



Escola de Sociologia e Políticas Públicas

Democracy, Civil Society, and the Importance of the International Context: The cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia

Rodrigo Gomes Quintas da Silva

Dissertação submetida como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de

Mestre em Estudos Internacionais

Orientador:
Professor Filipe Vasconcelos Romão
ISCTE-IUL

[Setembro, 2016]

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Filipe Vasconcelos Romão

Marco Lisi

Ana Mónica Fonseca

Bronisław Misztal

Jean-Charles Szurek

José Milhazes

Carlos Fino

António Vieira

António Alves

Marta Lima

Gonçalo Martins

And above all, to my parents and sister.

ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990s led to the disaggregation of the Soviet Union and the emergence of several new regimes in Eastern Europe. Some countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia went through democratic processes influenced both by internal and external factors. The academic research only recently started to focus on the external factors, and the influenced agents were mainly the political elites and institutions. This thesis seeks to provide a new perspective on democratization processes, by analyzing the role of external dynamics in the civil society and civil organizations of both Poland and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War.

RESUMO

O fim da Guerra Fria no início dos anos 1990 levou à desagregação da União Soviética e à emergência de vários novos regimes na Europa de Leste. Países como a Polónia e Checoslováquia passaram por processos democráticos influenciados por fatores internos e externos. A investigação académica só recentemente se começou a focar nos elementos externos, e recaiu maioritariamente sobre as elites e instituições políticas. Esta tese procura dar uma nova perspetiva sobre processos democráticos, analisando o papel das dinâmicas externas na sociedade civil e nas organizações civis da Polónia e Checoslováquia durante a Guerra Fria.

KEYWORDS

Cold War; Poland; Czechoslovakia; civil society; democracy; international democracy; political institutions

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INITIALS	9
INTRODUCTION.....	11
1. STATE OF THE ART.....	13
2. CONCEPTS	16
3. THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.....	18
3.1. The role of the Catholic Church - Poland	18
3.2. The role of the Catholic Church - Czechoslovakia	21
4. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL VALUES	24
4.1. The case of Poland	27
4.2. The case of Czechoslovakia	29
5. DISCUSSION	31
CONCLUSIONS	35
REFERENCES.....	37
ANNEXES	41

INITIALS

AWS – Solidarity Electoral Action

CPSU –Communist Party of the Soviet Union

EEC – European Economic Community

IOs – International Organizations

KOR – Polish Worker’s Defense Committee Party

NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations

ROP – Movement for Poland’s Reconstruction

UP – Labor Union

USA – United States of America

USSR – Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War initiated a wave of democratization in Eastern Europe's countries which had been under communist rule for decades. The liberalization policies initiated with Mikhail Gorbachev, who took power in the USSR in 1985, allowed its satellite countries to gradually pressure the political establishment (Milhazes, personal communication, January 28, 2016).

Much of the internal processes in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany or the Baltic countries have already been studied. However, a more recent discussion done by scholars like Samuel Huntington (1991), Geoffrey Pridham (1991) or Lawrence Whitehead (2001) focused on the international aspects of democratization. These authors acknowledged that there were some international elements and dynamics that influenced the political process of the newborn democracies. Some of these elements involved pressure from great democratic powers (like the USA or the EEC), international business, international trade among nations, and transnational religious movements, values or ideas. Nevertheless, these scholars always stressed that the internal processes were more important and relevant to the democratization debate than the international phenomenon (Huntington, 1991; Pridham, 1991; Whitehead, 2001).

The first important point to acknowledge is the existence of a civil society in Eastern Europe countries under communist regime. Miztal (personal communication, February 24, 2016) stresses that former communist countries in Eastern Europe had a civil society, only with a different structure than those of Western countries (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016). Therefore, excepting the political elite and their permeability to international dynamics, we follow Misztal's argument and recognize in this research that there existed a civil society that could be influenced by some sort of international dynamics.

This article then seeks to understand the importance of international dynamics under the civil societies of former communist Poland and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War. As stressed, not only do we acknowledge the existence of a very specific type of civil society in these countries before the end of the Cold War (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016), we also recognize the importance of international dynamics in influencing the population to support a political liberalization in both countries.

There are many international dynamics that we could bring into the discussion. There are, for example, the role of the Catholic Church (Misztal, 2016; Resende & Zatyka, 2014), the importance of external conflicts or culture (Huntington, 1991), the role of great powers' pressure (Whitehead, 2001), or the importance of Western business, governments and NGOs (Youngs, 2004).

For our two cases in particular, Poland and Czechoslovakia, we intend to analyze the role of the Catholic Church and the role of international values and ideals, such as human rights, pacifism, antimilitarism or environmentalism. Many scholars have written about the role of the Catholic Church in democratizing processes (see, for example, Troy, 2009; Enyedi & O'Mahony, 2007; Ethier, 2010; and Chu, 2011) and we have chosen it to understand the impact of this transnational institution in the liberalization/democratization paths of both countries. On the other side, we have chosen to study the impact of international values to contrast with the first dynamic, assessing the influence of a set of ideas and values in the two populations, independent from an institution or organization.

Although Czechoslovakia did not have the same degree of religiosity as Poland (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016; Szurek, personal communication, March 13, 2016), it is crucial to establish a comparison and understand in detail how the Catholic institution influenced both civil societies. International values will be yet another dynamic in discussion, because some of them, especially human rights, pacifism and environmentalism, deeply influenced some groups of civil societies in Eastern Europe before the end of the Cold War (Szulecki, 2011).

This thesis is part of our Master Program in International Studies, at ISCTE-IUL, and our goal with it is to present more hypothesis and dynamics to the study and discussion on democratization. We will first make an assessment of the published literature on the importance of international dynamics in democratic processes. Afterwards, we will present the two major concepts that will guide our research: what is the Polish and Czechoslovak "civil society" we talk about; and why the Catholic Church and some international values are the chosen international dynamics for the empirical research. After the analysis on the two cases and hypothesis, we will conclude with a discussion on the results we found.

1. STATE OF THE ART

Analyzing the role that the international context assumes in influencing the development of democratic processes is a recent though ever-growing phenomenon within the academic sphere. Until the beginning of the 1990s, domestic actors and institutions were regarded as the stepping stones towards understanding democratic transitions and consolidations. However, from 1991 onwards, the insights provided by Samuel Huntington, Geoffrey Pridham and Lawrence Whitehead highlighted the weight of the international scenario when studying democratic initiatives (Huntington, 1991; Pridham, 1991; Whitehead, 2001). The historical period in which the academic interest in this thematic arose coincides with the increased commitment of Western powers to promote democracy worldwide, more so after the end of the Cold War (Burnell, 2013: 266).

Huntington (1991) attempted to understand which international dynamics had influenced the democratic transitions throughout the 1970s and 1980s in a global perspective. In his investigation he finds that the loss of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes to democratic values, allied with the economic growth registered in the 1960s and the actions of the EEC and the USA, triggered the dismantling of several dictatorial regimes (such as the Portuguese one). The universal flux of information and communication was also a key contributor to such incidents (Huntington, 1991; Malamud & Brito, 2008: 212).

Pridham (1991) further complemented Huntington's work by stating that some of the dynamics progressively emerging within the international system possessed distinct capacity to catalyze or retard democratic expansions. In this context, he outlined the underlying forces driven by IO, NGOs, and other states, as well as overall economic growth, proximity to Western countries and, similarly to Huntington, the flux of information and communication. Although the existence of an international context was unquestionable, according to Pridham, the means through which such elements could accelerate or decelerate democratic implementations, remained unclear (Malamud & Brito, 2008: 203; Pridham, 1991: 28).

Finally, Lawrence Whitehead (2001) distinguished three ways in which the international context was able to influence democratic processes: contagion, control and consent. The first formula predicted that democratization would advance spontaneously from country to country, mainly through the fluxes of information and communication exchanged between countries. The second hypothesis saw democratization expand in the form of pressure of one state towards another, through economic sanctions or support; and the last assumption

through a convergence of goals between domestic and external actors (Malamud & Brito, 2008: 213; Whitehead, 2001: 3-25).

Considering that Whitehead's research was published almost a decade after the end of the Cold War, he also analyses the importance of the international context in the democratic processes in Eastern Europe. According to Whitehead, the democratization of the former satellites of the USSR had an implicit and automatic relation with an anti-communism mentality and adherence to the political and economic values of the West. That is not surprising, given the fact that the repossession of private property and the free market were among the first policies implemented by the new regimes (Whitehead, 2001: 358). Whitehead also affirms that Gorbachev's reforms as Secretary-General of the CPSU, especially the *glasnost* and the *perestroika*, intended to liberalize the political system, and not to democratize it. Nevertheless, those reforms were established in an external context characterized by the USA containment of communism, by economic and military pressures over the USSR, and by the general adoption of Western values by most of the countries in the world (Whitehead, 2001: 370-374).

The research of these three scholars enabled the expansion of this field of study in the decade of 1990. However, their work faces two major limitations: they regarded the international context as secondary when compared to domestic factors (Schraeder, 2003: 23); and its influence has mainly focused on the elites and institutions, and not upon the civil societies (Whitehead, 2001: 387). Whitehead argues that the USSR oppression over its populations and the fact that individuals felt more attracted to the West than to the political structures of their regimes, might explain this gap in the research (Whitehead, 2001: 387).

With the advent of the turn of the century, renewed insights on the topic were delivered by several scholars such as Levitsky and Way (2005), Nuno Severiano Teixeira (2008), or Magen and Morlino (2009). This new current of thought underlined more international dynamic forces and new democratic case studies. Furthermore Schmitz's work (2009), about transnational perspectives on democratization, especially the impact of NGOs, international institutions and transnational actors is also worth noting. Still, once again, these scholars emphasized the impact upon elites and institutions, neglecting potential effects on civil societies.

Nonetheless, some scholars indulged in studying the influence of the international context upon civil societies. Richard Youngs (2004) focused his research on Western influence over

the new-born democracies from Eastern Europe, especially the USA and EEC (later European Union). In his study, he divided that Western influence in three groups: states, international business, and NGOs, and the relation of the last group with civil societies. Youngs said that the 1990s saw the rise of a denser and more plural global civil society, permeable to the new inflows of information and communication (Youngs, 2004: 138). Youngs stated that in Eastern Europe specifically, many NGOs (embedded in the Western values) were crucial in changing the mentalities and perceptions of the majority of the population, and in exporting the Western model of political and economic organization to the USSR, having later assisted some governments in policy-making activities and in structuring their new regimes (Youngs, 2004: 137-144). Similarly, Scott (1999) developed a work on the role of Western political foundations and private institutions in promoting democracy worldwide.

As for the link between democracy and civil society within the scope of our case studies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the research is wide, but with few references to the international context. Weigle and Butterfield (1992) offered the first academic perspective on the birth of a “civil society” in Eastern Europe before the end of the Cold War. In their pioneer investigation, the authors acknowledged that “independent social activism” during the 1980s can be regarded as civil society (Weigle & Butterfield, 1992: 1).

During the last decades of the Soviet Union, and especially under Gorbachev’s leadership, the authors argue, the regime failed to incorporate a “set of shared social values”, which allied to a severe economic crisis and a deep crisis of nationalistic ideals, led to the emergence of this “independent social activism” (Weigle & Butterfield, 1992: 18). The naïve belief that this emerging civil society could fit the one-party state’s rules allowed the independent activism to flourish and become more demanding as time elapsed (Weigle & Butterfield, 1992: 15-16).

In the Polish case, we highlight Regulska’s work (1999) which focuses on the strengths and limitations of a NGOs action operating in Poland during the transition phase. Additionally, Korkut (2005) and Rose-Ackerman (2007) argued that a democratic process *per se* does not automatically lead to a general mobilization of civil society. Moreover, Mentzel (2012) links the “reemergence” of former USSR satellites’ civil societies with nationalism. Lastly, Raymond and Spina (2014) advanced the research beyond what had been previously established by studying the democratic empowerment of civil societies in Eastern Europe from foreign powers, especially the USA.

In the Czechoslovakian case, we point out Green's contribution (2009), a study on the role of nonprofit organizations in close collaboration with the Czechoslovakian civil society. Also, the seminal work delivered by Brooks (2006) who studied the political perspective of Václav Havel's artistic discourse inside and outside the country. Furthermore, Renwick (2006) focused his research in the importance of political dissidents as a form of opposition to the regime, and afterwards as a political force in the new-born democracy. Likewise, the study provided by Szulecki (2011) that shed some light into the impact on the Czechoslovakian civil society of concepts like peace, human rights and environmentalism, transmitted by dissident groups. And finally, the research conducted by O'Mahony (2010) and Balík (2013), specifically focusing on the relation between the Catholic Church and civil society.

2. CONCEPTS

Although the civil societies from Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 20 years before the democratic transitions of the end of the Cold War were far different from those of Western countries, they still existed – only with a different model. In this sense, we may talk about a different way of self-organization and mobilization of civil society (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016).

In some countries of the Soviet bloc, like Poland and Hungary, there existed a high level of social mobilization, but mostly through extra-political organizations – such as religious or school organizations. Furthermore, in Poland, mostly all social groups, such as the academia, the workers or local farmers, had some kind of social representation, and consequently, some kind of activism/mobilization. When the attempts for political change in Poland started to appear, fueled by the Solidarity movement, its civil society was well-organized to pressure regime change with more chances of success (due to the strong link between intellectuals, trade unions, workers and farmers) (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016).

In Czechoslovakia, the situation was rather different. Due to the heavier regime pressure (especially after the events in Prague in 1968), social mobilization and activism was considerably lower than in Poland. Some religious or education organizations that existed in Poland did not have the same ability to act and maneuver in Czechoslovakia. Also, the representation of the several social groups was far lower than in Poland, since the intellectuals were the most well represented group. Therefore, when the attempts for political change in Czechoslovakia started to appear, its civil society, due to the inexperience in mobilizing itself,

struggled far more than Poland to pressure a regime change. Although the intellectuals were the most active social group, they lacked the strong support from workers, farmers or trade unions, because the regime had not allowed such strong links between all these social groups (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016).

The main difference in the structure of both civil societies is that both had, especially from the beginning of the 1980s, a great wish of political liberalization; however, the more complex and well-organized civil society from Poland pressured a regime change with far more consequences than that of Czechoslovakia (in which a lot of the mobilization was blocked by the regime). Nevertheless, the first step in this context is to acknowledge the existence of a civil society, both in Poland and Czechoslovakia. To reinforce the presence and importance of these civil societies, Whitehead stated that “even though Communism may have traditionally suppressed most forms of civil society in the region, the societal push for democracy became a major independent variable as the transition process got underway” (Whitehead, 2001: 388).

As for the international dynamics, we present two comparing elements between our two empirical cases: the role of the Catholic Church; and the role of international values and ideals.

The role of the Catholic Church in forcing the transitions in Eastern Europe until the end of the Cold War is widely studied and debated. In this thesis, our intention is to specifically understand how it had influenced, throughout its history, the civil societies of both Poland and Czechoslovakia. By analyzing the different relations between civil society and the Church, we find that the latter was deeply rooted in the populations’ mind and actions. This argument helps us understand if the pressure upon the civil societies to support democratic processes had enough consequences or not. In this context, Welling Hall (1986) started to analyze the support that the Catholic Church gave to independent movements in the Soviet bloc; later on, Müller and Neundorf (2012) studied the relation between the state and the Church in Eastern Europe. Therefore, we considered the role of this religion institution to be an important dynamic to study on.

International values, such as pacifism, antimilitarism or environmentalism will be yet another dynamic in study. In this context, we will stress the importance of dissidents and their influence upon the societies from their homeland. In spite of the fact that they belonged, in mind and spirit, to the civil society where they originally came, they support and advertise ideas that differ from those of the regime – in most cases, similar to Western values. The big

majority of them were comprised by intellectuals or artists, and because their influence was mainly originated from countries of the Western bloc (which were willing to accept their permanence to freely pressure the regime from the outside in a wider and more effective way), it will be another dynamic under our consideration.

3. THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

3.1. The role of the Catholic Church - Poland

The literature affirms the major importance of Pope John Paul II in supporting the opposition (especially the Solidarity) and forcing a regime change (Main, 2011; Resende & Zatyka, 2014; Szporer, 2010). However, fewer studies focused on the importance of the Church as institution in invigorating the Polish civil society. In this context, the international movement of the Catholic Church managed to keep its adherents and followers among the Catholic populations, even facing severe during the communist era (Northmore-Ball & Evans, 2015: 32). In Poland in particular, one can argue in advance that the political communist elites from the 1970s and the 1980s were pressured by the Catholic Church to liberalize its regime, and that the same influence was successfully set upon the Polish civil society. There are two reasons, rooted in history, sociology and political science, which might help us explain the importance of the Catholic Church's influence upon the Poles in the final decades of the Cold War.

First of all, in Poland, religion had a great importance among the population during the times in history in which the country was divided between foreign powers, and nationhood was repressed. Nationhood and faith were always connected in the Polish history, and the practice of Catholic values in the country was constantly linked to the Polish identity (Borowik, 2002; Morawska, 1984; Müller & Neundorf, 2012). There is a rational explanation for this phenomenon. Morawska (1984), in her accurate analysis of the role of the Church throughout the Polish history, argues: "Statelessness, or alien-statelessness, has been the condition of Poland for most of its modern history. The opposition between the ideals of citizenship and the state became characteristic of the Polish national-religious ideology. After partition, good citizenship for patriotic Poles became synonymous with dissidence and protest against the established political order" (Morawska, 1984: 30). Therefore, she concludes that in a partitioned Poland, in which education and social and political organization was severely

limited, “religious practices provided the only peaceful occasion for Poles to publicly relive and reassert their national community and its social bonds” (Morawska, 1984: 30).

The communist regime in Poland always tried to smother the Church influence and activities (Szporer, 2010). During Stalin’s leadership, religious members (and also believers), were chased and tortured. It was only from the 1970s on that the persecution of religious members was reduced and especially with the launching of Gorbachev’s *perestroika* in the 1980s (Müller & Neundorf, 2012: 561). Then, the Church took advantage of the window of opportunity the regime allowed it, and it served as a major vehicle of nationalism and political pressure upon the communist regime (Müller & Neundorf, 2012). However, the heavy pressure suffered by the Catholic institution in Poland during communist times was unable to undermine centuries of social influence and importance of the Church within the local communities. It was not the first time in history that Poland and the institutions the Poles identified themselves with were under severe threat of existence. The Catholic Church was too deeply rooted in the local communities. In fact, many of the local and national organizations that lived apart from the state and helped the Poles organizing their social structure and daily lives were religious organizations (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016).

Religious organizations in Poland, apart from its link with nationalism itself, were a very important component of the Polish society for many years, and decades of communist order were only able to weaken some branches of the Catholic Church in Poland – but now the entire organization and its impact upon the populations.

Naturally, the Catholic Church then had the leverage to support the opposition efforts before the transition. The first and huge opportunity the Church had to support a civil society organization in pressuring the regime was the formation of the Polish trade union Solidarity, formed in 1980 by Lech Walesa. In a year, it reached a 10 million membership, in an organization with no ties to the Communist Party. The Catholic Church in general and Pope John Paul II in particular (a Pole himself) had a huge importance in supporting Solidarity in pressuring the regime (Main, 2011; Resende & Zatyka, 2014; Szporer, 2010).

But this was only the most known phenomenon when we analyze the relations between the Catholic Church and the civil society: as stated, for decades, the former supported opposition movements and was the cornerstone of the Polish nationality and foreign opposition. From 1970 on, some of the clergy would allow dissidents and other oppositional movements to join

and discuss in the basements of their churches where the communist authorities, fearing the influence of the religion organization, would not dare to trespass (Porter, n.d.).

Second of all, the influence of the Catholic Church upon the civil society was only possible considering the social and religious structure of Poland during the communist era. Müller and Neundorf (2012) conducted a research in the country to understand the real impact of communist policies to limit the Church's appeal. In order to find detailed results, the authors divided the interviewed individuals in two main groups: those who started to practice the Catholic religion before the communist era; and those who started to practice it when the communist policies towards the Church were implemented (who, theoretically, would be less prone to declare him or herself a religious person).

The results clearly prove the deep rooting of the Catholic Church in the Polish culture, nationalism and identity. The "generation gap" in religiosity levels was only of 4% (Müller & Neundorf, 2012: 563). Therefore, young Poles who started to practice their Catholic faith years after the communist regime implemented smothering policies towards the Church had similar religiosity levels to those Poles who were free to practice their Catholic faith before the arrival of the communist regime. Communism and its non-religious policies simply did not penetrate and erode the Catholic spirit embodied in the Polish culture and ideal. Comparing to other "generational gaps" in the study, Poland's 4% is a remarkable achievement; Hungary, another country with high level of Catholic religiosity, scored a gap of almost 20% between the two generations (Müller & Neundorf, 2012: 563). We will be back to this study to understand the impact in both generations in Czechoslovakia.

The study highlights another important feature of the Polish society. By then, around 90% of the population openly expressed the Catholic faith (Müller & Neundorf, 2012; also Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016). The great majority of the country had an homogeneous religion, and with that, homogeneous (or at least, similar) positions towards social and political ideas. It is then easy to understand why John Paul II's message condemning socialism reached so many people; it is also easy to understand why the Solidarity, supported by the Polish Pope at the time had such a huge impact in mobilizing the society to pressure the regime. The Polish society, as homogenous as it was in religious matters, made it easier for the "Catholic message" against socialism to spread among the population, thus threatening the regime.

The importance of the Catholic Church throughout history in the mission of uniting the Poles and providing and assisting them regarding the occupying regimes in the last centuries, along with a society in which more than 90% of the population practices that same faith, allowed the Vatican to play the religious factor against the communist regime. In this sense, Poland emerges as the simpler empirical case to analyze the role of the Catholic Church in the communist era. The same cannot be said of Czechoslovakia. In fact, in the Church's mission to fuel the Czechoslovak civil society against the communist regime, contrary to Poland, history and society's composition did not play in favor of the institution.

3.2. The role of the Catholic Church - Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia, the impact of the Catholic Church during the Cold War does not seem that obvious among the population as it was in Poland. Two elements contributed in limiting its influence on Czechoslovak civil society: its historical importance (considerably lower when comparing with Poland's Catholic Church), and the heterogeneous religious composition of the Czechoslovak society (along with the "fear and weakness" of the clergy, facing hard repression and little resources due to the seizing of its properties and assets) (Winter, 2008). According to Petr Rattay (n.d.), "the Catholic Church remained the most populous church", although "other denominations were fortified, mainly the new denominations: Czechoslovak Hussite Church and The Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren".

In the Czechoslovakian case, history plays a major role in this context, but the process was distinct from what happened in Poland. The country witnessed, during its history, the entrance of the Protestant faith, to which most political elites and scholars associated the Czechoslovak nationalism (such as the monarchs Maria Theresa and later Joseph II). The link between Czech nationalism and the Protestant spirit caused the Catholic Church to lose most of its properties and influence (Winter, 2008). Only during the World War II the Catholic Church managed to gain some of its reputation for being one of the few institutions that opposed the occupation. The Catholic clergy, in fact, was one of the first groups to be prosecuted and imprisoned during the Nazi occupation (Winter, 2008).

The Communist regime followed a similar approach: it limited the role of the Catholic Church by seizing its few properties and resources, leaving the institution completely dependent on the state resources (Winter, 2008). In 1949, Rudolph Slansky, at the time the General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, announced to the country that all of the Czechoslovak Church's properties were nationalized, the religious education was forbidden,

and priests became like any other civil servant: bounded to the regime and its social and political organization (O'Mahony, 2003: 180). This stance towards the Catholic Church was only eased with the end of the Cold War. The events of Prague, in 1968, gave yet another excuse for the regime to tighten control over the civil society, and consequently, over the Church.

Therefore, not only was the Catholic Church severely persecuted, the country was religiously divided. Religion was then unable to serve as an instrument to the Catholic Church to mobilize the population as a whole. In fact, right after Slansky's declaration, there was only one clergy in the country influential enough to negotiate with the political elites and bridge the dialogue between the civil society and the communist leaders: the priest Joseph Hromadka. However, Hromadka could never serve the Catholic interests for of two major reasons: not only was he a protestant (from the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren), he also supported some of the communist ideals, such as social justice and equal opportunity to the individuals (Hall, 1986: 195). The Catholic institution, which was never very attached to the socialist discourse, became even less so after the Vatican II Council, and fiercely against those ideals with the election of John Paul II (1978). In fact, the Polish Pope challenged the regime openly by forbidding, in 1982, all the Catholic clergy in Czechoslovakia to join organizations in the country (Hall, 1986: 196).

With the strong influence of Joseph Hromadka, the Catholic Church did not have the means to reach the entire Czechoslovak population, and consequently, the civil society was not influenced by this institution in a very remarkable way. Hromadka, who died in 1969, gave the Catholic Church an opportunity to mobilize some of its weak internal opposition. Although still far from the impact it had in Poland, the Catholic Church managed to mobilize the population in the late 1970s.

By then, a new religious figure started to emerge among the political opposition, and this time a Catholic: Cardinal František Tomášek. Tomášek has been opposing the regime for several years, for which he had been sentenced to prison. Not only did he participate in the Vatican II Council, he also supported the Prague Spring in 1968. His ability to mobilize the civil society while limited by the regime was not very high at the end of the 1960s (Hromadka, in this sense, reached far more people than Tomášek). But in the late 1970s Tomášek was appointed to the College of Cardinals and he participated in electing John Paul II as Pope in 1978. The support of the new elected Pope, and the protection he naturally had by being a member of the

College of Cardinals allowed him to criticize more openly the government, thus mobilizing more people than any Catholic before – especially the youth segment of society (Hall, 1986: 197). In a religious celebration in 1985, Tomášek noted that the biggest majority of the people were young people; and this young mobilization was as threatening to the regime as was the dissident movement of the Charter 77¹ (Hall, 1986). Furthermore, many Catholic clergy and theologians subscribed to Charter 77, promoted by Václav Havel, thus reinforcing the opposition movements of the civil society (Hall, 1986: 197).

However, the emergent impact of the Catholic Church in mobilizing the Czechoslovak civil society was very limited by the country's history. The country was historically divided in two religions and nationalisms (Czech and Slovak), and the harsh persecution the institution felt further crippled its ability to act among the civil society of the country.

Therefore, as stated before, Czechoslovakia had also a second limitation that did not allow the Catholic Church to mobilize the population as it did in Poland: the religious and social composition of the country itself.

In spite of the fact that Catholicism was the biggest faith in the country, several other religions coexisted with it. The several protestant churches were the most common, and it did not allow the country to link a nationalism (or national identity) to a religion – as it happened in Poland. The tension between the populations of the Czech and the Slovak lands was more rooted in the country's history than in any religious process. Never the Catholic Church could mobilize a civil society culturally, historically and religiously heterogeneous as the Czechoslovak from the end of the Cold War.

Müller and Neundorf's study (2012) shows us exactly that religious limitation the Catholic Church faced. The same two generations (those who started to practice their faith before the implementation of the communist regime in the country and those who started to practice their faith after the regime) had a huge religious difference between them: 24% (Müller & Neundorf, 2012: 563). Furthermore, Czechoslovakia, along with Ukraine, was the country in which the religious levels were the lowest from all countries analyzed. By the end of the Cold War, only an average of 40% of the individuals practiced a religious faith (Müller & Neundorf, 2012: 563). Rattay (n.d.: 15) states that, by the same time, only 25% of

¹ The Charter 77 was a document written throughout 1976 and presented in the beginning of 1977 by several Czechoslovak individuals, including Václav Havel Václav Benda or Jiří Hájek, pledging to the communist regime at the time to respect human rights in the country following the Helsinki Convention in 1975.

Czechoslovakia was “religiously minded”². The fact that that religion never played a central role in organizing the Czechoslovakian civil society might help us explaining why the registered levels are so low, and why the Church did not have such an impact on mobilizing civil society. The Czechoslovakian population was simply not “religious” enough to be permeable to an external influence from the Catholic Church (Szurek, personal communication, March 13, 2016).

Therefore, two elements limited the role of the Catholic Church in influencing the Czechoslovak civil society in the last decades of the Cold War. Not only the institution had no main role in organizing the society throughout its history, the country was also divided in several religions and nationalisms. Any external pressure from the Catholic Church was doomed to have limited impact in mobilizing the population. The only real accomplishment of the Catholic Church in this sense was Cardinal Tomášek’s role in mobilizing the younger generations of the country against the political establishment in the late 1980s. As Rattay (n.d.) stated, “John Paul II, who was Polish and became Pope in 1978, did little to change this situation. This was a significant point for Poles, as it provided for Catholicism to again become their most significant social and national unifying aspect. The situation in the Czech was completely opposite and, therefore, it was not influenced so much by the Polish papacy”.

Religion, and in particular Catholicism, was then a secondary international dynamic that influenced the Czechoslovakian civil society (in Poland, on the contrary, it was one of the most important, if not the most important one). In mobilizing the Czechoslovakian civil society, another international dynamic was far more important, as noted below in our research.

4. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL VALUES

The last dynamic under our consideration is the importance of international values, i.e., ideas and concepts with transnational character, which crossed political and cultural borders, and influenced populations from every country. Naturally, due to our limitations in detailing the most important global values and analyzing their individual importance over civil societies, this chapter seeks to provide a general view on how these ideas and concepts managed to

² (Rattay, n.d.). The difference in the numbers presented by the two authors can be understood by the fact that religious census were considered a “private matter”, and “the National Censuses in 1961, 1971 and 1981 did not inquire of [dissidents’] religious loyalties. Religion was considered a private matter and the law banned state organizations from investigating.” (Rattay, n.d.)

cross over the political repression of both countries, and influenced the populations of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

From this point on, it is important to stress that much of these values had a Western “origin”, or were mainly promoted and supported by Western governments and public opinions. To reinforce our research, we bring to the discussion the following values also used by Kacper Szulecki (2011): human rights, pacifism, anti-militarism and environmentalism. Furthermore, considering the political environment of both countries in the final years of the Cold War, these global values hardly reached the civil society as easily as in Western countries. How, then, could these global values and ideas pass through the repression and influence civil society? How or who bridged the external concepts with the internal populations?

Dissidents, whether living abroad, or inside the country, were a powerful way the international dynamics influenced the civil society. Therefore, they are not presented as an international dynamic *per se*, but as part of a broader picture: as links (or “bridges”) between values and ideas, and the civil society they belong. Dissidents were a special segment of society that allowed internationalized ideas to spread among the population. However, how did dissidents help spreading such ideas in Eastern Europe, where most countries were under authoritarian regimes? Aspen Brinton (2012), following older ideas from Hegel and Adam Ferguson, presented the concept of “parallel spaces” (Brinton, 2012). A parallel space was simply a way for a dissident (whether intellectual, artist, worker, writer or other) to join with his peers and discuss ideas, most of them with international importance (Brinton, 2012; Szulecki, 2011: 279).

This space did not have the intention of engaging or challenging the political establishment; only to be yet another space, outside the main society forums, to discuss ideas that the regime did not allow to be discussed. Debate, not political engagement, was the final end of these “parallel spaces”. However, the way they fomented the discussion and dialogue among individuals ended up by gradually fueling the population’s intent of liberalizing in several Eastern Europe’s regimes. Hence, dissidents were important to channel global values to the whole population; not because they wanted that population to clash against the regime, but because they realized that debate and dialogue were positive for the society.

Dissidents living abroad were also an important element in this context (Szulecki, 2011: 282). The Czechoslovak Milan Kundera, for example, who fiercely opposed the communist regime in his country, went to France in 1975. His works would be very influential to many Eastern

Europe societies during the final years of the Cold War. The direct contact between internal dissidents with Western public in, for example, international conferences, was also a very important way to legitimize and reinforce the dissidents' struggle in their own country. Western support was then crucial for the dissidents to easily pass their message within their own societies (Szulecki, 2011: 282). It is important in this context to stress the role of some members of the KOR in explaining the goals of the Solidarity to some Western circles (who did not understand how a trade union could ally itself with a religious institution) (Szulecki, 2011: 283).

Of these values, human rights were the first to be seriously discussed among Eastern Europe's dissidents – especially after the 1975 Helsinki Convention, in which several countries from the region, including Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, compromised themselves to defend and promote human rights in their societies. Dissidents from both countries certainly applauded the Convention's conclusions, but they also demanded the effective application of their governments' commitments. The fierce defense of the human rights by the dissidents was a crucial moment in Eastern Europe's history. It was a major international value they spread to their civil society (first with discussions in the already mentioned "parallel spaces", and then by collective mobilization), and helped forging a new idea of "dissident" (Szulecki, 2011: 279), closer to Western values and positions.

Szulecki, (2011: 283) stresses the importance that these internationalized ideas had in unifying several civil society's groups, clearing the way for self-mobilization. In normal conditions, Szulecki states, different political and social ideas of dissidents regarding internal politics could undermine their unity. International values helped foster a unique dissident body in each country, which in normal situations would not unite due to their political differences. By promoting social and political causes considered "international" or "global", dissidents had a good opportunity to unite and spread more widely their message of liberalization through the whole population.

In Poland, for example, the discourse on human rights by the Church helped the Solidarity to wide its base of support, because its message certainly reached way more Poles than any political ideology. When the end of the Cold War came in 1991, the Solidarity's social base disintegrated in several political parties, many of them with a similar political message. The AWS, the ROP or the UP were all parties that stem from the Solidarity in the post-communist period (Szczurbiak, 1999: 1401-1402). Hence, in spite of the political message embedded in

the Solidarity's movement (and in the Polish civil society in general), it is undeniable that international ideals such as human and workers' rights were of great importance to unify the Polish civil society in pressuring the communist regime.

In Czechoslovakia, human rights' watch was the cornerstone of Havel's Charter 77, which was signed by "proponents of pop culture, people of Catholic and protestant backgrounds, and ex-Marxist intellectuals" (Glasius, 2012: 351). The variety of groups from civil society (intellectuals, religious individuals, artists and workers, and especially Czechs and Slovaks) who signed the Charter remained together in their struggle for liberalization because the defense of human rights was the most important (and probably the only) ideal they all had in common. The Charter 77, in this sense, was not a political program subscribed to by all of individuals; it was rather a pledge to the communist regime to keep its commitment from Helsinki, 1975 (Pribán, 2005: 562). It is not a surprise that right after the country got its independence, it split in two parts: the Czech Republic and the Republic of Slovakia.

The role of dissidents in introducing global values in their countries, such as human rights, environmentalism or anti-militarism, was quite uniform in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In Poland, Lech Walesa, an electrician and religious man himself, managed to incorporate several international values in the Solidarity to legitimize its cause and gather the support of the Polish civil society. The Church's support of human rights and the promotion of workers' rights managed to mobilize a deeply religious society mostly composed by farm and industrial workers. The Solidarity was later the most important organization that forced the regime change in the country. In Czechoslovakia, human rights were indeed the most important global value that dissidents incorporated in their struggle. Havel's Charter 77 was simply a pledge to the Czechoslovak government to respect the Agreement it signed in the 1975's Helsinki Convention (Pribán, 2005: 562). Later on, it would get so much support from the Czechoslovak civil society that it would help to create the Civic Forum, and the election of Václav Havel, the head of the dissident movement, to President after the end of the Cold War.

4.1. The case of Poland

However, there are differences in both countries. There are some international values that easily succeeded in one country and hardly in the other. Poland and Czechoslovakia did not regard the international values described above the same way. Dissidents and individuals had different priorities, different interests, and consequently different influence among their

population (Renwick, 2006, 2011). Even in Czechoslovakia alone, global values had distinct impact both in Czech and Slovak lands (Szulecki, 2011: 279).

Considering the values we proposed for discussion, the Polish civil society seemed more permeable to the ideas of pacifism and human rights (Szulecki, 2011: 283). Similarly to what happened with the external influence of the Catholic Church, the religious, national and social homogeneity of Poland allowed these international values to spread easily among the civil society groups. Human rights (especially the workers' rights) were the cornerstone of the Solidarity activism, and the Catholic Church, as its main supporter, helped spread the defense of these values among the population. Also, with their dynamism and strong cooperation, local organizations and groups managed to create a wider and more organized civil bloc to pressure the communist regime (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016). Therefore, in Poland, the homogeneity and interconnection of the society allowed the international values to stick easily within the population.

However, some other international values seemed to have less impact in the Polish civil society. Poles were less eager to defend and promote causes like antimilitarism and reduction of the military's weight and importance in society (Szulecki, 2011: 283).

The country's history might help us understand why: Poland, as stated in the last chapter, had spent a lot of its history under the occupation of foreign powers. Resistance and struggle against a foreign opponent led the country to consider the existence of military strength and heroism as part of its identity (Szulecki, 2011: 283). The Poles did want peace and human rights to gradually take over the aggressive communist regime; they would not, however, discard the importance of military strength against those who had previously threatened their independence. Wojciech Jaruzelski, the last president of Poland before Lech Walesa, was himself a member of the Army, and for many decades he occupied several political seats. In spite of the fact that he was part of the military branch, many saw him as a respectful individual and with whom the dissidents could dialogue. Walesa and the Solidarity recognized his role in the country's political path and were able to dialogue with Jaruzelski about the liberalization of the country. Before him, too, Poland had had several leaders who came from the military branch, such as Marian Spychalski or Henryk Jabłoński. The importance of the military figures in a country used to be a target of foreign occupation could not be completely forgotten by the Polish population, even in the final days of the Cold War

and the arrival of democracy. As we will see further on, in Czechoslovakia, the feeling towards the military was rather different.

Finally, it is important to stress that there were some groups within the Polish civil society that did not identify themselves with the conservative message of the Catholic Church, with the mainstream groups of dissidents, or the communist State policies.

The young segment of society may be separated from this analysis, considering the fact that it was neither religion nor national conservatism that moved them. In Poland, the youth was permeable to other international values that set them apart from the rest of the population. The international punk movement (more of a lifestyle than properly a social or political ideology) and the importance of environmentalism were far more nuclear to the Polish youth than any religious ideas, communist ideology or dissident message (Piotrowski, 2010: 155). To this youth, Piotrowski affirms, “Two possible ways of change became available (...) in revolt: going to less politicized NGOs, or getting involved in anti-systemic social movements, often closely linked to subcultures” (Piotrowski, 2010: 155). It is relevant to stress the importance, for example, of the Orange Alternative, a student’s group formed in Wrocław, in 1985, that did not identify itself solely with communism (red color) or the religious message of the Catholic Church (yellow color). The orange was then a way to incorporate all values in dispute/debate in the Polish society in the 1980s. The existence of several groups similar to the Orange Alternative proves that even a uniform society like Poland could not incorporate the same values within its population.

4.2. The case of Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia, the situation was even more complicated. We have seen above how human rights were the cornerstone of the dissident movement headed by Václav Havel. Nevertheless, contrary to Poland, the Czechoslovaks adhered far easily to pacifism, antimilitarism and the reduction of military importance (Szulecki, 2011: 283) - the trauma of 1968 was still very present in Czechoslovak minds. In Poland, as we saw before, the military figures were seen as very important in the cohesion and resistance of the Polish state throughout history. In Czechoslovakia, on the contrary, the most relevant political figures were mainly civilians and intellectuals. Alexander Dubček, a member of the communist establishment, is the strongest example of this argument, and later on, Václav Havel, dramaturg and poet, would replace Gustáv Husák, who never belonged to the military, in the presidency of the country.

The most remarkable experience the Czechoslovaks had with the military at the time was the Prague Spring, which was taken down by the communist forces in 1968. Never Czechoslovakia had or would have any special relationship military leaders the same way Poland did. Furthermore, the Charter 77's dissident movement deeply based on international values such as human rights and antimilitarism could not reach the civil society as a whole. The social composition of the country, again, posed a problem for the unity of civil society and the spread of international ideals.

Both the Czech and Slovak parts of the country were distinct of each other, and consequently with a different level of penetrability of international values. The Slovak population always tried to gain more political independence from Prague, and they made of that a far more important element of their liberalization struggle than human rights or antimilitarism. They subscribed to the ideals that stemmed from the Charter 77 but their priorities were distinct from each other; probably explaining why the declaration was signed by far more Czechs than Slovaks (Szulecki, 2011: 280). Moreover, the promotion of environmentalism was much stronger in the Slovak lands (Szulecki, 2011: 286).

By having the Czech segment of population focused on forcing the communist regime to improve human rights conditions in the country, and the Slovak one concentrated on reducing its dependence to Prague, it is natural that they would not be influenced by the same ideas. They could (and indeed had) subscribed to similar values; but the two parts were not interested in using them to achieve the same goals.

A further characteristic of the Czechoslovak civil society prevented the same international values to influence the majority of the population. As stressed in the last chapter, the country was not religiously uniform. Apart from the Catholics, other Protestant religious denominations existed, like the Hussite Church and The Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren (Rattay, n.d.: 13). The Slovak lands were far more catholicized than the Czech lands (Rattay, n.d.: 5) and were consequently more permeable to the message of the Catholic Church. Therefore, many Slovaks showed more support to the Polish political process during the 1980s than they showed support to the Charter 77 movement (Szulecki, 2011: 280). We stress again that two distinct parts of the country with distinct political goals could indeed be influenced by international values like the defense of human rights and antimilitarism; but they could not unite themselves in pressuring the regime based on their identification with those ideals. The Czechs made their message solely political by requesting that the communist

government implement what it had signed in Helsinki in 1975; the Slovaks supported the political evolution in Poland, especially the dialogue between the regime, the Solidarity and the Catholic Church.

5. DISCUSSION

We have seen how the Catholic Church and international values have influenced the civil societies from Poland and Czechoslovakia to pressure their communist regimes into liberalization, and later democratization. From our analysis, we understood the following points.

The Catholic Church was indeed a crucial international dynamic in influencing in Poland, but the same cannot apply to the Czechoslovak case. The weight of Catholicism in the former country had created a psychological situation in which patriotism and national resistance was associated with religion practices (Morawska, 1984). The Catholic Church and its assistance to civil society throughout history turned it into a high-prestige institution, close to the whole society and individuals. As time went by, that confidence helped the Catholic Church to integrate some organizations into civil society, and religious organizations became one of the most important, influential and most numerous organizations in the country, before and after Communist came to Poland after World War II (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016). Naturally, the Catholic Church had leverage in fueling the Polish civil society against communism in the last decades of the Cold War. When the Vatican labeled Communism as a human rights enemy and told that it was against the social rights of the individuals, it was easy to foresee an easy adherence of the Polish population. In this context, the deep rooting of the Church in the Polish society and its influence in local organizations (close to the individuals) were a remarkable characteristic that allowed external pressure from the institution. The election of John Paul II as Pope in 1978 reinforced this reality, and his discourse further increased the civil society's pressure on the Communist regime (Misztal, personal communication, February 24, 2016; Morawska, 1986; Resende & Zatyka, 2014). The religious and national homogeneity of Poland also helped the message and pressure of the Catholic Church to spread to most civil society organizations, groups and individuals.

In Czechoslovakia, the situation was more complex. The Catholic Church was historically persecuted more fiercely than in Poland, and it had lost most of its importance and influence (Winter, 2008) when the Communist regime arrived after World War II. Protestantism was

also another religious faith that had significant importance throughout the Communist era. Interestingly, while the Catholic Church was being fiercely persecuted, Protestant leaders, and especially Joseph Hromadka, were dialoguing with the regime, hoping to achieve some kind of political result (Hall, 1986). It was only after Hromadka's death in 1969 and the events in Prague in 1968 that Catholicism managed, though still in a difficult way, to put some pressure upon the Communist regime. The role of Cardinal František Tomášek and his cooperation with John Paul II was the only serious process that helped Catholicism to influence the civil society. By the end of the Cold War, coincidentally, Czechoslovakia would be the first Eastern Europe country that the Polish Pope would visit. However, it is impossible to ignore the religious division of the country (between Catholics and Protestants), and the general lack of religiosity of Czechoslovakia (Müller & Neundorf, 2016; Szurek, personal communication, March 13, 2016). The Catholic Church could not influence the country's civil society as easily as in Poland because its weight and influence was not considerable and only part of the country openly professed Catholicism. The Catholic Church's role, our first international dynamic, was then crucial in influencing the Polish civil society in the last decades of the Cold War; but residual in influencing the Czechoslovak civil society in the same historical time.

International values were also an influential dynamic upon civil society. According to our analysis, human rights were the most influential, and affected positively the social activism both in Poland and Czechoslovakia within the historic time in study. Human rights (including and especially workers's right) were the cornerstone of the Lech Walesa's trade union, Solidarity, and fiercely mobilized the Polish civil society against the oppressive Communist regime. In Czechoslovakia, the call for human rights defense was embodied in Václav Havel's Charter 77, and even led to the creation of a political party, years after – the Civic Forum. In Czechoslovakia, human rights were even one of the few international values that stucked the whole opposition together (especially Czechs and Slovaks, who diverged in many other issues). However, not all the other international values in our study had the same weight on the minds and spirit of both countries. Given its history of national resistance against foreign oppressors, Poland valued the respect of militarism in its society, and thus was not very keen to see a deep anti-militarist policy in the country (Szulecki, 2011).

Quite the contrary, in Czechoslovakia, given the trauma of Soviet aggressive intervention in Prague, 1968, pacifism and anti-militarism were much more valued than they were in Poland. Environmentalism was a transnational movement valued equally in both countries. In Poland,

environmentalism served as an alternative for the country's youth who did not identify itself neither with conservative patriotism, the Catholic faith nor the Communist policies of the regime (Piotrowski, 2010); In Czechoslovakia, environmentalism was more important in the Slovak lands (Szulecki, 2011). Furthermore, the Slovak segment of Czechoslovakia seemed, according to our research, to be influenced in a different manner than the Czech one. Its desire to set itself apart from Prague's political hegemony led its civil society to support other chains of values such as environmentalism and the political (with religious influence) process in Poland (Szulecki, 2011). We can then conclude that international values did also have a crucial impact in influencing the Polish and Czechoslovak civil societies to support a liberalization, and later democratization of their regimes. Apart from its differences (even within one country), and the obstruction posed by the regime itself (Whitehead, 2001: 387), they managed to inspire the populations into further liberalization.

The next conclusion of our research highlights the importance of dissidents in influencing both civil societies. Dissidents may not be considered as an international dynamic itself, but they were undoubtedly the bridge between civil society and transnational values and groups abroad. The Czechoslovak Milan Kundera is one example of such. In spite of having different political views from those of Hável (even refusing to sign the Charter 77 in the first place), the influence of his work in Paris allowed the image of dissidents to be further valued and their opinions to be taken seriously into consideration. The Polish KOR and its members, moreover, were essential in marketing in Western societies the Solidarity and its political message.

Our research has also a forth important conclusion. When analyzing the importance of international dynamics, one must take a close look at the composition of each society to identify the main differences and similarities between the individuals, groups and organizations. Apart from what happens with the political elites, civil societies are much more complex actors, and consequently, differently affected by those dynamics (Pribán, 2005). Huntigton, Pridham or Whitehead focused their research on how the governments reacted when affected by an international dynamic. In the case of our research (and others similar to it), because civil societies are so heterogenous and complex, the same dynamic might have a different impact in different countries, and in different groups within the same country.

The religious homogeneity of the Polish society, our research shows, helped the Catholic Church to spread its message and support for the political opposition and political

liberalization. We have seen how history helped the institution to gain a lot of respect and consideration for the Polish population throughout the country and how religious organizations were one of the most numerous and rooted in the local communities in Poland (Morawska, 1984). The fact that the huge majority of the Polish population practiced the Catholic faith and were one of the most religious societies in Eastern Europe during the Communist regime (Müller & Neundorf, 2012) shows that religious homogeneity made the populations more permeable to the influence of the Catholic Church. The Czechoslovak religious fragmentation led to the opposite result. Not only was the Czechoslovak population much less religious (Müller & Neundorf, 2012; Szurek, personal communication, March 13, 2016), Catholicism did not reach the entire country as it did in Poland. John Paul II's visit to the country after the end of the Cold War was not a direct consequence of Catholicism's role in the whole political process that led to democratization. Furthermore, the historical division between Czechs and Slovaks further complexified the situation because both sides had different religious faiths, identity and political goals. The Czech part of the country was more influenced by ideals such as human rights and antimilitarism, but the Slovaks were, most of all, more interested in gaining political autonomy from Prague and were not deeply attached to the Charter 77 (Szulecki, 2011).

Moreover, by being much more Catholicized than the Czech part of the country, the Slovaks were more eager to support the political struggle of the Solidarity in Poland than Havel's political message (Szulecki, 2011). The structure of civil societies needs to be analyzed ahead of the research, because its complexity leads to different results. From our research, we understood that religion, national identity, organizations' structures and the interconnection of all civil society actors interfere in easing or aggravating international dynamics.

Following the previous idea, the thesis highlights the major difference between Poland and Czechoslovakia's civil societies and their permeability to international dynamics. In Poland, religion and nationalism walked side-by-side during history, and therefore, it was through religion and nationalism that the country freed itself from the communist regime. In Czechoslovakia, the situation was rather different. Since there was no sense of religion or national unity, considering the differences between Catholics, atheists and the several Protestant denominations, and Czechs and Slovaks, the population had only the strength of its ideas and the dynamism of its dissidents to empower itself against the communist regime. Therefore, social, religious and political dynamics throughout history created two completely different types of civil society in both countries, and those contrasting societal profiles ended

up by distinctively influencing the democratizing paths of both countries until the end of the Cold War. In Poland, centuries of unity between the Catholic Church and the country's collective identity allowed the political organizations, trade unions and dissidents to focus on that national spirit to uprise the population against the communist regime. In Czechoslovakia, its dissidents, groups and organizations, lacking a strong national and religious spirit to foment the population, relied on its ability to promote ideas and values, both internally and externally. That is why the main promoters, in Poland, of liberalization and later on democratization, were the religious organizations and trade unions/workers' organizations from the whole country (in which the Solidarity found its biggest support); quite the contrary in Czechoslovakia, the same liberalizing/democratizing effort was promoted by individuals, mainly from the academias and intellectuals, who relied on the strength of their ideas. It is then evident the contrast between the Polish "national-Catholicism", and Czechoslovak cosmopolitanism, which ended up by influencing the democratizing process in both countries.

Our research has yet an important limitation to highlight. It leaves behind other important and recognized international dynamics. One cannot understand how the Polish and Czechoslovak civil societies got influenced by the EEC (Whitehead, 2001), by international organizations or the USA (Huntigton, 1991), or by international business and Western NGOs (Youngs, 2004). Further research on this subject is essential to understand the weight of these variables alone, and comparably to those we used in this article: international values and the role of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, future researches must also analyze in a most detailed way how the latter variables influenced civil societies. Our thesis tried to show that they indeed influenced the populations; but how the several groups, organizations and individuals were influenced is a question yet to be answered.

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, our goal was to understand the importance of international dynamics in influencing the civil societies of Poland and Czechoslovakia to support democratic and liberalization processes in the decades before the end of the Cold War. We have positively concluded that the Catholic Church and international values and ideals had indeed influenced the civil societies of both countries, but in a more complex way than it affected the elites. In Poland, it was a much respected institution throughout history and it was therefore able to influence the populations in supporting a liberalization process. The deep local rooting of the

Catholic Church³ and Poland's religious homogeneity allowed the Church to mobilize the civil society in pressuring the Communist regime. The Solidarity, furthermore, incorporated in its values many international ideals such as human and workers' rights in its struggle against the regime. Although the Solidarity (and affiliated organizations such as the KOR) started to call for the improvement of working conditions in the country, they quickly shifted their goals to a broader political liberalization, in which human rights and other Western values were the main inspiration. The election of John Paul II further invigorated the civil society to pressure the regime (Main, 2011; Resende & Zatyka, 2014; Szporer, 2010).

In Czechoslovakia, the Catholic Church only managed to reach part of the country, and it is not, consequently, a relevant international dynamic (Szurek, 2016). Its religious fragmentation, along with the general low level of religiosity⁴ (Müller & Neundorf, 2012) did not allow the Catholic Church to intensely mobilize the civil society. The Czech lands were more atheist and Protestant than the Slovak lands, which were much more Catholicized (Szulecki, 2011). Human rights, pacifism and antimilitarism were more important in influencing most civil society groups in the country. Charter 77's cornerstone was a claim to the Czechoslovak government to keep its compromise of respecting human rights. Václav Hável's dissident movement, based in peace and human rights watch values even managed to form a political party (the Civic Forum), thus allowing Hável to be elected the first President of the country after the end of the Cold War. However, this major union around the Charter was unable to hide the national fragmentation of Czechoslovakia, which prevented that the same international values could reach the entire country. The Slovak segment, willing to win political autonomy from Prague, did not mobilize itself as fiercely as the Czechs in supporting the Charter and the claim for human rights (Szulecki, 2011). In fact, there were much more Czech signatures to the Charter than Slovaks. To the latter, the political process in Poland and the autonomy from Prague were the most important goals. Hence, international values were crucial in influencing the Czechoslovak civil society; but they did not affect all groups and individuals the same way.

³ Annex A illustrates this argument.

⁴ Annex B illustrates this argument.

REFERENCES

- Borowik, Irena (2002), "The Roman Catholic Church in the process of democratic transformation: the case of Poland", *Social Compass*, (Online), 49 (2). Available at B-on
- Brinton, Aspen (2012), "Association and recognition in authoritarian societies: a theoretical beginning", *European Journal of Political Theory*, (Online), 11 (3). Available at B-on
- Burnell, Peter (2013), "Promoting democracy", *Government and Opposition*, 48 (2)
- Chu, Lan T. (2011), "Unfinished business: the Catholic Church, communism, and democratization", *Democratization*, (Online), 18 (3). Available at B-on
- Enyedi, Zsolt and Joan O'Mahony (2007), "Churches and the consolidation of democratic culture: difference and convergence in the Czech Republic and Hungary", *Democratization*, 11 (4)
- Ethier, Diane (2010), "Is democracy promotion effective? Comparing conditionality and incentives", *Democratization*, 10 (1)
- Glasius, Marlies (2012), "Dissident writings as political theory on civil society and democracy", *Review of International Studies*, (Online), 38. Available at B-on
- Hall, Welling (1986), "The Church and the independent peace movement in Eastern Europe", *Journal of Peace Research*, (Online), 23 (2). Available at B-on
- Huntington, Samuel (1991), "Democracy's third wave", *Journal of Democracy*, Spring
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way (2005), "Ties that bind? Leverage, linkage, and democratization in the post-cold war world", *International Studies Review*, 7
- Magen, Amichai and Leonardo Morlino (2009), *International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring Democracy?* London, Routledge
- Main, Isabella (2011), "The avant-garde of the Catholic Church? Catholic student groups at the Dominican Churches in Poznań and Krakow", *Social Compass*, (Online), 58 (1). Available at B-on
- Malamud, Andrés and Alexandra Barahona de Brito (2008), "Dimensões internacionais da democratização: debates, paradoxos e opções políticas", in Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Karin Wall, Sofia Aboim and Filipe Carreira da Silva (Eds.), *Itinerários: A Investigação nos 25 Anos do ICS*, Lisbon, ICS

- Milhazes, José (2016, January 28), *Democracy and Civil Society: The Importance of the International Context* (R. G. Quintas da Silva, Interviewer)
- Misztal, Bronisław (2016, February 24), *Democracy and Civil Society: The Importance of the International Context* (R. G. Quintas da Silva, Interviewer)
- Morawska, Ewa (1984), "Civil religion vs. state power in Poland", *Society*, (Online), 30. Available at B-on
- Müller, Tim and Anja Neundorf (2012), "The role of the state in the repression and revival of religiosity in Central Eastern Europe", *Social Forces*, (Online), 91 (2). Available at B-on
- Northmore-Ball, Ksenia and Geoffrey Evans (2015), "Secularization versus religious revival in Eastern Europe: Church institutional resilience, state repression and divergent paths", *Social Science Research*, (Online), 57. Available at B-on
- O'Mahony, Joan (2003), "The Catholic church and civil society: Democratic options in the post-communist Czech Republic", *West European Politics*, (Online), 26 (1). Available at B-on
- Piotrowski, Grzegorz (2010), "Between the dissidents and the regime: young people by the end of the 1980s in Central and Eastern Europe", *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, (Online), 18 (2). Available at B-on
- Porter, Brian (n.d.), "Catholic Church in Poland", retrieved 09.04.2016. Available at: <https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/exhibits/roman-catholic-church/introduction>
- Pribán, Jirí (2005), "Political dissent, human rights, and legal transformations: communist and post-communist experiences", *East European Politics and Societies*, (Online), 19 (4). Available at B-on
- Pridham, Geoffrey (1991), "International influences and democratic transition: problems of theory and practice in linkage politics", in Geoffrey Pridham (Ed.), *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe*, New York, St. Martin's Press
- Rattay, Petr (n.d.), "Atheism in the Czech Republic", retrieved 10.04.2016. Available at: <http://apostolskacirkev.cz/studijni-texty/studijni-texty>
- Regulska, Joanna (1999), "NGOs and their vulnerabilities during the time of transition: the case of Poland", *International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, (Online), 10 (1). Available at B-on

- Renwick, Alan (2006), "Anti-political or just anti-communist? Varieties of dissidence in East-Central Europe and their implications for the development of political society". *East European Politics and Societies*, (Online), 20 (2). Available at B-on
- Renwick, Alan (2011), "The role of dissident values in institutional choice, *East European Politics and Societies*, (Online), 25 (2). Available at B-on
- Resende, Madalena Meyer and Marcin Zatyka (2014), "A história menos conhecida: A Igreja Católica polaca na transição para a democracia", *Relações Internacionais*, 43
- Schmitz, Hans Peter (2004), "Domestic and transnational perspectives on democratization", *International Studies Review*, (Online), 16 (3). Available at JSTOR
- Schraeder, Peter J. (2003), "The state of the art in international democracy promotion: results of a joint European-North America research network", *Democratization*, 10 (2)
- Scott, James M. (1999), "Transnationalizing democracy promotion: the role of Western political foundations and think-tanks", *Democratization*, 6 (3)
- Szczerbiak, Aleks (1999), "Interests and values: Polish parties and their electorates", *Europe-Asia Studies*, (Online), 51 (8). Available at B-on
- Szporer, Michael (2010), "Managing religion in communist-era Poland: Catholic priests versus the secret police", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, (Online), 12 (3). Available at B-on
- Szulecki, Kacper (2011), "Human rights, peace, and environmentalism in Czechoslovak and Polish dissident discourses", *East European Politics and Societies*, (Online), 25 (2). Available at B-on
- Szurek, Jean-Charles (2016, March 13), *Democracy and Civil Society: The Importance of the International Context* (R. G. Quintas da Silva, Interviewer)
- Teixeira, Nuno Severiano (2008), *The International Politics of Democratization: Comparative Perspectives*, London, Routledge
- Troy, Jodok (2009), "'Catholic waves' of democratization? Roman Catholicism and its potential for democratization", *Democratization*, 16 (6)
- Weigle, Marcia. A. and Jim Butterfield (1992), "Civil society in reforming communist regimes: the logic of emergence", *Comparative Politics*, (Online), 25 (1). Available at JSTOR
- Whitehead, Lawrence (2001), "Democracy and decolonization: Eastern Europe", in Lawrence Whitehead (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, New York, Oxford University Press

Winter, Sidonie F. (2008), "Quo vadis? The Roman Catholic Church in the Czech republic", *Religion, State and Society*, (Online), 26 (3/4). Available at B-on

Youngs, Richard (2004), *International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, Civil Society and Multinational Business*, New York, Oxford University Press

ANNEXES

A. NUMBER OF CHURCHES, PARISHES AND PRIESTS THROUGHOUT THE 20TH CENTURY IN POLAND. SOURCE: <https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/7>

YEAR	TOTAL NUMBER OF CHURCHES	TOTAL NUMBER OF PARISHES	TOTAL NUMBER OF PRIESTS	PARISIONERS PER PARISH
1946	7,904	5,889	8,806	2,060
1956	8,284	6,527	13,109	n/a
1971	11,083	6,692	18,761	1,704
1985	15,114	8,101	22,040	1,709
1991	14,335	8,905	23,578	1,522

B. NUMBER OF EXISTING AND PERSECUTED PRIESTS THROUGHOUT THE 20TH CENTURY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. SOURCE:

http://www.liquisearch.com/religion_in_czechoslovakia/1950s_and_1960s

Year	Total Number of Priests	Priests Persecuted
1950's	Declined by half	6000
1980's	3200	400