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Mass media driven mobilization and online protest:
ICTs and the pro East-Timor movement in Portugal

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Introduction:

This chapter addresses the Pro East-Timor movement held in Portugal in 1999 and the role that ICTs and the traditional mass media played in its emergence and orientation. It aims to identify the pattern of use of these media by the agents directly implicated and, on the other hand, to ascertain changes prompted by such usage on the underlying organizational structure and communication fluxes. We do this through the intertwining of the constructive insights of different analytical approaches in the social movements field, thus shedding light not only over the societal context in which the protest evolved and the resources it mobilized but also over the cultural identity framing it promoted. We highlight the following aspects, all of which are staple features of our analytical object: a) that this movement qualifies as a networked social movement, that is, a movement focused on cultural values, acting from the local in an attempt to influence the global, using the ICTs as a fundamental tool (Castells, 2001: 138); b) that it illustrates an ability to fruitfully integrate different media, with a central axis on the Internet; c) that media agents themselves may be assuming a key role in the very orientation of some protests. Accordingly, the following hypotheses will be tested: on one hand, that ICTs facilitate traditional forms of protest; on the other hand, that ICTs are simultaneously a tool used by protesters and sometimes a target of their actions.

1. East-Timor: Think local and act global.

Following its 1974 democratic revolution, Portugal initiated a process meant to give up its authority over several colonies, one of these being the territory of East-Timor - north of Australia, bordered by land by The Republic of Indonesia -, a territory Indonesia would later invade in September 1975. During the following twenty-four

years of occupation a war was fought against the native Maubere people and the leader of the FALINTIL (Timorese Liberation Army) Xanana Gusmão[i].

In August 30th 1999 a United Nations- sponsored referendum was held in East-Timor. Four hundred thousand voters rejected, by a massive seventy-eight and a half per cent, an administrative autonomy proposed by Indonesia, thus stating a preference for independence. But soon after the results became common knowledge a widespread wave of violence erupted, leading to the evacuation of all UN personnel and to the killing of several thousand people in East-Timor.

At the same time, in order to act in support of the Maubere people, an unparalleled social participation movement developed in Portugal, comparable only to that which occurred following the Portuguese 1974-1975 revolution. Sixteen days, from September 4th to the 20th, were ones of intense diplomatic action by the government officials but, and more importantly, they were days of nationwide civic participation, solidarity and action towards the defense of human rights in East-Timor. Anyone visiting Portugal at the time would have witnessed creative forms of protest being performed: from painted murals and daily demonstrations at the UN and Security Council countries' embassies in Lisbon, to people wearing white clothing, to cars holding white flags and written messages of support. The country stopped for three minutes and flowers were thrown into rivers.

Traditional mass media - radio, television and newspapers - gave plenty of visibility to the protests, contributing directly to the achievement of the movement's goals. New media also became a protest ground: international fax lines were jammed by calls to the government representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; more than 100,000 personal emails were sent to the UN proclaiming a fierce opposition to the Indonesian actions; and dozens of Websites were created to provide a public forum.

2. Why study the pro East-Timor movement and the use of ICTs in it?

Social movements, one of society's most common phenomena (Neveu, 1996: 110), have increased in the last decades not only in terms of figures but also in terms of diversity (Rocher, 1977-1979: 119; Crook, Pakulski, Waters, 1992: 140). However, if the forms assumed by collective action are this diverse, so are its possible approaches,

from the ones inscribed in macro-historical trends to the so-called midrange theories. In spite of such diversity it seems analytically useful to take into account the strengths of each of these approaches, much as Garner suggested (Garner, 1996: 5).

In order to understand the pro East-Timor movement we need to understand the social structure that informs its' action both at national and international levels and frame the protest in a socio-historical context, per the ongoing changes in the economic, social and cultural fields (Crook, Pakulski, Waters, 1992: 141/142). If social structures and cultural frames are, as Calhoun states, inseparable (Neveu, 1996: 74) so the more important it seems to support an analytical crossover underscoring the relations between structure and agency.

Portugal, a newcomer to the world of democratic nations and a member of the EU since 1986, has made a hard transition from the mainly agricultural society of the 1970s (Viegas J., Firmino A.: 17-43) to the Informational Economy (Cardoso, 1999) of the late 90s. Only recently has Portugal been able to draw closer to the European Union average standards of living. Following Veen e Inglehart's {REFERENCE?} (CROOK, PAKULSKI, WATERS; p.145/148) line of thought, some of the aims already present in other late modernity societies' collective action might be surfacing only now in Portugal.

Until the events of September 1999 Portugal and its civil society political participation, in the shape of social movements, had been mainly concerned with national and local agendas, with the media especially television and newspapers feebly incorporated by movements, such as trades unions and ecological groups,. As far as the use of the Internet is concerned, its involvement in the context of social protests before the events of September 1999 had also been somewhat low, with the exception of the Accessibility Campaign (Cheta R., 2002). Until 1998 the Internet had essentially been used by students through a government-funded network, which serves schools from first grade to the university, and by a small number of households and companies. Political parties had started to incorporate the role of the information society in their discourse from 1996 onwards and the first websites in political elections were conceived in the same year (Cardoso, 1999).

In the light of this context the Pro East Timor protests may just have represented a turning point in the civic participation in Portugal for several reasons: they introduced a new set of issues, namely the open defense of human rights; they developed around the need for a global reach, promoting the aim of collective action from the national to the

global level; new social actors took political stands, from individual citizens to national companies; the ICTs – traditional mass media (Macquail, D., 1998: 12-20) and new media (Silverstone R., 1999) – assumed a central role in the protests; and journalists participated actively on the mobilization of citizens and on the coordination of the movement.

All things considered, we argue the Pro East-Timor movement is not only of interest to the study of social movements in Portugal but also an interesting illustration of the evolution of such movements in what Giddens (1998) identified as late modernity

3. The pro East-Timor movement: a social movement?

In his proposal of readdressing Alain Touraine's classic categorization of social movements Manuel Castells (1997: 71) states two key ideas. First, that social movements must be understood in their own terms: namely they are what they say they are. Their practices (and foremost their discursive practices) are their self-definition (1997:69-70). Second, that the definition of a social movement stands on three principles: the movement's Identity, the movement's Adversary, and the movement's vision or social model, which he calls Societal Goal.

The Pro East-Timor movement identified an Adversary, that is, all those acting against the Maubere people – both those directly involved in the violence and those states which, by omission, were not helping to stop it – and had as a goal the request to stop the violence and achieve the presence of a multinational intervention force in the territory. Regarding its Identity, the movement - the result of an informal coalition of Portuguese citizens, Maubere associations and refugees, NGOs, civic associations, private companies and members of the State apparatus - spoke on behalf of the Maubere people, which could not make itself heard outside East-Timor.

Although assuming many different shapes, the Pro East-Timor movement had a common objective: 'to end the suffering of the Maubere people', that is, to stop such abuses as the killing and wounding of people, the lack of freedom of expression and the sexual abuse of women. We should then consider it, from an analytical perspective, a social movement geared towards the defense of human rights (Garner, 1996: 149) – even though, according to Cohen and Rai, the human rights movements have been poorly integrated into the social movements analysis, particularly the new social

movements literature (Cohen, Rai, 2000: 10). But this is a challenge rather than an obstacle: not only is the very development of human rights simply inconceivable outside the dynamic of new social movements (Baxi, 2000: 36) but the socialization of 'grievances' into causes of social praxis should be a staple theme of the social movements theory (Baxi, 2000: 37).

4. The role of traditional and new media in the pro East-Timor movement

Most of the events in our lives take place within contexts decisively influenced by information (Melluci, 1995: 434). The role of ICTs is then of particular interest for the understanding of the particularities of the pro East-Timor movement: they were a precious organizational resource, both in their traditional mass media and new media dimensions, in the emergence, organization and development of this movement. Not only did they become the organizational tools that made actions at the national and international level easier, but it was also through the traditional mass media that the cultural and political context of opportunity for the emergence of the East Timor protest was laid.

4.1. The role played by the traditional Mass Media and journalists

As Eder states, when approaching collective action we should take into consideration that it is inevitably mediated by culture (Pakulski, 1995: 67; Gibbins, Reimer, 1999: 96-97; Tarrow, 1998: 106). Both as a pre-condition for and as a result of social movements, action frames - conceived as carriers of meaning - are created, translating strains, conflicts and grievances into social action patterns (Maheu, 1995: 11) by resonating them with a population's cultural predispositions (Tarrow, 1998: 110). However although consensus formation can emerge concerning a given subject, only consensus mobilization will orient individuals to action (Tarrow, 1998: 113), not only by summoning the 'right' individual identity but also by prompting it to become connected to practices as well as ideas (Garner, 1996: 374).

It was thanks to the work of two free-lance journalists (ETAN, 2002) that the Portuguese population became truly aware of the drama of the Maubere people. On November 12th 1992 the massacre in Santa Cruz cemetery, Díli, was videotaped and

smuggled outside the territory, allowing it to be broadcasted worldwide. If it had a significant impact outside Portugal, it had a tremendous effect within its borders, because during the shootings one could hear and see people praying in Portuguese. These images did to the collective identity what the political parties and NGOs hadn't been able to achieve since the invasion of East-Timor in 1975: the establishment of a cultural link between the suffering of the Maubere people and the Portuguese people. It should be noted, then, that unlike the White March event in Belgium (Walgrave, 2000), the pro-East-Timor activism in Portugal largely preceded the media leverage of the social movement we have portrayed. There existed, for instance, the CDPM, a NGO created in 1981 to assure constant small-size, volunteer-based protests, and which was at the very genesis of some of the demonstrations that took place following the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre; also several organizations of catholic inspiration had acted in support of Maubere refugees living in Portugal since the mid-seventies. University students constituted another example of civic involvement in the East-Timorese cause, from informal groups acting at the students union levels they evolved to a formal group MEUDH (University Students for Human Rights), that promoted several demonstrations in Portugal and raised funds nationally to install a giant TV screen displaying the Santa Cruz massacre during the EU Treaty signing in Maastricht.

Credit should, then, be due to the catalyst power of images: just as in the case of the cultural link established in the Los Angeles riots, prompted by the broadcasting of video footage showing the beating of Rodney King, again the ICTs seem to make one activist as important and effective as a large group of activists; since camcorders are everywhere suddenly everybody is a potential reporter.

Traditional mass media are nonetheless the means through which the majority of citizens establish contact with the political sphere (Gibbins, Reimer, 1999: 106). Not only are social problems many times the result of media assimilation and interpretation of specific situations (Neveu, 1996: 97/98), but, and because of the latter, they give visibility to certain facts, including them in the political agenda, thus creating new modes of political discourse (Crook, Pakulski, Waters, 1992: 148) and changing the political field itself (Gibbins, Reimer, 1999: 106).

Although media become a tool movements cannot easily replace in reaching out to their potential supporters, such usage poses specific problems. First of all, it sets media world related boundaries for the movement discourse framing, if movements are to get adequate coverage (Garner, 1996: 31). Secondly, because of the specific media

issue-table - where competition for visibility is fierce, making such usage limited (Tarrow, 1998: 116) - movement actions often have to turn into more emotional 'performances' (Neveu, 1996: 93; Tarrow, 1998: 107; Touraine, 1981: 137).

Social movements have to manage information strategies in order to capture the attention of the media and use the acquired broadcasting time, or articles in a newspaper, in order to mobilize support and interact with the powers on the public arena. Those information strategies try to gain the attention of the media through emotional performances: such was the case of the Pro East-Timor protest. However, and in a way that should not be underestimated, in this case those strategies were initiated and promoted by the media system itself, namely by journalists.

To understand the real importance of the Portuguese media in this process we have once again to return to the analysis of the structural constraints and cultural-political opportunity context, under which the movement grew. Portugal, although being a member of the EU, is a country with medium-low diplomatic influence in the International scene and could not immediately deploy any military forces to East-Timor due to a set of institutional limitations. Those constraints were known to the public, namely because the media had for a long time dealt with the question of the human rights abuses towards the Maubere people. So the question people wanted answered was: 'if the politicians can't solve the problem, what can we do to help?' The media gave the answer by establishing an agenda destined to amplify the protest movement up to the point where it could reach the international decision makers.

In its analysis of the role of the radio in the pro East-Timor movement Proença argues that the TSF radio, during the non stop broadcasting - the first hundred hours without any commercial jingles, from 7PM September 5th to 11 PM September 9th -, acted not only as a news radio station but as a grassroots radio station (Proença, L., 2000).Further, 'if the news director wanted to generate "street effects" capable of capturing the attention of the international news media in order to be able to reach worldwide audiences and influence the political decision centres, particularly the countries with veto in the security council of the UN, that could only be achieved by promoting initiatives of highly emotional nature, that is, aimed at television broadcast' (Proença L., 2000).

Among the initiatives promoted by TSF, and later embraced by the national television broadcasters and newspapers, we can identify the following as being more effective in the mobilization of individuals and enhancing the human rights movement:

'A day dressed in white!', 'throw a flower to the river!' and 'stop the country for three minutes!'. Proença in his analysis of the role of TSF as a grassroots radio, describes how the choice of those initiatives was tied to the symbolic meaning and degree of media attention they could promote (Proença L., 2000).

In the 'A day dressed in white!' initiative the objective was to promote a common element to the different protests that were emerging: the colour white. White was chosen because it could be understood by different cultures, allowing for its message to be internationally amplified - white standing, in western cultures, for purity, for joy and happiness for Asians, and a symbol of respect for Muslims. White was adopted as the colour of protest and from TV anchors presenting news dressed in white to people with flags on their windows and cars, a unified element was incorporated by the protesters.

The second initiative was put forward by the need to mourn all those being killed in East-Timor. In the absence of bodies to mourn in traditional senses, people were invited to throw flowers into rivers so that they could symbolically unite both countries in their suffering. In order for the action to become more media oriented people were also invited to gather in front of the US Embassy in Lisbon.

The last event, again coordinated with other media and this time joined by Unions, was to 'stop the country for three minutes!'. This last event was widely publicised in the International media, since people stopped their cars on the streets, stopped walking, left their jobs to come out into the streets. The idea was simple: not to get just a moment's silence but to achieve a total stoppage to all activities in Portugal.

These forms of protest had two objectives: first, to give a unified structure to the protest movement and secondly, while doing so, to build the necessary synergies to make the abuses occurring in East-Timor known to international public opinion.

The radio news directors and radio journalists played an important organizational role on the mobilization process around East-Timor and, more important, they set and gave people the resources to express its solidarity through the participation in the actions promoted by the media. But that role was amplified from the moment newspapers and television joined the mobilization process.

During September 1999, the two leading daily national newspapers "O Público" and "Diário de Notícias" published, respectively, 399 and 350 articles about East-Timor. The weekly newspaper "Expresso" gave Timor 176 articles in four weekends.

The national news agency Lusa transmitted, on average 100 reports per day on the Timorese issue .

To the agenda setting promoted by the newspapers we must also add the publicizing of daily lists of hundreds of small scale initiatives promoted by individual citizens identifying companies selling goods imported from Indonesia, or the bank account numbers for donations for humanitarian aid.

From the analysis of the empirical data available about the production of news in the month of September 1999 we can say journalists choose to break away from the traditional impartiality of their editorial lines, which tended to promote political parties and interest groups agendas (Gibbins, Reimer, 1999: 114), and gave priority to the defense of cultural values, namely human rights. This decision was of essential importance because their knowledge of how the media system works gave the civil society the means to express their feelings into a collective action of high media visibility; this *know how* became a fundamental organizational asset.

Having chosen to follow this path, journalists through the media took the role of catalysts for a feeling already shared by the Portuguese population: being pro east-Timorese. As Carlos Andrade (Andrade, C., 1999), the news director of the TSF[1], stated in a interview, 'regarding the relationship between Portugal and East-Timor and in order to understand the protests, there are three paths worthwhile paying attention to: the politicians, who lived the situation without that many hopes for its resolution; the press, which sooner than everyone else understood the true issue; and the people, which kept Timor close to their hearts'.

Many of the actions promoted by journalists and editorial standings of the Portuguese press during that period seem to qualify as what Shah designates as development journalism: a kind of journalism that is concerned with social, cultural and political aspects of development, in addition to economic aspects; a kind of journalism that is democratic and emphasizes communication from the 'bottom up'; that is pragmatic and unconventional in its approach to reporting and that can encourage action, can help create, maintain and strengthen a mobilization space with news (Shah, 1999: 176-178).

Shah, therefore, envisions journalists as possible substitutes for the intellectuals' role under social movements: to provide energy for collective action by helping create a space for awareness and action (Shah, 1999: 176-178). Their identities, as the identity of

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[1] the leading Portuguese 24hours commercial news radio.

the social movement they gave impulse to, were interactively created (Shah, 1999: 176-178). We should, therefore, consider that journalists, during the East-Timor protests, played the leverage role of the latent social movement.

4.2. The role played by New Media

We have so far acknowledged that communication and traditional mass media, like in other social movements (Downing, 2000: 26), have played a fundamental role in the Pro-East Timor movement trajectories. However, although traditional mass media performed a fundamental role in the success of the East-Timor protest movement in Portugal, social movements often seem to be striving for the establishment of new platforms of communication (Garner, 1996: 375).

Manuel Castells states that the most influential social movements need the legitimacy and support provided by local groups, but must at the same time think local and act global, because the networks of power act simultaneously at different levels (Castells, 2001: 142/143).

The Internet played an important role during the years of Indonesian occupation of East-Timor. Since 1997 an Internet domain for Timor (.tp), managed by Connect-Ireland, was available online, hosting entities and organizations that supported the Timorese cause. Another example of the use of the Internet during the Indonesian occupation can be found on the information services destined to create awareness about East-Timor. Examples of such networks can be found on the Portuguese TimorNet (http://www.uc.pt/Timor), the American ETAN (http://www.etan.org), Mojo Wire (http://motherjones.com/east_timor/), the Australian news service Timor Today (http://www.easttimor.com) or the Indonesian Solidamor (http://www.solidamor.org). Hacking, or more accurately cracking, became another use of the Internet in order to protest against Indonesia. Between October 1997 and 2000, a group called "Portuguese Hackers Against Indonesia" launched intermittent attacks against Indonesian networks (Mckay, 1999). Their most successful hit was achieved in April 1997 when a group called 'toxyn' capped a two-month protest, over the Indonesian government's treatment of East Timor, by breaking into the Indonesian Military Network Homepage and altering the page. On February 1997, the group had started the protest by altering the homepage of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia. This altered homepage was online for 3 hours. Among other things, there was the title "Welcome to

the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Fascist Republic of Indonesia". After this first attack, Indonesian hackers countered by breaking into the East Timor site, hosted at Connect-Ireland and re-registered East Timor top-level domain names.

In the East-Timor protests many of the potential constituencies of the movement were geographically too distant from one another for face-to-face interaction to take place (Smelser, 1988/1989: 722). The actions promoted by the East-Timor protest had to act simultaneously in four continents: Asia (East-Timor and Indonesia), Oceania (where the closest intervention forces where placed and where the ASEAN meeting was being held), North America (where the USA was the traditional political ally of Indonesia, and the country where the Security Council of the UN is placed) and finally Europe (home of the EU and the place (primarily, but not exclusively, Portugal) where people were promoting a social movement in defense of the human rights of the Timorese). From the moment the main objective of the protesters became the deployment, in the shortest time possible, of a UN peacekeeping force in East-Timor, the use of the Internet as a resource was widely encouraged and, interestingly, promoted either by the traditional mass media, private telecommunication companies or by individuals on the web.

The website 'Guia do Activismo Online' (Silva, R. 2000), a web directory of social protests through the web, displayed in February 3rd 2000 a total of 60 actions of protest dedicated to East-Timor. Although many didn't display an online counter, it was known that more than 190,000 people used those websites to send emails to, among other decision makers, Bill Clinton – at the time President of the USA -, J.B.Habibie – former President of Indonesia – and the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

Solidarity with East-Timor	Situation	Support	Duration
Campanha "Militia: Terror Still in Refugee Camps"	Ongoing	458	Since 6/11/99
Petição "Contra o desarmamento das FALINTIL II"	Ongoing	278	Since 14/10/99
Petição "Contra o desarmamento das FALINTIL I"	Ongoing	276	Since 16/10/99
Petição "Science with East Timor"	Finished	349	Between 11 and 15/9/99
Campanha "Cordão humano mundial online por Timor"	Ongoing	425	Since 12/9/99
Campanha "Cordão Humano por Timor na Internet" (GUIA)	Ongoing	323	Since 10/9/99
Campanha "SOS Timor" (Portugal Telecom)	Finished	3.382	Between 9 and 15/9/99
Campanha "Um email por Timor" (Sapo)	Finished	100.627	Between 6 and 15/9/98
Petição "Contra o massacre em Timor I" (TSF)	Finished	42.865	Between 5 and 15/9/99
Petição "ONU em Timor Leste II" (SOS Timor)	Finished	9.600	Between 5 and 6/9/99
Petição "ONU em Timor Leste I" (Lusitânia Expresso)	Finished	32.163	Between 22/4 and 15/9/99
Situation as of 3 February 2000			

(http://members.tripod.com/~Protesto_MC/timor.html)

Other imaginative uses of the Internet during the September 1999 included a human chain that intended to multiply the references to East-Timor available on the World Wide Web, the distribution of banners about the lack of freedom of expression in Timor by the Portuguese Journalists Union, or the campaign Freed East Timor managed by the Portuguese ISP Netc who gave 1 cent for the reconstruction of the territory for each visit to their homepage.

The first actions using the Internet through emails and faxes started on September 5th. A web programmer offered help to the TSF radio station and got the numbers of fax machines and emails, via the internet, of the political decision makers at the UN, USA and Indonesia.

Soon after TSF, other media and commercial websites started their protest actions, and so the numbers and email addresses started to circulate in an informal, viral, way through the Internet so that soon many other websites were displaying similar texts to be sent to the UN and to the White House. In this process the ISP Portals and Telecom companies played a fundamental role. More than half of the emails sent were gathered through SAPO – the Portal of the leading Portuguese ISP – and Portugal Telecom created a fax gateway and free fax numbers through which people could send faxes (Portugal Telecom 1999) to the White House and Security Council fax-machines.

This participation of commercial companies (whose main objective is profit) in the protest campaign is one of its most interesting components. One can argue that under a situation of generalized popular discontentment with Indonesia and support to the Maubere people this kind of action can be looked at as a public relations investment or that under particular events national identity might still be a decisive element for the decision of private companies. The explanation might also, however, reside on the Internet's very own culture (Castells, 2001: 61). The companies that supported the protest, both technologically and financially, were new economy companies (Castells 2001:65), where the Internet culture is more widely present, and where the technocratic belief in the progress of humans through technology is more commonly accepted. Being those companies the holders of the technology – be it the portals or the Internet fax-gateways – necessary for the success of the movement's societal goals, it is possible to argue that in the Information Age social movements might include in their ranks not only citizens and NGOs but also some of the New Economy companies.

Another example of Internet protests actions was the online polls being conducted in their interactive services by the global media broadcasters like CNN or the BBC as shown in the table below.

Online Polls	Situation	Support	Duration
Send Portuguese soldiers to East-Timor? (Virtual Azores)	Finished	84% Yes	Between 12 and 15/9/99
Send US troops to East Timor? (MOJO Wire)	Finished	64% Yes	Between 10 and 15/9/99
Send UN troops to East Timor? (TIME)	Finished	65% Yes	Between 8 and 14/9/99
International force in East Timor? (Jakarta Post)	Finished	94% Yes	Between 9 and 10/9/99
Naciones Unidas en Timor ? (El Mundo)	Finished	98% Yes	Between 9 and 14/9/99
UN peacekeepers to East Timor? (CNN)	Finished	95% Yes	Between 7 and 10/9/99
Militares Portugueses para Timor? I (D. Digital)	Finished	94% Yes	Between 8 and 15/9/99
Imposto excepcional por Timor? (Público)	Ongoing	54% No	Since 8/9/99
East Timor: Time to Intervene? (BBC)	Finished	96% Yes	Between 7 and 9//9/99
Indonesia and East Timor (CNN)	Finished	52% Yes	07-09-1999
Situation as of 3 February 2000			

(http://members.tripod.com/~Protesto_MC/timor.html)

The online polls promoted by the BBC constitute one of the most interesting empirical examples gathered in this analysis because only half of the messages and responses came from Portugal, which gives us a notion of how the movement was evolving from the national to the global level. At the BBC Website, one could find messages from British and North-American citizens stating their support and underlining the similitude between East-Timor and Kosovo and the need for the International Community to have a common standard for human rights violations (Viegas H., Gomes S., 1999).

Web Search for Timor in February 2002		Messages exchanged including the word Timor	
WebPages in ...	Number	Newsgroups in ...	Messages Posted
English	600.000	English	27.400
Portuguese	38.800	Portuguese	3.390
Spanish	35.900	Indonesia	982
French	24.900	Italian	786
German	20.000	Dutch	784
Indonesian	19.300	French	534
Italian	18.200	Spanish	429
Dutch	7.410	German	208
Total WebPages	1.140.000	**Total of messages posted**	190.000
Source google		Source Dejanews 1-9-1999 to 30-9-1999	

Another example of how a national protest became one of global reach is the analysis of the web pages still available today about East-Timor and the number of

different languages they are expressed in, as shown by the table above. Similar analysis can be made about the origin and amount of posts in newsgroups during the month of September 1999.

Dutton reminds us, that the focus of the Information Age should not be 'information' but 'access'. Technology has not made information a new resource, for it has always been a critical resource; instead, it has changed the way we gain access to information and while doing so the ICTs have also redefined the ways in which we can access other people, services, and technologies themselves (Dutton, 2000: 172).

The ability to use technologies to access and process information more rapidly and to interconnect people around the world in real-time frames enabled the movement to reach its objectives. During the month of September the East-Timor protest slowly faded as events started to move towards the devised movement's societal goals. Interestingly, the enrolment of the international media became generalized only after the first set of images from the protests in the streets of Lisbon arrived to the international news agencies and emails appealing for support started to circulate widely on the Internet. The online polls were the confirmation that the problem was finally getting the attention of international public opinion. The battle for media coverage fought by the Pro East-Timor movement reached its objectives when the images of the siege on the UN compound in Dili were broadcast worldwide and it exemplified that the information blackout promoted by Indonesia could only confirm what the people were saying all over the Internet: that a violation of human rights was being perpetrated in East-Timor.

4.3. The outcome

Although the exact amount of emails and faxes sent between September 5 and 15th is not known, what we do know about the effect of the protest actions is that they led to the disconnection of several phone lines at the UN building in New York and at the White House. The Indonesian presidential web server was disconnected due to an overload of messages and the UN and White House servers from September 7th onward would not accept emails sent from the .pt domain (Viegas H., 1999).

On the other hand we can also relate these actions with the timing of the shift in the international community approach to the situation in East-Timor. Both Koffi Annan and Bill Clinton, recognized publicly the role played by the worldwide awareness campaign in the final outcome of the East-Timor peoples struggle (Bebiano, 1999). On

September 9th 1999, the very same day in which the Internet online polls of the BBC and CNN showed the widest support for a multinational force in East-Timor, the British P.M. Tony Blair and the President of the USA, Bill Clinton, made public their agreement on the need for a multinational force under the mandate of the UN to be dispatched. On the 12th Indonesia formally requested of the Secretary General of the UN the presence of a multinational force in East-Timor and on the 16th the Security Council approved the Resolution 1264 mandating the Secretary General to implement the sending of troops and interim administration of the territory. The Australian-led multinational force arrived in Díli, East-Timor, on September 20th 1999. We can argue that it took the Pro East-Timor movement eleven days of network actions combined with an integrated management of ICTs and the diplomatic action of the Portuguese State to put pressure over the Security Council in order to achieve a resolution.

5. The pro East-Timor protest as a networked social movement: bridging across and combining traditional and new media.

For many scholars, ICTs are potentially the first true public sphere, not only because they allow for massive and potentially uncensored knowledge to be shared (Ford, Gil, 2000: 202/203) but also because they compensate the near monopoly of radio and television given to the older groups such as parties and interest groups (Gibbins, Reimer, 1999: 114). Contemporary social movements tend to have in common the assimilation of the ICTs as instruments of action and organization. But, although the Internet is becoming the central axis of action allowing social movements to act globally, we should question whether ICTs play such a purely instrumental role in developing citizenship and political expression or if, on the other hand, by taking part of the political system, they can go as far as changing its rules (Castells, 2001: 137). On the other hand, we should not overlook the integration of traditional mass media by social movements, the role-played by journalists and other social actors – for instance, the new economy companies – in the process.

This movement here depicted developed under the characteristics of the social movements of the Information Age (Castells 2001: 140). Like the December 1999 protests against the WTO (Castells 2001: 141), the East-Timor movement was a specific coalition for specific goals, focusing on cultural values - the defense of human rights -,

acting from the local in an attempt to influence the global - that is, the political decision process at the UN -, and using ICTs as a fundamental tool for the success of their actions. The displayed visual symbolism acted as an assembler of the collective identities of the Portuguese people towards the suffering of the Maubere people and set the pre-conditions for the eruption, in September 1999, of collective action for the defence of human rights.

Like Castells and Touraine [references?], (CASTELLS, 2001; TOURAINE, 1981).we argue that the novelty in contemporary social movements might be found in the network, but if the network is the prevalent organizational form, surfacing from the integration of the Internet, the achievement of the movement's goals can only occur when combined strategies of traditional and new media usage are implemented. That is why, though considering the East-Timor protest movement as a networked social movement, it is our belief that we can only consider a social movement truly networked when it achieves the combined use of the traditional Mass Media and New Media as organizational resources and linkages to reference groups. The table presented here summarizes the integration of the different ICTs in the achievement of the Pro East-Timor movement's goals.

Media integration by the pro East-Timor Movement

	Emergence	Mobilization	Organization and coordination	Protest	Range
Fax	-	-	-	Yes	International
Television	Yes	Yes	-	-	International
Radio	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	National
Newspapers	-	Yes	-	-	National
World Wide Web	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	International
Email	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	International
Chat	-	Yes	-	-	International
Newsgroups	-	Yes	-	-	International

The analysis of the Pro East Timor movement shows how social movements might themselves be changed due to the interactions they establish with different ICTs. Under the analysis developed here it was also shown how the social integration of ICTs by the protest movement influenced the role played by specific information mediators, the journalists, and social actors - as the new economy companies.

Analysing the Pro East-Timor movement we can find the novelty of such protest in the fusion between media and movement, especially through the participation of agents seldom directly involved in the organization of such protests (journalists and new economy companies). The way traditional and new media were brought together,

informing and orientating each other's action, constitutes another dimension of the novelty associated with this protest, showing how ICT's facilitate traditional forms of protest and become both a tool and a target for collective action.

Looking at the movement, from the political opportunity structure and societal context standpoint, it can be observed that the lack of direct diplomatic influence by the Portuguese state on the international level obliged the protesters to take on other repertoires of direct (new media mediated) and indirect (mass media mediated) action. It did so, without using a clear and rigid organization, but a fluid network-like set of informal ties, which allowed protests to give way to their opinions, much of which had, from the resource mobilization point of view, both the grassroots guidance of the new and the traditional media.

Taking into consideration the expressed above, it can be argued that the Pro East-Timor movement represents a clear example of the role played by the new media in the social movements achievement of their goals. The background of newly embraced late modern values and the catalyst power of images and Internet communication succeeded where formal and institutional action had failed.

Maybe Russell Dalton has been able to capture the essence of what is new about the contemporary social movements: they have greater discretionary resources, enjoy easier access to the media, have cheaper and faster geographic mobility and cultural interaction, and can call upon the collaboration of different types of movement-linked organizations for rapidly organized issue campaigns (Tarrow, 1998: 207/208). Now we must understand also how those elements are combined together towards the achievement of their societal goals. The evidence of the Pro East Timor Movement's use of digital media raises new questions in the study of social movements. How can traditional and new media be combined in mobilizing and protesting towards the achievement of the social movements goals? Can it be that the Internet culture, which promotes the technocratic belief in the progress of humans through technology, is transforming social movements by incorporating new economy companies as social actors for collective actions? Are journalists replacing or joining intellectuals in their traditional role of framing, construction of collective identities and leverage of latent social movements?

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[i] During the years of occupation of the territory, the population suffered systematic violations of human rights, confirmed by international independent organizations and individuals, which led to accusations of genocide being perpetrated by Indonesia against the Timorese people.

The award of the Nobel Prize for Peace in December 1996 to two Timorese, the Catholic Bishop Ximenes Belo and the Foreign Minister of the Timorese Resistance Movement, Ramos Horta, marked a turning point in the awareness of the International community towards the situation faced on this part of the Timor island.

In the beginning of May 1999 Indonesian President Suharto was forced out of office by Indonesian student-led demonstrations and replaced by B.J.Habibie. This change in the internal politics of Indonesia, combined with an increase of worldwide public opinion support to Xanana Gusmão, facilitated a breaking of the stalemate in the negotiations between Portugal (the international recognized administrative power of the territory), the United-Nations and Indonesia. An agreement between the three parties was reached in the May 6th 1999 and the date of August the 8th was chosen for the implementation of a referendum destined to ask the Timorese people for their views about the future of the territory.

The people were asked to choose between a special autonomy, integrating East-Timor in the Republic of Indonesia, or to reject the autonomy leading consequently to separation from the Republic of Indonesia. After outbreaks of violence across the territory, the referendum was postponed to August 30th and on the 4th of September the results were finally known: 78,5% of the 410.000 participants rejected the autonomy and the path to independence was open for the territory.

The next 16 days were characterised by fierce violence perpetrated by armed militias against the supporters of independence, violence that led to the killings of five to seven thousand and the displacement of several hundred thousand people. Indonesian armed and police forces gave wide support to the violence of the militias until the 20th September, when the United Nations supported International Peace Keeping Force (INTERFET) arrived at the Timor Capital, Díli. The INTERFET implemented the retreat of the Indonesian army, disarmed the armed militias, and implemented the arrival of a UN transitory administration on the territory.