed for a sustained and fast economic growth, allowing for an improvement of the life of the Chinese people.

Additionally, in the speech *Building the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership* by the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Wen Jianbao, on the 8th of November 2009, and the key-note speech of the Opening ceremony of 8th FOCAC ministerial conference delivered by President Xi Jinping on the 2nd of December 2021, the historical references touch the

³³ The first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence was Ghana in 1957.

period of colonialism and how both sides struggled against the western imperialism, and the hard endeavors both sides had to confront to uphold their respective national economies³⁴. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway, the Chinese medical teams and the young Chinese volunteers in Africa are referenced as examples of China's assistance to the continent, while Africa's contribution on restoring China's seat in the United Nations, the Beijing Olympic torch relay in Africa and Africa's donations to the victims of the Wenchuan earthquake are referred as examples of Africa's friendship towards China. The discourse present on the samples seems then to reflect the struggles of the past in the achievements of the present and highlights the future gains both sides might achieve through the principles of mutual understanding, non-interference, and peaceful coexistence.

In another scope, the reference of the African proverb *If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together*, together with the Chinese proverb *As distance can test a horse's strength, so time can reveal a person's heart*, in subsequent order on the last paragraph of the speech Building the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership, by the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Wen Jianbao, on the 8th of November 2009, establishes a link between cultural values both in Africa and China and also between an idea of development and social organization. The combined use of these two proverbs sustain the next section of this paragraph in which Wen Jianbao states *I am convinced that as long as China and Africa go hand in hand with an enterprising spirit and cooperate on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, we will seize opportunities and overcome challenges to take the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership to a new level and make China-Africa friendship and cooperation even more fruitful*.

Other uses of Chinese proverbs were also registered on the report at the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, delivered by Yang Jiengchi on November 10, 2009, and on Xi Jinping's speech at the Opening ceremony of 8th FOCAC ministerial conference on December 2, 2021. The first one translates as *If two people unite as one, their strength is powerful enough to cut through metal*, and seems to be used as an expression of the need for China and Africa to continue to work together to overcome their difficulties and reach new achievements in their cooperation. The second transcribes as *A journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step* and is

³⁴ Historical reference to the decades of war that left negative impacts on China's economy from 1949 onward. On those years half of the machinery in the main industrial districts had been dismantled and sent to the Soviet Union by the time the war with Japan ended in 1945. Lack of maintenance had led to the destruction or degradation of the electricity, communication, and transportation infrastructures. Food production was below its pre-war peak level due to the disruption of agriculture, and one of the worst inflations in recorded history was being felt worldwide. Additionally, the period of the Great Leap Forward famine and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution seemed to also be negatively impacting the economy. (Naughton, 2006) Despite this backdrop, China was able to significantly raise its average living standards and social stability after implementing economic reforms in 1978, transforming the country from an isolated socialist state into the center of the global economy. China's political backing for the anti-colonial fight in Africa also had set the ground for its technical help throughout the period of independence. During this time, China and Africa engaged in economic cooperation mostly in the fields of agriculture and health, where China's own changing experiences were considered as particularly suitable for Africa's rural economy. (Alden, 2019)

used as a direct reference to the historical beginning of China and Africa's diplomatic relationships. Both proverbs seem to allude to the positive concept of unity between both sides, aiming through their use to further reaffirm China's positive intentions to pursue stable and peaceful cooperation together with the African continent.

In the discourses englobing the following years: 2010, 2012, 2015, and 2021 it's verified that the discourse presents a bigger focus on informing the African countries of the importance and advantages brought upon China-Africa cooperation through the foundation of the FOCAC, while rooted on the concept of traditional friendship and the principle of mutually beneficial cooperation. Describing one by one the achievements done in each area of cooperation while reaffirming China's stand regarding their policy of non-interference in internal affairs and of a cooperation with no political strings attached. There are references to China's encouraging African countries to go in a specific direction, while reaffirming that said direction chosen should come from Africa's independent will, reinforcing the faith that the African people have the wisdom and ability to achieve economic prosperity and social progress through their unremitting efforts. However, there are also references to the international community and how it should increase the support and care given to Africa in facing their biggest challenges.

Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macau)

The samples referent to Forum Macau deliver a tone of speech more direct and supported by quantitative data regarding commercial statistics, direct investment, and volume of trade between China and the PSC, that helps the speaker to provide a better picture to the audience regarding the evolution of sino-lusophone trade and cooperation. It's possible to notice from the start a great use of metaphors when the speaker refers to Macau. The importance of Macau is frequently compared to: a *Bridge*; a *door*; a *window* or a *platform* that represent a projection and contact with the outside and builds the way, connects, and strengthens the relations between China and the PSC's, serving as a basis of cooperation for these to grow and develop at a commercial and cultural level. In our understanding, the use of these metaphors can be understood as a reference to Macau's advantageous location within the Great Bay Area, serving as a facilitator and intermediary for local banks, consultants, and specialized organizations from nearby areas inside the GBA to negotiate with the PSC that are members of the Forum Macau. This is possible by the specific characteristics of Macau as a convergence point of the Lusophone culture vastly promoted not only by the use of the Portuguese language as a work instrument under Forum Macau, but also, through the investment in the training of human resources as a strengthening of cooperation between China and the PSC. This through the choice of Macau as host for international conferences that bring together professionals from all

Portuguese-speaking countries working in a variety of sectors, including medicine, journalism, law, and government institutions. Additionally training sessions are offered in Macau to technicians from the PSC that englobe organized trips to China, that ultimately contribute to strengthen the trust between both sides and consequently facilitate the establishment of commercial links.

The use of metaphors to refer to Macau is especially frequent on a 2017 Interview held after the 12th regular meeting of the permanent secretariat of the Forum Macau with Sun Tong, the General-Director of the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau at the Ministry of Commerce, where the General-Director refers to Macau as having an irreplaceable role as a bridge and a bond that connects China and the PSC's; The Forum Macau as another (...) *transatlantic bridge* of Macau, and finally compares Macau to a (...) *lotus flower of the silk sea route*. All these mentions in three different parts of the interview, however, are used to enhance the importance of deepening the role of Macau as a platform inside the scope of Forum Macau.

Some historic references are registered in the speech delivered by The Vice-minister of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Gao Yan, at the seminar on the retrospect and prospect of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of Forum Macau in 2018; in a 2016 interview to the secretary-general of the permanent secretariat of the Forum Macau (2016-2020), Xu Yingzhen, regarding Macau's role as a platform between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries in the most diverse areas of cooperation, and in the speech delivered by the Deputy- secretary-general of the permanent secretariat of the Forum Macau, titled *Cooperation is real and the results are excellent* in 2021. These historical references highlight the position of Macau as a point of convergence between the Lusophone and Chinese cultures, and how its multicultural nature was conserved after being returned to China in 1999, having kept the great influence from the Portuguese culture and Portuguese language. These historical references are mainly used at the beginning of the speeches and interviews identified and it not only presents itself as an acknowledgment of the culture of the audience, which are the Portuguese-speaking countries, but also builds the stage for the central role the Portuguese language takes as an instrument that not only favors the contact with the PSC but also fosters the development of both sides relations and cooperation in the most varied aspects through Macau.

The use of quotes from prominent political figures from China was also registered in speeches from 2018, 2020, and 2021. The first is registered on the speech from the Vice-minister of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (2013-2018), Gao Yan, delivered at the Seminar on Retrospect and Prospect of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Founding of the Forum Macau, held on July 6th, 2018, the speaker makes a reference to a quote by Mao Zedong *Xiongguan Mandao is really like iron, and now he is stepping forward from the beginning* in the poem *Remembering Qin'e-Loushanguan*, which portrays the victory in the commanding of the Battle of Loushanguan, and expresses Mao Zedong's emotions at the time and his hope on the future to come. Here it is used also in a hopeful and positive

tone for the future while looking back on the achievements and initiatives already held under the Forum.

Additionally, on the speech from the Chairman of the China-Africa development fund and the China-PSC's cooperation and development, delivered at the Investment promotion session in PSC's at the 11th International Forum on Investment and Construction of Infrastructure, held on December 3rd of 2020, the expression *foster new opportunities amidst crises, open up new horizons on a shifting landscape* was used. It is interesting to highlight this expression as the same one would be used two years later May 2022 by president Xi Jinping at the World Economic Forum, on which he had last been present on the 2017 edition. In its usage by president Xi Jinping, the expression highlighted the need for countries to learn by comparing their long history cycles and to observe the subtle changes in them and further improve their collaboration under the basis of respect for each other, common ground and win-win cooperation. The usage of such expression in this speech under the Forum Macau seems to be used in the same context as these principles are mentioned right after it's usage and in both situations the expression is used while talking in a hopeful tone for a better cooperation in the aftermath of the pandemic.

Meanwhile, on the speech from the Deputy-secretary-general of the permanent secretariat of the Forum Macau, Ding Tian, titled *Cooperation is real, and the results are excellent* present on Forum Macau's 48th Bulletin from 2021, there's a reference to a 2016's quote from Li Keqiang in which the prime-minister states (...) *Macau is a bridge, a window and a platform between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries*. Once again hinting to the unique characteristics of Macau as a Chinese territory with unique and strong connections to the Lusophone culture.

5.2.3. Comparative analysis of the FOCAC and Forum Macau discourses

Through both the content and discourse analysis done above, we could verify that the tone of the discourses analyzed for Forum Macau are presented as more direct, factual, and business-centered, also having a greater focus on the PSC, including countries outside Africa, and the importance of Macau as a point of convergence for the Lusophone culture and for China's commercial collaboration with the PSC's. The principles of peaceful coexistence are equally present in the discourses under Forum Macau, as they are under FOCAC. However, they are not the center of the discourses, being mainly introduced through or after the use of references to past quotes from high political figures or metaphors. This stands in opposition to the discourses under FOCAC as the principles of peaceful coexistence were mentioned throughout the different stages of each sample and especially under the presentation of the new proposals for development under the Forum.

In another stage also stands the tone present on the discourses from FOCAC that, despite also having technical sections in which the speaker usually went through the data and records of the past

few years of evolution on the China-Africa cooperation under the forum, presented a more emotional approach to the construction of the discourse, emphasizing the common history and the long-standing friendship between both regions. In both forums it's interesting to highlight that, references to the BRI are more present in the discourses of Forum Macau (starting from 2015), while FOCAC only seems to have mentions of it on the 2021 speeches. This is not to say that China hasn't presented efforts on expanding her collaboration under the BRI with the African countries as it is referenced that in 2018 *Fifty-two African countries and the AU Commission have signed BRI cooperation agreements with China*, it does show however an increase on the use of this platform to connect both discourses for cooperation with Africa, in resemblance of what has come to be done under the Forum Macau with the PSC's.

Additionally, through the adoption of the Theory of Reception/Horizons of expectation of Hans Robert Jauss we were able to identify some other interesting aspects amid the findings of our analysis. Starting with FOCAC it is clear in the samples from 2004 to 2021 that there is a great focus on the use of historical references, metaphors, and proverbs in the structure of the discourse under the forum, which can be understood as China's effort to create not only an appealing powerful image, but also a relation of trust that connects with an audience that had grown wary of lacking western aid promises and whose weak elites were mainly concerned with the stability of national political power as a priority above the social improvement for the citizens. For such audience, China, who already shared historical ties with the African continent had become an example of rapid growth and transformation, having evolved from one of the poorest countries to the world's second-largest economy. This phase of *creating trust* was then sedimented through a sentiment of liberation solidarity, echoing how both sides suffered at the hands of the western imperial powers and introducing the premise that the cooperation under FOCAC would be based on the five principles of coexistence, initially presented on the Conference of Bandung by Zhou Enlai, and from these enhancing the one's referent to mutual benefit, non-interference, and non-strings attached (with exception to the support for the One China principle), clauses which greatly pleased the African leaders of the time.

However, as mentioned on point 5.2.2, with the samples from 2010, 2012, 2015, and 2021 the discourses seem to have adopted a greater focus on informing the African countries of the importance and advantages brought upon China-Africa cooperation through FOCAC, through enumeration of the achievements inside the past initiatives held inside the forum and plans for future cooperation improvement. Additionally, we can also note that from the Five principles of peaceful coexistence there is a special reinforcement of China's policy of non-interference in internal affairs and of cooperation with no strings attached. Together with this, there's a new mention of the need for international actors to act on their aid promises and the start of a special focus on referencing security issues. This new discourse approach under FOCAC can be understood as a new phase of reinforcing trust, following the increasing international accusations regarding China's motives on the African

continent as being malicious-intended and seeking a *new colonialism* based on *debt-diplomacy*. As such, before an audience of African leaders, worried about the steps to be taken further in the future inside the forum and wary of the increasing debt situation inside the continent, China's discourse shows an adaptation to a more urgent tone, almost indirectly answering each worry one by one and further enhancing regional security cooperation in the continent as it is one of Africa's main areas of interest on the current context.

Finally, and from another perspective, the same theory can be applied to the discourses analyzed under Forum Macau to understand the differences registered in the discourse construction under this second forum. However, some greater challenges were met regarding this forum because of the timeframe to which the samples belong. Contrary to FOCAC we were only able to find official samples starting from 2014. Providing too short of a timeframe for us to be able to apply Jauss theory in a way that would allow us to gather more complete comparative results of the evolution of the discourse towards the audience of Forum Macau. Nevertheless, we noticed that in the speeches from 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2021 there was a frequent use of metaphors and historic references that fundament a powerfully positive and appealing image, despite in a shorter volume than the ones used in the discourses analyzed for FOCAC.

Contrary to FOCAC, the use of both metaphors and historic references doesn't seem to be specifically oriented around creating trust amongst the audience receiving the discourses, since most members in Forum Macau have already worked with China under other platforms, such as the case of FOCAC for the African countries and the BRICS for Brazil. It seems then, more oriented around the justification and selling of the advantages that can be brought through a new bilateral and more direct and personal collaboration using Macau as a platform. This aligns with what is expected by the audience under this forum as contrary to FOCAC in which the audience consists of mainly government leaders of the member countries, Forum Macau is essentially composed of representatives of these countries nominated inside the structure of the Forum, giving to their members a new and more involved role inside bilateral plans for development. In the samples from 2018, 2020, and 2021 quotes from prominent political figures were also registered but these seem to appear essentially as having a reinforcement role of the intention behind the metaphors and historic and cultural references already mentioned above, with one of the direct quotes, of a sentence delivered by Li Keqiang in 2016, being a metaphor in itself.

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS

This work aimed to analyze if China's discourse for Africa allowed for an adaptation to the continent's realities and cultural characteristics not only at an international level but also at a regional one through FOCAC and Forum Macau. For this, two specific questions were posed: what the possible implications of reflection on China's discourses under her regional forums could be and whether there was a general discourse for the whole African continent or if China had opted for a specific discourse for the Portuguese-speaking countries. To achieve a plausible answer to the imposed questions, a selection of discourses under the above-mentioned forums was made. These underwent a content and discourse analysis that would allow us to have a bigger picture of the main term utilized during the delivery of the selected discourses and the historical, cultural, and linguistic elements that could broaden our understanding of China's discourse.

On the one hand, our analysis verified that both forums are sustained by the same principles of peaceful coexistence that are also present in China's general political discourse. However, there seems to be a mild adaptation to the specific audience of each Forum. For FOCAC, we recorded a dominance of historical references, especially the remembrance of Africa's support for China in upholding the one-China principle by recognizing the PRC as representative of the China seat on the United Nations. China also seems inclined to inform the African countries of the importance and advantages brought upon China-Africa cooperation through the foundation of the FOCAC, which is presented as being rooted in their many years of friendship dating from China's support for Africa during the age of the liberation movements as it presents a deconstruction of the achievements in each cooperation area and aims to reaffirm China's stand regarding her policy of non-interference in internal affairs and cooperation with no political strings attached. Additionally, the references noted regarding the BRI seem to indicate that a new approach for south-south cooperation and strengthening of China-Africa's ties could be achieved by combining the Initiative with Africa's development strategy.

This reassurance from China and the constant reminder of the principles that form this cooperation are essential for maintaining a healthy Sino-Africa cooperation in an era where, despite most of the continent looking favorably to China's presence, there are some raising worries facing its long-term impact, both from the African countries, and the west. The tone of the discourses delivered here is essentially aimed at a political and academic audience. The topics presented are also mainly focused on security and peacekeeping, economic development, and social development, with the subject of security having recorded a growing focus over the years and especially since the nomination of president Xi for the leadership of the PRC.

In an even more specific discursive approach, we have the Forum Macau. Despite being a regional forum equally derived from the Chinese initiative, just like FOCAC, the Forum Macau already presents in its structure a more particular goal through its foundational connection to one specific region of China and its aggregation of countries, not for its geographical belonging but essentially for its shared history and spoken language. Our analysis of the discourses delivered under Forum Macau showed that there was a more significant emphasis on the importance given to Macau by the mainland and how the region acts as a point of convergence for the Lusophone culture and China's commercial collaboration with the Portuguese-speaking countries. The principles of peaceful coexistence mark their presence also on the Forum Macau as they do in China's general discourse.

However, in a different stand than FOCAC, China centers her discourse under the Forum Macau specifically towards the PSCs, using the shared linguistic inheritance between them and Macau, not being restricted only to the African continent. The use of historical references in the construction of the discourses is present. Still, their volume is far from the one used under FOCAC and is limited to the historical and cultural connection between Macau and the Lusophone world. The use of metaphors, however, is dominant in the selected samples, enhancing the importance of deepening the role of Macau as a platform inside the scope of Forum Macau. The tone of the discourses delivered under the forum also presents itself as aiming for a more business-wide audience by focusing mainly on commercial trade, investment, human resources cooperation, and cultural interchange. Interesting to note is also the fact that the discourses acquired from this Forum were mainly extracted from the bulletins available on the official website and mainly in the form of interviews that were constructed using a less formal tone than the ones used on the discourses acquired from FOCAC.

Through this analysis, it becomes clear that despite the core discourse of China being sustained on the same principles of mutual benefit, non-intervention, equality, and win-win cooperation used in their international discourse, there seems to be an effort to adapt this discourse to the different realities and cultural characteristics of both Forum's audiences. However, such results should be further analyzed for a complete picture of the political implications reflected in these discourses, how their adaptation evolved, and what we might expect from the future. It would be interesting in further studies to not only have access to discourses delivered under Forum Macau referent to the period before 2014, which presented impossible for us to find with the available tools. But also, to compare the original and translated versions of both forum's discourses to verify the existence or lack of changes between them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. African Development Bank Group. (2022, February 8). African Development Bank sets course to close infrastructure gap with. African Development Bank - Building Today, a Better Africa Tomorrow. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-sets-course-close-infrastructure-gap-board-approval-its-first-public-private-partnerships-strategic-framework-48875>
2. Afrobarometer (2014), AD122: China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad122-chinas-growing-presence-africa-wins-largely-positive-popular-reviews>
3. Akhiapor, J. C. W. (1985). The success and failure of dependency theory: the experience of Ghana. *International Organization*, 39(3), 535–552. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300019172>
2. Albert, E. (2017, July 12). China in Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa>
3. Alden, C., and Alves, A. C. (2016). China's Regional Forum Diplomacy in the Developing World: Socialisation and the 'Sinosphere.' *Journal of Contemporary China*, 26(103), 151–165. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1206276>
4. Alden, C. (2019, April 15). Evolving Debates and Outlooks on China–Africa Economic Ties. *China-Africa and an Economic Transformation*, 84–97. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830504.003.0005>
5. Amnesty International UK. (2019). *1989 Tiananmen Square protests*. Retrieved September 28, 2022, from <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/china-1989-tiananmen-square-protests-demonstration-massacre>
6. Araújo, C. G. D., Brandão, C. M., & Diegues, A. C. (2019). As transformações no modelo de desenvolvimento econômico chinês: De Deng Xiaoping ao período atual. *Revista Economia Ensaio*, 33(1). <https://doi.org/10.14393/ree-v33n1a2018-39517>
7. Atlantic Council (2020). Chinese Discourse Power: China's Use of Information manipulation in Regional and Global Competition. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/China-Discourse-Power-FINAL.pdf>
8. Albert, E. (2018) China's Big Bet on Soft Power. Council on Foreign Relations. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power>
Chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-its-implications-for-africa-wwf-kenya-december-2016.pdf.

9. Bailey, M. (1975). Tanzania and China. *African Affairs*, 74(294), 39–50.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/720907>
10. Baldick, C. & Oxford University Press. (2008). *The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms*. Oxford University Press.
11. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). (n.d.). Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html>
12. Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (2017). Vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road. Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation.
<http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html>
13. Blanchard, J.-M. F. (Ed.). (2021). China's maritime silk road initiative, Africa, and the Middle East: Feats, freezes, and failures. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-334-013-8>
14. Briefing, C. (2018). China-Africa Trade to Benefit from Growing Economic Cooperation. China Briefing News. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-africa-trade-to-benefit-from-growing-economic-cooperation/>
15. BRICS Policy Center (2018) Fórum de Cooperação China-África (FOCAC). Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://bricspolicycenter.org/en/forum-de-cooperacao-china-africa-focac/>
16. BRICS Policy Center (n.d.) Fórum para a Cooperação Econômica e Comercial entre China e Países de Língua Portuguesa (Fórum de Macau). Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://bricspolicycenter.org/forum-para-a-cooperacao-economica-e-comercial-entre-china-e-paises-de-lingua-portuguesa-forum-de-macau/>
17. Carrai, M. A., Defraigne, J.-C., & Wouters, J. (2020). The Belt and Road Initiative and global governance: By way of introduction. Em *Chapters* (pp. 1–19). Edward Elgar Publishing.
https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/19220_1.html
18. Carrozza, I (2018) Talking the China talk: China's Africa discourse goes global. *Asia Dialogue*. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/10/05/talking-the-china-talk-chinas-africa-discourse-goes-global/>
19. Carrozza, I. (2018). China's African Union Diplomacy: Challenges and Prospects for the Future. LSE Global South Unit Policy Brief Series, No.2/2018.
20. Carvalho, G. de, & Forti, D. (2020, March 12). How Can African States Become More Influential in the UN Security Council? IPI Global Observatory.
<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/03/how-can-african-states-become-more-influential-un-security-council/>
21. Chen, X. (2017). Win-Win Cooperation: Formation, Development and Characteristics. China Institute of Internal Studies. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from

https://www.ciis.org.cn/english/ESEARCHPROJECTS/Articles/202007/t20200715_3604.htm
1

22. Christensen, T. J. (2011, December 31). *Worse Than a Monolith*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 127. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400838813>
23. Commisceo Global Consulting Ltd. (n.d) Guanxi: The Chinese Cultural Concept. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.commisceo-global.com/blog/guanxi-the-chinese-cultural-concept>
24. Confucianism | National Geographic Society. (n.d.). Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/confucianism/>
25. Costa, C. M. (2020). The Words of the Belt and Road Initiative: A Chinese Discourse for the World? in F. J. B. S. Leandro & P. A. B. Duarte (Eds.), *The Belt and Road Initiative* pp. 23–44. Springer Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3_2
26. Costa, C. M. (2021) Macau: uma ponte para os países de língua portuguesa. *Janus: Anuário de relações exteriores* 20: p.52-54. <https://repositorio.ual.pt/handle/11144/4929>.
27. Costa, C. M. (2020) A Chinese mission for Macau: to build bridges between China and the Portuguese Speaking Countries. In *The Presence of China and the Chinese Diaspora in Portugal and Portuguese-Speaking Territories*, 109-124
28. Costa, C. M. (2020) O discurso chinês para os países africanos de língua portuguesa: o papel do Fórum Macau. *Relações Internacionais* 65, p. 43-55. <http://www.ipri.pt/index.php/pt/publicacoes/revista-r-i/arquivo-de-revista-r-i/3425-relacoes-internacionais-65>.
29. Declaration of the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. (2015). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/201512/t20151210_679428.html
30. Demissie, A., Wiegel, M., & Tang, X. (2016). *China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implication for Africa*. WWF Kenya, Nairobi Kenya.
31. Diop, M (2015) *Lessons for Africa from China's Growth*. World Bank. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2015/01/13/lessons-for-africa-from-chinas-growth>
32. Dittmer, L. (2003). Leadership Change and Chinese Political Development. *The China Quarterly*, 176, 903–925. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20059066>
33. Dittmer, L. (2015, January 21). *China's Dream, China's World*. *China Dreams*, 33–55. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814611145_0002

34. Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Namibia. (n.d.). Harmonious World: China's Ancient Philosophy for New International Order. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cena/eng/xwtd/t410254.htm>
35. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). (n.d.). Belt and road initiative (BRI). Retrieved October 13, 2022, from <https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html>
36. Embassy of The People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana (n.d.) Chinese Government Issues African Policy Paper. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegh/eng/xwtd/t231007.html>
- 37.
38. FOCAC Mechanisms. (n.d.). Retrieved September 6, 2022, from http://www.focac.org/eng/ltjj_3/ltjz/
39. FOCAC (2015) The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016–2018). Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/201512/t20151225_7933575.htm
40. Foot, R. (2006). Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging. *International Affairs*, 82(1), 77–94. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00516.x>
41. Foundethakis, M. (2022, July 25). Africa: The impact of the G7's multi-billion dollar plan on the continent's infrastructure gap. *Global Compliance News*. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/2022/07/25/africa-impact-of-g7-multi-billion-dollar-plan-on-continents-infrastructure-gap130722/>
42. Fraser, C. (2022) "Mohism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/mohism>.
43. Ghiasy, R. (2017). In *The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications and EU-China cooperation prospects*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Shanghai.
44. Gilman, N. (2015). *The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction*. Humanity. <http://humanityjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/HUM-6.1-final-text-GILMAN.pdf>
45. Gómez, J. P. (n.d.). A new Silk Road for the 21st Century. University of Navarra. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/a-new-silk-road-for-the-21st-century>
46. Green, J. M (2018). China's Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road>
47. Harris, R. L. (2009). Cuban Internationalism, Che Guevara, and the Survival of Cuba's Socialist Regime. *Latin American Perspectives*, 36(3), 27–42. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20684641>

48. IDE-JETRO (n.d.), The Role of FOCAC - China in Africa—AGE (African Growing Enterprises) File. Institute of Developing Economies- Japan External Trade Organization. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_04.html
49. Institute Montaigne (2020) China Trend #6—Searching for China’s International Discourse Power. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/china-trends-6-searching-chinas-international-discourse-power>
50. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (2011) Country profiles: China. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/culturaldiplomacynews/content/pdf/Cultural_Diplomacy_Outlook_Report_2011_-_03-01.pdf
51. ISS (2008). Chapter 1: Introduction, FOCAC and Africa. Institute for Security Studies. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://issafrica.org/chapter-1-introduction-focac-and-africa>
52. JAUSS, H. R.. (1994) A história da literatura como provocação à teoria literária. Trad. Sérgio Tellaroli. São Paulo: Ática, 78p.
53. Kobayashi, S., Jia, B., & Sano, J. (1999). The “Three Reforms” in China: Progress and Outlook. Japan Research Institute. <https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/>
54. Kodjo, T. (n.d.). Press Release: Signing of Agreements between the African Union and the People’s Republic of China-African Union - Peace and Security Department. African Union, Peace and Security Department. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-release-signing-of-agreements-between-the-african-union-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china>
55. Lafargue, F. (2009). China in Africa: A Limited Conquest. *China Perspectives*, 2009(1), 80–86. <https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.4778>
56. Leandro, F. J. B. S., & Duarte, P. (Eds.). (2020). The Belt and Road Initiative: An old archetype of a new development model. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2564-3>
57. Lee, C. J. (2021). Rethinking how we look at Africa’s relationship with China. *The Conversation*. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <http://theconversation.com/rethinking-how-we-look-at-africas-relationship-with-china-159747>
58. Li, H. (2015). The Chinese Model of Development and Its Implications. *World Journal of Social Science Research*, 2(2), 128-138. Available at: https://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/pol_facpub/18
59. Liang, W. (2012). China’s Soft Power in Africa: Is Economic Power Sufficient? *Asian Perspective*, 36(4), 667–692. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704810>

60. Matias, J. C. (2010). The Macau Forum: China's charm offensive for Lusophone countries, in IPRIS – Lusophone Countries Bulletin, Novembro. pp. 15-19
61. Meidan, M. (2006). China's Africa Policy: Business Now, Politics Later. *Asian Perspective*, 30(4), 69–93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704565>
62. Mendes, C. A. (2010). A China e a cooperação Sul-Sul.
63. Miller, S. (1990). Foucault on Discourse and Power. *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, 76, 115–125. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41801502>
64. Mirza, M. N., Abbas, H., & Nizamani, M. Q. (2020a). Evaluating China's Soft Power Discourse: Assumptions, Strategies, and Objectives. *Global Strategic & Securities Studies Review*, V(IV), 40–50. [https://doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2020\(v-iv\).05](https://doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2020(v-iv).05)
65. Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India. (2012). History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement. <https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement>
66. Murphy, D. C. (2022a). *China's Rise in the Global South*. Amsterdam University Press.
67. Nantulya, P. (2018) Grand Strategy and China's Soft Power Push in Africa. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/grand-strategy-and-chinas-soft-power-push-in-africa/>
68. Nantulya, P. (2019) Implications for Africa from China's One Belt One Road Strategy. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Obtido 14 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/>
69. Naughton, B. J. (2006, October 27). *The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (The MIT Press)* (Illustrated). The MIT Press.
70. National Museum of American Diplomacy. (2022). Ping Pong Diplomacy: Artifacts from the Historic 1971 U.S. Table Tennis Trip to China - National Museum of. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://diplomacy.state.gov/artifact-collection-highlights/ping-pong-diplomacy-historic-1971-u-s-table-tennis-trip-to-china/>
71. National Geographic Society (n.d.). Taoism. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/taoism/>
72. Nedopil, C. (2022) Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative; Shanghai, Green Finance & Development Center, FISF Fudan University, www.greenfdc.org
73. Ndzendze, B. and Van Hoeymissen. Z. S (2018). China and Africa's Integration Agenda: The Role of FOCAC. ISPI. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/china-and-africas-integration-agenda-role-focac-21280>
74. Nye, J. S. (1990). Soft Power. *Foreign Policy*, 80, 153–171. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580>

75. Ping, Y. (2020). Chinese discourse studies in media and politics: Theories, concepts and methodologies. *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17447143.2020.1825453>
76. Reis, B. (2018). Ponte a ponte, China avança para a África que fala português. Outline. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.publico.pt/2018/12/05/politica/noticia/ponte-ponte-china-avanca-africa-fala-portugues-1853379>
77. Richard, G. and Jiayi, Z. (2017). The Silk Road Economic Belt Considering security implications and EU–China cooperation prospects. <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/13188-20170223.pdf>
78. Ronning, H. (2016) How much ‘Soft Power’ does China have in Africa? in Zhang, Xiaoling, Wasserman, Henry, Mano, Winston : China's media and soft power in Africa: Promotion and perceptions. Palgrave Macmillan pp. 65-78
79. Ryder, H. (2021). Where Is the Africa-China Relationship Headed in 2021? Center for Strategic & International Studies. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.csis.org/analysis/where-africa-china-relationship-headed-2021>
80. Sautman, B., & Hairong, Y. (2009). African Perspectives on China–Africa Links. *The China Quarterly*, 199, 728–759. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574100999018X>
81. Schorr, V. (2010). Economics of Afro-Pessimism: The Economics of Perception in African Foreign Direct Investment. Nokoko - Institute of African Studies. <https://carleton.ca/africanstudies/wp-content/uploads/Nokoko-Fall-2011-2-Schorr.pdf>
82. Selormey, E. (2020). Africans regard China’s influence as significant and positive but slipping.
83. Shelton, G. and Paruk, F. (2008). The Forum on China– Africa cooperation: A strategic opportunity. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/103618/mono156full.pdf>
84. Sheng, M., and Gu, C. (2018, May). Economic growth and development in Macau (1999–2016): The role of the booming gaming industry. *Cities*, 75, 72–80. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2018.01.003>
85. Subban, V. (2022, June 14). Africa: China’s trade ties with the continent continue to strengthen. *Global Compliance News*. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from <https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/2022/06/14/africa-chinas-trade-ties-with-the-continent-continue-to-strengthen-31052022/>
86. Taylor, I. (2000, January). The Ambiguous Commitment: The People’s Republic of China and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 18(1), 91–106. <https://doi.org/10.1080/025890000111986>

87. Thomas, D. (2021) What did FOCAC 2021 deliver for Africa? African Business. Obtido 8 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://african.business/2021/11/trade-investment/what-can-africa-expect-from-focac-2021/>
88. Veloso, I. (2015). O Fórum Macau e a CPLP nas Estratégias de Cooperação Sul-Sul Da China e Do Brasil Na África. 45, 41–62.
89. Walia, S. (2020). China's Development Model and its Political and Economic Implications. Impakter. <https://impakter.com/china-development-model-political-economic-implications/>
90. Wang, F.L. and Elliot, E. A. (2014). China in Africa: Presence, perceptions and prospects. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(90), 1012–1032. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.898888>
91. Wei, S. (1999). Some Reflections on the One-China Principle. Fordham International Law Journal, 23(4), Article 7. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144226458.pdf>
92. Williamson, J. (2002). What Washington Means by Policy Reform. Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? <https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/what-washington-means-policy-reform>
93. Wilson Center Digital Archive (n.d). Main speech by premier Chou En-lai [zhou enlai], head of the delegation of the people's republic of China, distributed at the plenary session of the Asian-African conference. Obtido 14 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121623>
94. WWF (2016). China's Belt and Road Initiative & It's Implications for Africa. World Wide Fund for Nature. Obtido 14 de Fevereiro de 2022, de <https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/11316/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-its-implications-for-africa-wwf-kenya-december-2016.pdf>
95. Xinhua. (2005). The Ten Principles of Bandung. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/23/content_436882.htm
96. Xinhua (n.d) Full text of Chinese commerce minister's signed article on People's Daily. Retrieved September 6, 2022, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/02/c_137296686.htm
97. Yee, H. S. (1983). The Three World Theory and Post-Mao China's Global Strategy. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 59(2), 239–249. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2619937>
98. Zhao, K. (2016). China's Rise and its Discursive Power Strategy. Chinese Political Science Review, 1(3), 539–564. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0037-8>
99. Zheng, B. (2022, April 22). Chinas "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status. Foreign Affairs. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-09-01/chinas-peaceful-rise-great-power-status>

ANNEX

Annex A - Table of resources analyzed

Table A1 – Materials analyzed for FOCAC

Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)					
Nº	Title	Speaker	Position	Date	Retrieved from
1A	Report to the Second Ministerial Conference of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum	Li Zhaoxin	Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China	2004	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
2A	3rd Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation	Wu Yi	Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China	2006	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
3A	Opening Ceremony of the High-level Dialogue Between Chinese and African leaders and Business Representatives	Wen Jianbao	Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China	2009, Sept. 25.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm

	es and the Second Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs				
4A	Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation	Hu Jintao	President of the People's Republic of China (2003- 2013)	2009, Sept. 25.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index. htm
5A	Opening Ceremony of the High-level Dialogue Between Chinese and African Leaders and Business Representativ es And the Second Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs	Wen Jiabao	Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China	2009, Sept. 27	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index. htm
6A	Building the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership	Wen Jiabao	Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic	2009, Nov. 8.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index. htm

			of China		
7A	Report at the 4th Ministerial Conference Of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation	Yang Jiechi	Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China	2009, Nov. 10.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
8A	Second Round of Ministerial Political Consultations Between China and Africa	Yang Jiechi	Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China	2010, Sept. 27.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
9A	Broad Prospects for the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership	Zhai Jun	Vice Foreign Minister	2012, Sept. 13	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
10A	Take the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership to a New High	Yang Jiechi	Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China	2012, Jul. 16.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm

11A	Deepen Result-Oriented Cooperation and Promote Common Development	Wen Jiabao	Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China	2012, Jul. 18.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
12A	Open Up New Prospects for A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership	Hu Jintao	President of the People's Republic of China (2003-2013)	2012, Jul. 19.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
13A	Working Together to Write a New Chapter In China-Africa Cooperation	Xi Jinping	President of the People's Republic of China (2013-Present)	2015, Dez. 15.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
14A	Opening ceremony of 8th FOCAC ministerial conference	Xi Jinping	President of the People's Republic of China (2013-Present)	2021, Dez. 02.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm
15A	Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation	Wang Yi	State Councilor and Foreign Minister	2021, Dez. 6.	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). (n.d.). Important Speeches. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zyjh/index.htm

Table A2 – Materials analyzed for Forum Macau

Forum Macau					
Nº	Title	Speaker	Position	Date	Retrieved from
1B	Ministerial Meeting on Infrastructure between China and the Portuguese speaking countries	Echo Chan	Representative of the Government of Macau	2015, Jun. 5	Forum Macau. (2021, January 19). Dossiers - Forum Macau. https://www.forumchina.plp.org.mo/pt/dossiers-4/
2B	Closing Ceremony and Delivery of Certificates from the Colloquium on Commercial and International Law for Portuguese speaking countries	Chang Hexi	Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum Macau (2009-2016)	2015, Jul. 6	Forum Macau. (2021, January 19). Dossiers - Forum Macau. https://www.forumchina.plp.org.mo/pt/dossiers-4/
3B	Interview: Forum Macau promotes economic and trade cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries through the Macau Platform	Chang Hexi	Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum Macau (2009-2016)	2015	Forum Macau Bulletin, Nº 31, September 2015, P.4-7
4B	Interview: Macau's role as a platform between China and Portuguese-speaking countries in the most diverse areas of cooperation	Xu Yingzhen	Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum Macau (2016-2020)	2016	Forum Macau Bulletin, Nº35, October 2016, P.34-36

5B	Interview with the Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China	Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China	Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation Department	2017	Forum Macau Bulletin, N°37, Spring 2017, P.8-12
6B	Interview: Participation and Support in the construction of the "One Belt, One Road" and the role of the platform in the economic and commercial relationships with the Portuguese speaking countries.	Leong Vai Tac	Secretary for the economy and Finance	2017	Forum Macau Bulletin, N° 37, Summer 2017, P. 8-10
7B	Interview: After the 12th regular meeting of the permanent secretariat of the Forum Macau.	Sun Tong	General-Director of the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau of the Ministry of Commerce	2017	Forum Macau Bulletin, N°37, Spring 2017, P.14-17
8B	Interview: Results achieved by the institution over almost 15 years	Xu Yingzhen	Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum Macau (2016-2020)	2018	Forum Macau Bulletin, N° 41, Summer 2018, p.14-17
9B	Interview: Government appoints new assistant secretary-General for the	Casimiro de Jesus Pinto	Deputy-Secretary-General	2018	Forum Macau Bulletin, N° 42, Winter 2018, p. 31-32

	Macau Forum				
10B	Seminar on Retrospect and Prospect of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Founding of Forum Macau	Gao Yan	Vice-minister of Chinese Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (2013-2018)	2018, Jul. 6.	Forum Macau. (2021, January 19). Dossiers - Forum Macau. https://www.forumchina.plp.org.mo/pt/dossiers-4/
11B	Interview with the ambassador of the People's Republic of China in São Tomé and Príncipe	Wang Wei	Ambassador of the PRC in São Tomé and Príncipe	2018	Forum Macau Bulletin, N° 44, Winter 2019, P.56-60
12B	Session of Presentation on Investment in Portuguese Speaking Countries of the 11th International Forum on Investment and Construction of infrastructure	Ding Tian	Deputy-Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum of Macau	2020	Forum Macau. (2021, January 19). Dossiers - Forum Macau. https://www.forumchina.plp.org.mo/pt/dossiers-4/
13B	Investment Promotion Session in Portuguese speaking countries At the 11th International Forum on Investment and Construction of Infrastructure	Song Lei	Chairman of the China-Africa Development Fund and the China-Portuguese-Speaking Countries Cooperation and Development	2020, Dez. 3.	Forum Macau. (2021, January 19). Dossiers - Forum Macau. https://www.forumchina.plp.org.mo/pt/dossiers-4/

14B	"Cooperation is real and the results are excellent"	Ding Tian	Deputy-Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum of Macau	2021	Forum Macau Bulletin, N° 48, Winter 2021, P.10-13
15B	Interview: Partnerships for prosperity	Ji Xianzheng	Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum Macau (2022-present)	2022	Forum Macau Bulletin, N° 49, 1st trimester 2022, P.9-14

Annex B – Categories

Table B1 -Percentage and number of occurrences on the samples analyzed for FOCAC

Position	Words	% of total of words	% of total frequency	Frequency
1	Cooperation	1,5%	15,6%	406
2	Countries	1,0%	10,5%	274
3	Development	1,0%	10,0%	261
4	International	0,5%	5,3%	138
5	Forum	0,4%	3,8%	98
6	Relations	0,3%	3,6%	94
7	Support	0,3%	3,4%	89
8	Friendship	0,3%	3,0%	79
9	Trade	0,3%	3,0%	79
10	Peace	0,3%	2,9%	75
11	Exchanges	0,3%	2,8%	73
12	Mutual	0,2%	2,5%	65
13	People	0,2%	2,5%	64
14	Ministerial	0,2%	2,2%	58
15	Assistance	0,2%	2,2%	56
16	Government	0,2%	2,1%	54
17	Developing	0,2%	2,0%	53
18	World	0,2%	2,0%	53
19	Common	0,2%	1,9%	50
20	Partnership	0,2%	1,8%	48
21	Political	0,2%	1,8%	48
22	Security	0,2%	1,8%	48
23	Strategic	0,2%	1,8%	48
24	Investment	0,2%	1,8%	47
25	Friendship	0,2%	1,7%	43
26	Issues	0,2%	1,7%	43

27	Joint	0,2%	1,6%	41
28	Efforts	0,1%	1,5%	40
29	Promote	0,1%	1,5%	40
30	Enhance	0,1%	1,4%	37
			Total of words	27307
			Total frequency	2602

Table B2 -Percentage and number of occurrences on the samples analyzed for Forum Macau

Position	Words	% of total of words	% of total frequency	Frequency
1	Countries	1,7%	12,0%	321
2	China	1,6%	11,1%	298
3	cooperation	1,5%	10,2%	273
4	Macau	1,4%	9,8%	263
5	Portuguese language	1,3%	9,1%	243
6	Forum	0,8%	5,3%	142
7	Development	0,6%	4,3%	115
8	Platform	0,5%	3,4%	90
9	Commercial	0,5%	3,2%	87
10	Investment	0,4%	2,5%	66
11	Economic	0,3%	2,4%	64
12	Companies	0,3%	2,3%	61
13	Services	0,3%	2,1%	56
14	Capacity	0,3%	2,0%	55
15	Productive	0,3%	1,9%	52
16	Promotion	0,3%	1,9%	51
17	Construction	0,3%	1,8%	49

18	Government	0,2%	1,6%	43
19	Business	0,2%	1,5%	40
20	International	0,2%	1,4%	38
21	Role	0,2%	1,4%	38
22	Promote	0,2%	1,4%	37
23	Economy	0,2%	1,3%	36
24	Projects	0,2%	1,3%	35
25	Secretariat	0,2%	1,3%	35
27	Participants	0,2%	1,2%	33
28	Great	0,2%	1,2%	32
30	Conference	0,2%	1,1%	30
Total of words				18483
Total frequency				2683

Annex C - Analysis of categories

Table C1- Analysis of the categories extracted from fifteen selected discourses delivered under FOCAC.

Category ³⁵	Neutral/Positive /Negative	Localization ³⁶	Context	Association to other concepts
Cooperation	Positive	Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;8A,9A;10A;11A; 12A;13A;14A;15A	It presents an even distribution throughout the different samples, having a slight increase on frequency on the paragraphs following greetings or the redirection of greetings to the audience. Its reference is specially compacted in association to the term "China-Africa Cooperation".	Friendship and Cooperation; China-Africa Cooperation; Cooperation with the African nations; Bilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms; Bilateral cooperation; South-South cooperation; Multilateral Cooperation; mutually beneficial cooperation.
Countries	Neutral	Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;8A,9A;10A;11A; 12A;13A;14A;15A	Registers a bigger frequency at the middle of the individual samples, amid the enumeration of accomplishments done through the cooperation China-Africa, or while urging	African countries; Developing countries, Developed countries; Poor countries; Least

³⁵ Annex B, Table B1

³⁶ Annex A, Table A1

			action from the developed countries for them to act in areas of need close to the developing countries. It appears mostly in the samples together with the terms "African" and "Developing".	developed countries
Development	Positive	<p>Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;8A,9A;10A;11A; 12A;13A;14A;15A</p>	<p>Registers a bigger frequency on the middle of the samples, amid the presentation of the accomplishments and new measures resultant of the China-Africa cooperation, and after redirecting the greetings to the audience. It refers mostly to the development situation in Africa as it appears mostly associated with the continent's name.</p>	<p>Africa's Development; Social development; Human resources development; Development strategy; future development; Economic development; Development assistance.</p>
International	Negative	<p>Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;8A,9A;10A;11A; 12A;13A;14A;15A</p>	<p>Mainly used on the paragraphs after the speaker redirects the greetings to the audience (Ex: "Ladies and Gentlemen"; "Mr. Chairman") in the middle of the speech or right at the beginning of the speech after the initial greetings. It appears to present a Negative connotation mostly close to the end of the speech when the speaker refers to the "complex and profound changes"; "uncertainties" and</p>	<p>International cooperation; International Affairs; International Financial Crisis; International system; International security cooperation; International relations; International order.</p>

			<p>"volatilities" in the international situation at the time that have gone "unabated". The category is mostly mentioned associated with "Affairs" and "financial crisis" on the totality of the samples and followed by "cooperation" in the tone of a solution for the implied existence of problems associated with it.</p>	
Relations	Positive	<p>Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;8A,9A;10A;11A; 12A;14A;15A</p>	<p>Mainly used at the beginning and end of the samples in an optimistic tone of improvement, or in a celebratory tone. Frequently mentioned after referencing the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and other cooperation forums. In its frequency it is mainly presented in association with "China-Africa".</p>	<p>China-Africa relations; growing relations; International relations; diplomatic relations; our relations; political relations.</p>
Support	Positive	<p>Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;8A,9A;10A;11A; 12A;13A;14A;15A</p>	<p>This category presents itself in a more scattered way in the totality of the samples, being more intensely mentioned through the topic of China-Africa political exchanges and cooperation in diverse areas. It doesn't show a tendency to appear significantly concentrated with one specific concept to which it is associated.</p>	<p>China's support; Intellectual support; Public support, Active support; Popular support.</p>

Forum	Positive	<p>Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;8A,9A;10A;11A; 12A;13A;14A;15A</p>	<p>Most frequently present at the beginning of the samples and after the redirection of greetings to the audience, and it refers mainly to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.</p>	<p>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; African Education Forum; Women's Forum; Lanting Forum; People's Forum; Think Tanks Forum; Young leader's Forum; China-Africa youth services forum.</p>
Friendship	Positive	<p>Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;8A,9A;10A;11A; 12A;13A;14A;15A</p>	<p>It presents an even distribution throughout the different samples. Mainly referred in talks of promoting and enhancing China-Africa friendship.</p>	<p>China-Africa Friendship; Friendship and cooperation; Friendship and comprehensive cooperation; Traditional friendship; all-round friendship; renew friendship; Enhancing friendship; Bridge of friendship; Sincere friendship; our friendship.</p>

Trade	Neutral	<p>Samples: 1A; 2A; 3A; 4A; 5A; 6A;7A;9A;10A;11A;12A;13A;14A;15A</p>	<p>Scattered frequency throughout the totality of the samples, used mainly in a numerative and descriptive way when the speaker is referring to the areas of cooperation and development to be discussed under the Forum's work plans.</p>	<p>Trade relations; Trade talks; Trade imbalance; Trade deficit; Trade volume; Economic and trade ties; Trade and economic cooperation.</p>
Peace	Neutral	<p>Samples: 1A; 3A; 5A; 6A; 7A; 8A; 9A; 10A; 11A; 13A; 14A; 15A</p>	<p>It presents a very scattered frequency throughout the totality of the samples, being more compacted on the sample 15A as a bigger section was dedicated to the China-Africa's cooperation on peace and security. At a general level the promotion of peace is referenced as both a daunting challenge, and an important goal and pillar for the cementing of the unity and cooperation among developing countries. The category however is mainly positioned as a consequence of the achievements from other categories such as "Cooperation" and "Support".</p>	<p>Peacekeeping; Peace and Security; Peaceful reunification; Peace and development; Peace and common prosperity;</p>

Table C2- Analysis of the categories extracted from fifteen selected discourses delivered under Forum Macau.

Category ³⁷	Neutral/Positive/Negative	Localization ³⁸	Context	Association to other concepts
Countries	Neutral	Samples: 1B;2B;3B;4B;5B;6B;7B;8B;9B;10B;11B;12B;13B;14B;15B	Evenly distributed throughout the totality of the samples, mainly used in association with "Portuguese Language".	Portuguese Language Countries; Countries on the Forum Macau; Lusophone Countries; Friendly countries.
China	Neutral	Samples: 1B;2B;3B;4B;5B;6B;7B;8B;9B;10B;11B;12B;13B;14B;15B	Evenly distributed throughout the totality of the samples, mainly used in association with "Portuguese Language countries".	China and the Portuguese language countries; Ministry of Commerce of China; China's Development Bank; Development of China; China and Macau; Companies of China; Government of China, Economy of China.
Cooperation	Positive	Samples: 1B;2B;3B;4B;5B;6B;7B;8B;9B;10B;11B;12B;13B;14B;15B	Presents a bigger agglomerate at the middle and ends of the individual samples but occurs with balanced frequency in the totality of the samples. It is presented as a receiver of the benefits that might come to it through Macau's platform and the use of the Portuguese language as one	International cooperation; Multilateral cooperation; Cooperation fund; Economic and commercial cooperation; Industrial cooperation; Business cooperation; Cooperation for development.

³⁷ Annex B, Table B2

³⁸ Annex A, Table A2

			of its work instruments.	
Macau	Positive	Samples: 1B;2B;3B;4B;5B;6B;7B;8B;9B;10B;11B;12B;13B;14B;15B	Evenly distributed throughout the totality of the samples, used frequently after reference to "China", "Platform" or the "Portuguese language speaking countries". It appears throughout the samples as a positive symbol under the form of the Forum Macau that promotes the China-Portuguese language speaking countries relationship.	Services of Macau; Region of Macau; Forum Macau; Macau and the Portuguese language speaking countries; Official languages of Macau; Government of Macau; Role of Macau.
Portuguese Language	Positive	Samples: 1B;2B;3B;4B;5B;6B;7B;8B;9B;10B;11B;12B;13B;14B;15B	Appears in great agglomerates throughout the individual samples and is highlighted as a promoter of the China-CPLP relationship and advantage to the dynamization of both sides' cooperation.	Portuguese language Countries; Portuguese language speaking Asian and African countries.
Forum	Positive	Samples: 2B;3B;4B;5B;7B;8B;9B;10B;11B;12B;13B;14B;15B	Frequently mentioned with more intensity at the middle and end of the individual samples as a actor of promotions for the cooperation in between China and the CPLP in various areas.	International Forum; Forum Macau; Forum for the Economic and Comercial Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Language Countries; Young Entrepreneurs forum.

Development	Positive	Samples: 1B;2B;3B;4B;5B ;6B;7B;8B;10B;1 2B;13B;14B;15B	Appears with great intensity throughout the totality of the samples and just like with "Cooperation" it is presented as a receiver of the benefits that might come to it through Macau's platform and the use of Portuguese language as one of its work instruments.	Continuous development; Social development; Economic development; Cooperation for development; Common development; Development of the Forum; Integrated development; Opportunities of development; Sustainable development; China-Africa development; Bigger development; Accelerated development.
Platform	Positive	Samples: 1B;2B;3B;4B;5B ;6B;7B;8B;9B;10 B;11B;12B;14B; 15B	More frequent at the middle point of the individual samples and represented as an invaluable agent of connection for the strengthening of China's cooperation with the CPLP.	Platform of Macau; Platform of services; Macau as a platform; our platform; Privileged platform; China-Portugal Platform; Sino-Portuguese Platform; Platform of cooperation; Platform of encounters; Platform of exchanges; Platform for promotion.
Commercial	Positive	Samples: 1B;2B;3B;4B;5B ;6B;7B;8B;13B;1 4B;15B	More frequent at the middle point of the individual samples, used mainly at the moment when the speaker is referring to the areas of cooperation and development to be discussed	Economic and commercial cooperation; Commercial law; Commercial cooperation; Commercial and Industrial development; Commercial promotion.

			under the Forum's work plans. Despite this it is taken as the principal area of promotion and cooperation under the Forum Macau.	
Investment	Positive	Samples: 1B;3B;4B;5B;6B ;7B;8B;9B;10B;11B;12B;13B;14B ;15B	Mainly present at the beginning and middle point of the individual samples. Highlighted as having a fundamental role for the development of the involved countries.	Macau's investment; Projects of Investment; Environment of investment; informations of investment; Foreign investment; Direct investment; Great investment.